



**Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission**  
(JMEC)

**REPORT BY**

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**ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE  
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**FOR THE PERIOD**

**FEBRUARY – APRIL 2017**

**JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN**

## **I. Introduction**

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 5 of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) and covers the period 1<sup>st</sup> February to 30<sup>th</sup> April 2017.
2. The report highlights the prevailing political, security, humanitarian and economic situation in the Republic of South Sudan and their impact on the implementation of the peace agreement, or lack thereof. This report also recommends measures that should be taken to create a condition conducive for the realisation of peace and effective implementation of the ARCSS.

## **II. Status of the Implementation of the Peace Agreement (ARCSS)**

### *Overview*

3. Whilst there is evidence of greater commitment and determination on the part of the current TGoNU, the regional and international community and JMEC members to forge ahead with implementation of the ARCSS, real progress and tangible results are still lacking. The political, security, economic and humanitarian situation in South Sudan continues to deteriorate.
4. In March and April, the security situation deteriorated considerably with a pattern of increased vindictive violence and retaliatory attacks unleashed against the civilian population. This has in turn further exacerbated an already dire humanitarian and economic situation, in what I referred to as a "crisis within a crisis" in my address to the JMEC plenary meeting of April 2017. The growing hostility and insecurity drives people off the land, affects productivity and commerce, sends prices skyrocketing, which results in hunger and threatens the increased spread of famine.
5. The challenge now is that across the board, there appears to be a systemic failure of command and control. The bulk of the violence being perpetuated by parties to the ARCSS, or their affiliates, is increasingly based on local decisions taken at local levels without higher authorisation. This is further complicated by the emergence into the conflict of other armed actors, not affiliated to or controlled by forces allied to any party to the peace agreement. It has made enforcement of the permanent ceasefire, and monitoring thereof impossible as one group may declare allegiance to one leader today and to another tomorrow, but evidently takes no command or instruction for their action. However, this does not

exonerate the principal signatories to the ARCSS from their obligations to exercise control and restraint.

6. There is an urgent need to stop the proliferation of new armed groups, restore and enforce the permanent ceasefire, embrace a political dialogue and restore inclusivity into the peace process. In this regard, JMEC calls upon the regional and international community to speak with one voice in condemning any proposition of violence and engage with all parties who seek a return to the full implementation of the ARCSS.
7. In this reporting period, JMEC convened three Plenaries and received briefings from the TGoNU and considered reports from the different Agreement institutions and mechanisms on the implementation of the Agreement. In summary, all the reports indicate some new developments and movement in the right direction, even though the progress remains too slow and fraught with many challenges.
8. To further enhance our oversight role, promote inclusivity and participatory monitoring and evaluation of the ARCSS, JMEC established six Thematic Working Committees responsible for each of the chapters of the Agreement to work in close consultation with the three TGoNU clusters – Governance, Humanitarian and Service Delivery respectively. Five of these Working Committees have met and been fully constituted, elected Chairpersons and developed matrices for their evaluation. I am grateful to all the members of JMEC, including the TGoNU, for their strong support in ensuring that this initiative commenced well and is progressing in a very positive and collaborative manner.
9. The Thematic Working Committees support JMEC's work, provide advice and recommend remedial action to be considered by the TGoNU and other bodies responsible for implementation of the Agreement. With strong commitment by all members and stakeholders, the Thematic Working Committees will provide considerable leverage in the discharge of the mandate of JMEC going forward.
10. There has also been some improvement particularly in the opening of new humanitarian corridors for food relief to reach the famine stricken areas in South Sudan. However, JMEC remains extremely concerned about the safety of humanitarian operators and the constraints affecting free and unfettered access imposed by the government and the armed opposition. Humanitarian organisations will continue to face severe setbacks as the security outlook in most areas of the country appears to be deteriorating as fighting continues.

11. JMEC continues to receive reports of ceasefire violations from CTSAMM and has submitted ten (10) specific violation reports to the authorities of both the SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO. JMEC has yet to receive feedback from the aforementioned authorities on the reports or actions undertaken to address the concerns raised.
12. The Joint Military Ceasefire Committee (JMCC) is pressing forward with cantonment planning, and is currently focusing efforts on two (02) sites near Juba. I welcome the announcement by the TGoNU on 27 April 2017 regarding the allocation of some funds for cantonment. The timely disbursement of the funds to the JMCC will be critical to facilitate its work in preparing the cantonment sites, as well as developing and training of the Area Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (AJMCC) and Joint Military Ceasefire Teams (JMCT's), and conducting joint site surveys of the projected cantonment sites throughout the country.
13. Members of an advance party of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) arrived in Juba but the rest of the Force has not yet been deployed. The RPF is essential to support the demilitarisation and pacification of Juba and its environs, as well as in creating a conducive environment for the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
14. The economic crisis in South Sudan continues, driven by declining oil production, low oil prices and decline in food production. The South Sudanese Pound (SSP) continues to depreciate and inflation remains high. However the economic measures implemented by the TGoNU to enhance economic stability have had some success.

## **Chapter I**

### **Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan**

15. The National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) is now fully constituted and is finally making substantial progress in the execution of its tasks as stipulated under Art. 13 of Chapter 1 of the ARCSS. The NCAC has completed the drafting of the Constitutional Amendment Bill (2017) incorporating provisions of the Agreement into the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011). The Constitutional Amendment Bill was officially presented to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs on April 13, 2017. The Minister has prepared a memo presenting the draft Bill to the TGoNU Council of Ministers. I now call upon the TGoNU to expedite this process and ensure that the

Amendment Bill is presented for adoption by the TNLA and subsequently ratified by the President within the mandated period.

16. Although the process for the ratification of the draft Constitutional Amendment Bill (2017) is yet to be concluded, the finalisation of the draft Constitutional Amendment Bill is a significant milestone that has been achieved. The incorporation of the ARCSS into the TCRSS 2011 makes it possible for the TGoNU to commence the Permanent Constitution making process. The TGoNU therefore should finalise this process and take immediate steps to initiate the Permanent Constitution making process.
17. Upon completion of the first phase of its tasks, the NCAC has now embarked on revising other relevant national legislations – including the Political Parties Act, 2012; National Elections Act, 2012; SPLA Act, 2009; National Security Act, 2014; Police Service Act, 2009; Prisons Service Act, 2011; Wildlife Service Act, 2011 and others – to ensure that they conform to the Agreement. The TGoNU should further enhance its cooperation with the NCAC in order to expedite the process.
18. The National Dialogue initiative of H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, is yet to take shape. The President recently reconstituted the National Dialogue Steering Committee, and made a commitment to guarantee the safety of participants in the process. JMEC welcomes the President's National Dialogue initiative and the reconstitution of the Steering Committee, and urges that it should be used to promote reconciliation and facilitate the return of estranged parties and aggrieved communities into the peace process.
19. In my considered view, a genuine and inclusive National Dialogue process would complement the ARCSS, encourage a cessation of hostilities and enable all parties to engage in a political process that would lead to a ceasefire and create conditions conducive to its inclusive implementation.

## **Chapter II**

### **Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements**

20. There were increased hostilities and major violations of the ceasefire in the months of March and April. Despite the call for a unilateral ceasefire by IGAD in the same period, fighting between government and opposition forces continued in different parts of the country. The border town of Pajok in Equatoria was attacked by SPLA-IG forces resulting in the death of sixteen people and the destruction of a school and hospital; three oil

workers were abducted by opposition forces in the North but eventually released. Fighting also broke out in Wau, Eastern Lakes state, and clashes occurred in Western Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Unity states resulting in the reported death of 50 civilians.

21. There are reports of continuing and increasing incidents of targeted and retaliatory killings, sexual violence, torture and destruction of farmland and property, committed by uniformed forces as well as Other Armed Groups (OAGs). The main highways and commercial transit arteries remain highly dangerous due to the large number of robberies, ambushes and murders. The extent to which these incidents can be attributed to forces aligned with the TGoNU, the Opposition Groups or OAG's, is very difficult to prove because of the growing complexities of the conflict.
22. Some of the confrontations were allegedly between cattle raiders motivated by the desire to acquire more livestock and control of resources such as land, food and water rather than political affiliations. As a result, increasing numbers of people were reported to be fleeing these areas, and in many cases the country, to avoid or escape the cycle of violence – be it by uniformed forces confronting political opponents, OAGs staking their influence, or opportunistic elements, criminal or pastoral communities competing for resources.

#### *Ceasefire Violations*

23. Verification of violations of the ceasefire remains complex due to the split of SPLM-IO, the proliferation of unidentified OAGs and non-signatories to the Agreement which do not fall under CTSAMM's verification and investigation operations mandate. JMEC issued ten (10) specific violation reports to both the SPLM and SPLM-IO authorities and is yet to receive feedback on them or on subsequent and substantive actions taken.

#### *Status of Transitional Security Arrangements Mechanisms*

24. The work within the Transitional Security Arrangements mechanisms such as the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the Joint Integrated Police-Management Team (JIP-MT) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) continue, albeit at different paces, with varying results and impact. However, these institutions continue to strive to build operational capacity under and aligned with the ARCSS.

#### *The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission*

25. The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) has been meeting routinely with their focus on developing and implementing their Chapter II responsibilities including cantonment of forces, National Architecture development and other security related activities. The National Architecture, which includes the Area Joint Military Ceasefire Committees (AJMCCs) and the Joint Military Ceasefire Teams (JMCTs), is yet to be established due to a persistent lack of funding and resources. The main goal of the National Architecture will be to support cantonment operations and other verification duties for TGoNU. The JMCC is pressing forward with cantonment planning, and is currently focusing efforts on two (02) sites near Juba, (Tandere Pilot Cantonment Site and Molbor Cantonment Transition Site).
26. The Molbor site is currently undergoing de-mining assessment, after which the TGoNU will contract an entity to clean and clear the site for development. With the release of funds for cantonment, announced by the TGoNU on 27 April 2017, the JMCC should be able to move forward with preparations of the Molbor and Tendere sites, develop and train the AJMCCs and CMJTs, and conduct joint site surveys of the projected cantonment sites throughout South Sudan.
27. Lastly, the JMCC rotated the Chairmanship of the Commission from the SPLM-IG to the SPLM-IO effective 1 February 2017.

#### *The Joint Operations Centre*

28. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which had been established, remains non-operational. Currently the compound and buildings dedicated for the JOC are secured and constructed; however, the installation of the required communications and other electronic equipment is yet to be completed. 95% of the personnel required to support the JOC have been identified and assigned. The remaining tasks are the training of the assigned JOC personnel and the clarification of the de-confliction mechanisms to be used in JOC operations in coordination of all security actors within Juba.

#### *The Joint Integrated Police*

29. The recently appointed JIP Management Team is coordinating with multiple agencies such as JMEC, UNDP, SSNPS, UNPOL and various partners to regenerate the JIP training facility and mechanisms in Rajaf (30km outside Juba). There are approximately 1,000 trainees, both male and female and from both opposition and government, on site and

engaged with the training program. Some issues of concern and delay are being encountered with the JIP program. Most notably the failure of the TGoNU to 'approve' the registration of Opposition JIP for securing their National Identifications, which are required for the personnel to subsequently receive a JIP Certification and be eligible for deployment under the program. This approval lies with both the Inspector General of Police and the Minister of Interior, and to date it is unclear as to where exactly the obstruction lies with these security clearances. Also, the JIP trainees are suffering from lack of food and water at the facility, which is resulting in the trainees not showing up for classes and drills.

### *Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism*

30. CTSAMM continues to report obstructions to the freedom of movement of its Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) in the Equatoria's, Upper Nile and Western Bahr el Ghazal regions, particularly in the immediate aftermath of high profile and widely reported violations.
31. The significant restrictions on freedom of movement in their operational areas due to the activity of many armed groups, together with intransigence by those allied to SPLA-IO (Machar), adversely impacts on their ability to report across the country. Despite these obstructions, CTSAMM has managed to conduct many patrols and tasks, including Long-Duration Patrols and, as a result, have been able to report violations through their Board and JMEC and to the host nation officials.
32. CTSAMM verification reports attribute violations of the permanent ceasefire to both SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO.
33. Whilst CTSAMM appreciates the administrative and force protection it receives from UNMISS, the absence of dedicated force protection units that can deploy in a timely manner hampers its operations and seriously impedes CTSAMM's ability to report on critical violations.
34. CTSAMM has also reported human rights violations such as killings, rape, arbitrary arrests and detention, looting, burning of people, including children, inside houses and vehicles, denial of movement for civilians, blocking of humanitarian convoys and denying people access to humanitarian assistance.
35. CTSAMM has increased its footprint in the country and is now able to deploy up to 14 MVTs in support of its mandate and tasks. This increase has in most cases been supported and hosted within UNMISS Temporary

Operating Bases. CTSAMM continues its verification of the Transitional Security Arrangements in Juba, support to the JMCC and the JIP training at the Rajaf Police Training Academy. The TGoNU has authorized and is planning cantonment of SPLA-IO forces in Molbor and Tendere and CTSAMM will work closely with the JMCC in respect of this.

36. CTSAMM's assessment based on its monitoring and verification reports during the quarter is that the security situation has continued to deteriorate dramatically as the fighting persists, ethnic tensions and wide scale displacement has accelerated. In addition, all warring parties have failed to control their forces and cease hostilities.

#### *Strategic Defence and Security Review Board*

37. The reconstituted Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board has not met since December, and is constrained by lack of resources. The JMEC Secretariat continues to work closely with the SDSR Chairperson to reactivate their activities and has offered to facilitate a planned workshop. A draft Strategic Security Assessment and draft Defence Policy have been developed but require review, revision and editing by the SDSR Board before they can be presented to the TGoNU for consideration.
38. The work of the SDSR Board has a critical impact on other Chapter II processes, such as Cantonment and DDR, and therefore it must resolve its funding difficulties and get back on schedule. At the very least it must provide a set of planning parameters regarding eligibility for service within the security forces and broad guidance for the DDR Commission.

#### *The Regional Protection Force (RPF)*

39. The status of the Regional Protection Force remains unclear and although recent deployment of members of an advanced party is noteworthy, the deployment of the main body of the RPF still remains undetermined with no defined timelines as to deployment of the body, or the completion of the site preparations and infrastructures required for the RPF base(s).

### **Chapter III**

#### **Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction**

40. The humanitarian condition in the Republic of South Sudan is precarious and continues to deteriorate. The conflict in South Sudan has reportedly

resulted in internal displacement of an estimated 2 million people and 1.8 million refugees living in neighbouring countries.

41. During the reporting period, famine was declared in counties of Leer and Mayendit, where an estimated 100,000 people were at risk of dying and a further one million were reported to be at risk of starvation. The UN warns further that a third county, Koch, is also at the brink of famine. Besides the on-going conflict, the lean season for farmers from July to September is expected to exacerbate the problem of food insecurity in the country.
42. Whilst the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the country is attributed to several causes, the persistence of armed hostilities is the main factor. In April alone, more than 200,000 people were reportedly displaced due to escalation of conflicts in multiple areas of the country.
43. Renewed offensives in Yuai, Waat, Tonga and Kodok areas in Jonglei resulted in the displacement of between 50,000 and 100,000 people. In Upper Nile, at least 25,000 people fled to Aburoc and Sudan because of renewed fighting and the government offensive on the West Bank of the River Nile. In Central Equatoria, the persistence of hostilities has led to heightened reported cases on gender-based violence against women and girls, including killings, particularly in and around Yei town.
44. On two separate days in April, 31 women were raped by the forces meant to protect them. The violations in Yei prompted a protest from the community who demanded that the Governor remove the forces responsible for the violence against women and provide access for women to leave Yei town as their protection is not being guaranteed.
45. High level of destruction of property was reported in the opposition-held territory of Tore, Yei. The UNSAT analysis of satellite image in early March suggests that at least 18,300 structures could have been destroyed, and more than 150 huts burnt in Bori Boma in late April.
46. The reported eviction by government authorities of more than 6,600 internally displaced persons (IDPs) sheltering at the compound of the Episcopal Church of Sudan in Wau town in March, and their forced relocation to Hai Masna, has raised concerns regarding the plight, dignity and safety of civilians caught up in conflict, particularly the IDPs.
47. The intensification of hostilities between belligerents during the reporting period has also significantly hampered the work of humanitarian aid

workers resulting in the evacuation and relocation of some workers. The spread of hostilities in the West Bank of River Nile in March and April, for instance, compelled the humanitarian organisations to relocate their staff from Kodok and Aburoc.

48. In mid-April, heavy fighting between armed groups in Raja town resulted in civilians deserting the town and looting of at least three humanitarian compounds, including an NGO warehouse that had supplies meant to support at least 1,200 children. Unknown armed group killed seven humanitarian workers in March 2017 making it the worst incident since the outbreak of violence in December 2013.
49. The concerns highlighted above suggest that the humanitarian organisations will continue to face severe setbacks as the security outlook in most areas of the country appears to be deteriorating as parties continue to violate the permanent ceasefire with impunity.
50. As reported in response to the IGAD Communique of March 27, JMEC welcomed the decision of the Governments of the Republic of the Sudan and Kenya to open humanitarian corridors through their borders and for the generous donation by the Government of Sudan to the suffering people of South Sudan. JMEC urged that negotiations towards the opening of other humanitarian corridors and trade routes be expedited.
51. The steps taken so far, immediately following the IGAD Communiqué, have been positive but inconclusive on the status of humanitarian access. The UN OCHA reports that of the USD 1.6 billion required for the South Sudan 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan only USD 442.7 million, 27 per cent, has been received thus far.

## **Chapter IV**

### **Resource Economy and Financial Management Arrangements**

#### *Economic Trends*

52. The civil conflict together with depressed oil prices, continues to weigh heavily on economic conditions within South Sudan. The economy has contracted markedly, due to declining production of oil, but also within the agriculture sector. Oil revenues are not only the dominant revenue resource for the government but are also the main source of international currency for financing imports. Thus, marked shifts in production and prices have huge economic impacts, both on the budget and on financing

domestic consumption and investments. GDP, calculated in USD, is estimated to fall by 80 percent over the two-year period 2014/15 to 2016/17.

53. The fiscal deficit moved from 3 per cent of GDP in 2013/14 to 31 per cent in 2015/16. However preliminary indications are that a tighter budget, more effective controls of budget execution, better than projected oil prices combined with the moderating impact of the exchange rate changes, has resulted in a substantive reduction in the deficit in the first half of 2016/17.
54. The actions of the authorities to monetize the large fiscal deficit occurring in 2015/16 led to unusually strong money growth, a large exchange rate depreciation and consequently severe inflation. The lingering impact of this policy stance continues to date, despite a temporary respite in inflation in the last quarter of 2016, and notwithstanding the more recent prudent approach in the 2016/17 budget in addressing the fiscal deficit. Indeed, since December 2016 the exchange rate has been steadily weakening reaching a peak of 200 SSP/USD in April 2017 in the parallel market before falling back to a range of 140 – 160 SSP/USD.
55. Given the country's high dependence on imports, the precipitous slide in the currency value translates almost immediately to high levels of inflation. Shortfalls in domestic food production have further exacerbated the import situation thus placing an increasing burden on the most vulnerable within society. Prices in April were almost 5 per cent higher than in March. On an annual basis, inflation is declining due to the cumulative effects of tighter fiscal policies, but inflation still stood at 273 per cent in April.

### *Economic Outlook*

56. If South Sudan continues to pursue tight fiscal and monetary policies aimed at lowering deficits, inflation and exchange rate depreciation is expected to moderate further thus contributing to an improvement in overall economic stability. However net oil revenues cannot be expected to increase significantly soon, given the present oil price and production trends. It is likely that South Sudan will continue to find itself in a very difficult budget situation over the medium term. Thus, new domestically financed spending related to development will have to entail reallocations within the present budget envelope.

57. Despite these budgetary constraints, an end to the hostilities should bring about peace dividends for the people of South Sudan. The present threats to life and property will recede, and people will be able to return home. Farmers can resume cultivating their land, and thereby increase the supply of food in the markets. Safer transport routes and more stable economic conditions will additionally add to marketable goods and stimulate economic activity. Initiating broad development initiatives requires peace. However, planning for post conflict development should start now to ensure that a framework is in place that can offer the best use of available resources when hostilities cease.

## **Chapter V**

### **Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing**

58. The Technical Committee for the National Consultative Process for the Establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), established by the Ministry of Justice, has resumed its meetings. Like all other institutions and mechanisms established pursuant to this Agreement, the work of this Committee has been beset by lack of resources, inadequate representation of all parties, and concerns over the growing insecurity which undermines confidence in the overall peace process, limits consultations with and participation of other key constituents and stakeholders out of Juba.
59. The Technical Committee has completed its first tasks of identifying and mapping out the areas most affected by the conflict for purposes of planning its sensitization and future consultations. It now plans to embark on a nation-wide sensitization campaign – resources and security permitting – to create awareness and elicit the views of the affected communities in the pursuit of truth, healing and reconciliation, as well as appropriate compensation and reparation as provided for under Chapter V of the ARCSS.
60. The Hybrid Court for South Sudan remains an important component of the Transitional Justice package as provided for under Chapter V of the ARCSS and JMEC continues to engage with the African Union Commission's Office of the Legal Counsel to assess progress if any, and steps already taken in this direction. The establishment of this mechanism is a responsibility of the African Union Commission, in collaboration with the TGoNU and the TNLA, and JMEC calls upon the concerned parties to adhere to this critical task earnestly.

## **Chapter VI**

### **Parameters of Permanent Constitution**

61. The completion by the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) of its initial task of incorporating the ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011 provides the opportunity for the TGoNU to immediately initiate the Permanent Constitution making Process as provided for under Chapter VI of the ARCSS. JMEC urges the TGoNU to publicly initiate this important process, enact the necessary legislation to reconstitute the National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) in accordance with the ARCSS, and commence the Permanent Constitution making process without further delay. This is indispensable if democratic elections are to take place at the end of the Transition Period.

## **Chapter VII**

### **Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission**

62. As Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) I have continued my engagements with the TGoNU, particularly with H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, and H.E. General Taban Deng Gai, the First Vice President. I have also engaged in further diplomatic missions with the leadership of the United Nations, the African Union Commission, IGAD, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as the various Special Envoys. I have also spoken to other prominent South Sudanese political leaders, and estranged parties to the Agreement, all with the intention of finding a path out of the current crisis.
63. Throughout my diplomatic engagements with the leaders of the region, the AUC, IGAD, UN, Troika, EU and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan, I shared our 'One Voice' initiative on South Sudan and appealed for the need to speak with one voice and encourage them to align their messages and actions to prevent the situation in South Sudan from further deterioration.
64. I also reiterated JMEC's concerns over the significant and unacceptable increase in hostilities and violence across the country that has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. The proliferation of new armed groups not only threatens the fabric of South Sudanese society but further complicates the challenges already facing implementation of the ARCSS.

65. I also met with former First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar, former leader of the Other Political Parties within JMEC, Dr. Lam Akol, and former detainees and other South Sudanese leaders in the region to appeal to them for peace and a return to implementation of the ARCSS. The South Sudanese leadership should be willing to listen to each other, make compromises and politically accommodate each other. My appeal remains: renounce violence, declare and observe a ceasefire and engage in dialogue to find a political solution.

### **III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Observations**

66. The political, security and economic situation in South Sudan therefore remains precarious and not conducive for the full implementation of the ARCSS. The recent escalation of armed violence resulted from the July 2016 clashes in Juba which was a flagrant violation of the permanent ceasefire by both parties (SPLA-IG/IO). This remains the primary factor exacerbating the worsening economic and humanitarian situation, and is an impediment to inclusive political and social progress in the country. The growing insecurity continues to cause civilian flight, displacement and constitutes an obstacle to humanitarian access and implementation of the ARCSS. Therefore, unless the fighting stops, the economic and humanitarian situation will continue to worsen, more lives will continue to be at risk and responses will be further obstructed. As the main guarantors of the ARCSS, the IGAD leaders must take urgent and practical measures to revitalize its implementation.
67. It is my considered opinion and recommendation that, the regional and international guarantors of the ARCSS, led by IGAD should declare a definitive period for all the conflicting parties in South Sudan to choose whether they want peace or intend to wage a violent struggle. They should persuade the parties to engage in dialogue and resume full implementation of the ARCSS immediately.

## **Recommendations**

### **To TGoNU:**

- I. Declare a comprehensive ceasefire throughout the country and commit to unfettered CTSAMM verification.
- II. Expedite the deployment of the RPF to Juba by eliminating any conditionalities and avail requisite enablers.
- III. Complement the implementation of the ARCSS with a genuine and inclusive National Dialogue initiative to address other grievances and underlying issues affecting communities in the Republic of South Sudan.
- IV. Ensure free and unfettered humanitarian access and the opening of all major corridors and trading routes.
- V. Expedite the Constitutional Amendment Bill 2017 process to finalise incorporation of the ARCSS into the TRCSS 2011.
- VI. Immediately initiate the Permanent Constitution making process to ensure a timely promulgation of the Permanent Constitution.
- VII. Convene regular meetings of the High Level Humanitarian Oversight Committees at least monthly to enable timely information sharing and TGoNU action.
- VIII. Stay on course in the economic stabilization plan by ensuring that both fiscal and monetary policy implementation continues to support stabilization, to ensure that the gains achieved in the last quarter of 2016 are not reversed.
- IX. Develop a 3 – 5-year economic development plan in accordance with article 2.2.1.1 in Chapter IV of the ARCSS to provide a long-term framework for ensuring effective use of limited resources for rebuilding and developing the economy.

### **To the regional and International Community:**

- I. Condemn all forms of violence by all Parties in South Sudan and underscore the need for a permanent and inclusive ceasefire.
- II. Exert pressure on the TGoNU to facilitate the expeditious deployment of the RPF.
- III. Speak with one voice and coordinate their actions to support a peaceful path in South Sudan.
- IV. IGAD to convene a summit to address the deteriorating political, humanitarian and security situation in South Sudan.
- V. The AU to expedite the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and provide relevant support to the comprehensive transitional justice and accountability efforts in South Sudan.
- VI. The UN, AU and IGAD to jointly appeal to member states to mobilise resources to address the humanitarian funding gap.