



**Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
(RJMEC)**

REPORT BY

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**ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVITALISED
AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

FOR THE PERIOD

1st January to 31st March 2019

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List of Acronyms

<i>AJMCCs</i>	<i>Area Joint Military Ceasefire Committees</i>
<i>AU</i>	<i>African Union</i>
<i>AUC</i>	<i>African Union Commission</i>
<i>CoHA</i>	<i>Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access</i>
<i>CRA</i>	<i>Compensations and Reparations Authority</i>
<i>CTSAMVM</i>	<i>Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism</i>
<i>DDR</i>	<i>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</i>
<i>FDs</i>	<i>Former Detainees</i>
<i>HCSS</i>	<i>Hybrid Court for South Sudan</i>
<i>HLRF</i>	<i>High Level Revitalisation Forum</i>
<i>IBC</i>	<i>Independent Boundaries Commission</i>
<i>IGAD</i>	<i>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</i>
<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Internally Displaced Persons</i>
<i>JIP</i>	<i>Joint Integrated Police</i>
<i>JDB</i>	<i>Joint Defense Board</i>
<i>JMCC</i>	<i>Joint Military Ceasefire Commission</i>
<i>JTSC</i>	<i>Joint Transitional Security Committee</i>
<i>MVTs</i>	<i>Monitoring and Verification Teams</i>
<i>NCAC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Amendment Committee</i>
<i>NPTC</i>	<i>National Pre-Transitional Committee</i>
<i>OCHA</i>	<i>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</i>
<i>OPP</i>	<i>Other Political Parties</i>
<i>PCTSA</i>	<i>Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements</i>
<i>R-ARCSS</i>	<i>Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</i>
<i>RJMEC</i>	<i>Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</i>
<i>R-TGoNU</i>	<i>Restructured Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>SDSRB</i>	<i>Strategic Defence and Security Review Board</i>
<i>SGBV</i>	<i>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</i>
<i>SPLM</i>	<i>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</i>
<i>SPLM-IO</i>	<i>Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition</i>
<i>SSOA</i>	<i>South Sudan Opposition Alliance</i>
<i>SSPDF</i>	<i>South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces</i>
<i>TBC</i>	<i>Technical Boundary Committee</i>
<i>TCRSS</i>	<i>Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan</i>
<i>TGoNU</i>	<i>Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>TNL</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislature</i>
<i>TNLA</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislative Assembly</i>
<i>UN</i>	<i>United Nations</i>
<i>UNDP</i>	<i>United Nations Development Program</i>
<i>UNSC</i>	<i>United Nations Security Council</i>

Executive Summary

This Report of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) on the status of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) covers the period from 1st January to 31st March 2019. It highlights the prevailing political, security, humanitarian, and economic situation in the country while paying close attention to the progress being made by the Agreement institutions and mechanisms to implement their mandate as envisaged during the Pre-Transitional Period.

In addition, it identifies incidents of compliance or lack thereof with the terms of the R-ARCSS. At the same time the Report underscores the engagement of the RJMEC leadership with the Parties, regional guarantors and stakeholders of the R-ARCSS. Finally, it offers some key observations and recommendations for remedial action to ensure effective implementation of the Peace Agreement.

The general political and security situation in the Republic of South Sudan continues to offer hope for a successful implementation of the R-ARCSS, underpinned by a commendable show of commitment and cooperation exhibited by all the Parties. There are also signs of economic normalcy returning. For the most part, there has been very few reports of fighting or active conflict in the country, except for heightened tensions around the Yei River area, and an upsurge in incidents of cattle rustling around Wau. There has also been reports of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in a few areas of the country, which has prompted action on the part of the authorities to address the issue.

Notwithstanding the generally favourable atmosphere, CTSAMVM continues to encounter denial of access by some of the Parties as it attempts to investigate alleged incidents of violations of the R-ARCSS. Humanitarian access impediments, although on the decline, also continue to occur in a situation where more than three-quarters of the population are reported to be food insecure and in need of humanitarian assistance. Importantly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) renewed the UN Mission (UNMISS) mandate, which remain focused on protecting civilians, creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitoring and investigating human rights, and supporting the peace process.

During the current reporting period the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) successfully established the Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) and the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC). The TBC completed its work of listing, describing and mapping tribal boundary areas of 1st January 1956 currently in dispute as a consequence of the establishment of 32 States in South Sudan, and submitted its report to the IGAD mediation.

In the same period, the IBC began working on its mandate to consider the number of States of the Republic of South Sudan, their boundaries, the composition and restructuring of the Council of States and to make recommendations on the same. With the establishment of the IBC only one, the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Commission remains to be reconstituted under the terms of the Agreement.

Regarding progress in implementing the prescribed pre-transitional tasks by the various Agreement institutions and implementation mechanisms, the RJMEC made very good progress in the dissemination of the R-ARCSS. It reprinted sixteen thousand copies of the R-ARCSS, and produced seventeen thousand six hundred copies of the summarized version, which have

also been translated into some local languages, and Arabic, and these have been recorded for broadcast as public service announcements.

The National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC) has played a critical role in coordinating implementation of the activities of the Pre-Transitional Period. It's leadership and support were instrumental in the activities of most agreement institutions and mechanisms and in facilitating the return of opposition representatives to Juba. The NPTC developed a budget and solicited financial and other resources from the incumbent TGoNU and partners, which has enabled implementation of key activities.

The security mechanisms after a delayed start have begun implementation. In particular, the Joint Defence Board (JDB) after a series of confidence building measures in potential hotspots have put in place plans, together with the Joint Military Ceasefire Committee (JMCC), for cantonment and the unification of forces.

Phase One of the process entails twenty-five (25) sites dedicated to the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army - In Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), and ten (10) major barracks assigned for the South Sudanese Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF). Each of the 25 sites is planned to hold a maximum of 3,750 troops. SPLA-IO and SSOA troops are reportedly moving to locations closer to the proposed cantonment sites. The JDB has also developed a plan to identify and train a force of three thousand (3,000) South Sudan National Police Forces to assume the role of internal security of Juba.

The RJMEC leadership continues to support the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan in the quest to engage non-signatories to join in implementation of the R-ARCSS. RJMEC seconded advisors to develop a strategy for engagement of non-signatories and the RJMEC leadership accompanied the Special Envoy in talks with General Thomas Cirillo on two separate occasions in Addis Ababa and once with General Paul Malong in Nairobi.

This in efforts to ensure the uninterrupted and smooth implementation of the peace process. Other engagements included meeting with the leadership of the NPTC and the other Agreement institutions and mechanisms, holding discussions with the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, the diplomatic community, and the leadership of the Parties to the Agreement.

Overall, the R-ARCSS provides the best available opportunity to ending the cycle of violence in South Sudan and building lasting peace. RJMEC is encouraged with the political will and commitment being demonstrated by the leadership of the Parties to the peace agreement. Admittedly, there has been a slow start and some critical timelines have been missed, but all indications are that the Parties, with support from the partners, will be positioned to expedite and implement all pending and requisite tasks.

These may all not be possible within the prescribed Pre-Transitional Period but what is critical is to lay a firm foundation upon which the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) can be formed to take forward implementation of the peace agreement.

In light of the above the RJMEC encourages the Parties to proactively engage one another and together agree on the best way forward to expedite formation of the unity government; explore and avail additional resources to the NPTC and all agreement mechanisms; and adopt a unified

and coordinated awareness campaign to send a strong message of unity of purpose to the people of South Sudan.

Also, the JDB should expedite the cantonment, training and deployment of unified forces; and the Parties should immediately reconstitute the DDR Commission, a key mechanism for dealing with former combatants who do not qualify to join the unified forces. Lastly, the RJMEC renews its call to the Parties to adhere to their obligations to refrain from acts and forms of SGBV and ensure protection and safety of women in areas under their control.

Finally, IGAD should expedite and conclude its engagements with the non-signatories before the end of the Pre-Transitional Period and prior to the formation of the unity government. RJMEC further recommends that IGAD convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers and a Summit to take stock of the status of implementation of the pre transitional tasks and make a determination on the way forward.

I. Introduction

1. This Report is submitted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 7.9 of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and covers the period 1st January to 31st March 2019. The end of the first quarter of 2019 marks more than six months of Pre-Transitional activities and less than two months before the start of the Transitional Period, as indicated in the R-ARCSS.
2. Overall, relatively good progress has been made in accomplishing the Pre-Transitional tasks. However, two critical activities anticipated to have been completed by the end of the Pre-Transitional Period only started during this quarter. This relates to the cantonment and training of a unified army and the tasks of the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC), linked to considering the number of states of South Sudan, their boundaries, and the restructuring of the Council of States. The Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Commission remains the only implementation mechanism yet to be reconstituted.
3. Notwithstanding the delay in getting the IBC established the Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) has completed its work and presented its Report to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation. The TBC was charged with defining and demarcating the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1st January 1956, and the tribal boundaries that were violated by the 32 states. Their report will inform the IBC in making its recommendations on the number and boundaries of states.
4. The political and security situation remains relatively stable with most of the country considered to be calm. However, tensions remain in the Yei River area where fighting previously took place between forces allied to General Thomas Cirillo of the National Salvation Front (NAS) and those of the South Sudanese Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army - In Opposition (SPLA-IO). The NAS faction led by Gen. Thomas Cirillo has rejected the R-ARCSS and considers itself not bound by the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements being implemented by the Agreement Parties. There has also been an upsurge in incidents of cattle rustling, particularly in the area East of Wau, often resulting in violence. Confidence building efforts between the various parties to the Agreement have continued apace, and the work of the institutions and implementation mechanisms, for the most part has been progressing well.
5. During the period under review the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan Ambassador Ismail Wais with the support of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) leadership launched a diplomatic effort to reach out to the non-signatories to the R-ARCSS. To date talks with General Thomas Cirillo have not yielded much result while those with General Paul Malong have generally been more encouraging.
6. The RJMEC has embarked on a rigorous dissemination exercise as it seeks to distribute information on the Agreement to as wide a segment of the population as possible. This include

translating a summary of the peace agreement into Juba Arabic, Dinka and Nuer, which have also been recorded and broadcast as public service announcements and making available English copies of the Agreement across South Sudan. In addition, efforts necessary to produce the summary in Bari, Zande and Shilluk have also been taken, and will be completed shortly.

7. Section II of the Report highlights the prevailing political, security, humanitarian and economic situation in the Republic of South Sudan. At the same time Section III reports on the progress made in implementing various activities by the Agreement institutions and implementation mechanisms, during the reporting period. This is augmented by a detailed list and update of the activities pursued since the signing of the R-ARCSS, in Annex A.
8. The Report also highlights some key activities of the RJMEC Secretariat in Section IV. Finally, Section V presents observations and recommendations aimed at setting the stage for successful monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

II. Prevailing Political Security Humanitarian and Economic Situation

Overview

9. In general, the political situation in South Sudan during the reporting period has been calm and stable. Many key opposition members who have been in Juba since December report continued favourable political conditions conducive to carry out their work within the various Agreement institutions and implementation mechanisms.¹ That notwithstanding, the internal leadership wrangles observed during the last quarter within the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) and the Other Political Parties (OPP) remain unresolved and pose a threat to their cohesiveness within the R-ARCSS.²
10. With regards to security, for the most part, there has been very few reports of fighting or active conflict in the country, except for heightened tensions around the Yei River area, and an upsurge in incidents of cattle rustling around Wau. In addition, there have been disturbing incidents of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in some areas of the country (See Box 1).
11. On several occasions the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements and Monitoring Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) was denied access by some of the Parties as it sought to investigate alleged reports of violations of the R-ARCSS. Humanitarian access impediments, although on the decline, also continue to occur in a situation where more than three-quarters of the population are reported to be food insecure and in need of humanitarian assistance.

¹ For a while this situation was threatened by the non-payment of hotel bills for the opposition members, as NPTC struggled to secure financial resources. However, this has been regularised and the bills cleared thus allowing the members to remain in Juba.

² The SSOA is the third largest of the five Parties and signatories to the R-ARCSS while the OPP is the fourth. SSOA is comprised of eight opposition political parties and the OPP is made up of six.

Box 1: Reports of Sexual and Gender Based Violence

Despite an apparent reduction in reported cases, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) remains a serious concern and needs to be addressed.

In its report on SGBV cases in the Bentiu area, released in March, CTSAMVM confirmed that there had been widespread incidents going as far back as early 2018. For instance, in November 2018, CTSAMVM received allegations from the UNMISS Human Rights Department and other Humanitarian partners of SGBV incidents which were reported to have occurred in what is known as Northern Liech State between 19 and 29 November 2018. The Bentiu MVT visited MSF on the 2nd December 2018 and was informed that 125 women and girls sought their services.

The report also indicated that the overall numbers cannot be confirmed based upon the evidence presented but that the scale was significant and conformed with trends identified in its earlier reports. It also mentioned that state authorities are clearly aware of the scale of the SGBV issues and were endeavoring to address it but they were not proving to be capable of holding perpetrators to account.

Unfortunately reports of such incidents have continued into 2019 with CTSAMVM investigating allegations of SGBV including rape by SSPDF in Karpeto, Lobonok in Central Equatoria on 18th January 2019. It found that one woman and one female minor were raped by SSPDF soldiers and the victims had been sent to Juba for treatment. The CTSAMVM report also highlighted that reports from local government authorities in the area indicated that the perpetrators have been arrested and were awaiting judicial proceedings.

RJMEC reminds the Parties to the Agreement that these atrocities are serious violations of the R-ARCSS and together with IGAD and the international community has forcefully condemned all such actions. Further, RJMEC has informed the IGAD Council of Ministers of the continuing violations while demanding a full report from the TGoNU on the Bentiu incidents.

12. In March 2019 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2459³ extending the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 March 2020, maintaining the overall force levels at the troop ceiling of 17,000 and the police ceiling of 2,101 police personnel. The UNMISS core mandate remains largely focused on protecting civilians, creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitoring and investigating human rights, and supporting the peace process. The civilian aspect of the mandate was adjusted to provide support in developing and implementing gender-sensitive community violence reduction (CVR) programs.
13. UNMISS was also charged to “support the facilitation of the safe, informed, voluntary, and dignified return or relocation of IDPs from United Nations protection of civilian sites, in coordination with humanitarian actors and other relevant stakeholders, and within existing resources.” The UNSC agreed to maintain the Regional Protection Force (RPF) troop levels not exceeding 4,000. It also expressed its willingness to consider a proposal from the IGAD that its members, namely Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, contribute troops to fill an identified RPF deficit of 1,695 troops.

³ Resolution 2459 was adopted by 14 votes to none with one exception (Russian Federation). The Council also requested for the conduct of a military and police capability study subsequent to the negotiation of permanent security arrangements by the signatories to the R-ARCSS, signed on 12th September 2018.

14. The Security Council also demanded that all parties to the conflict immediately end the fighting and engage in political dialogue; that South Sudan's leaders implement the permanent ceasefire declared in the R-ARCSS and other relevant agreements; and that the government complies with its obligations as set out in the status-of-forces agreement; and immediately cease obstructing humanitarian actors and UNMISS personnel in the performance of their mandates.

Status of the Permanent Ceasefire

15. The permanent ceasefire generally held but tension remains high between SSPDF/SPLA-IO and the NAS forces of General Cirillo, a non-signatory armed group in Central Equatoria, particularly in the Yei River area. The rise in cattle rustling was a major security concern, particularly to the East of Wau where large raids were recently reported. The rustlers were said to be up to a hundred strong, well-armed, and ruthless.
16. The rustlers were accused of killing civilians, and abducting women and children as well. The raids quickly assumed a political dimension as it was exploited by local politicians and fuelled wild speculation on Social Media. The general theme is that the raiders are organized, armed youth being used as proxy forces by the Parties. I-TGoNU has authorized the National Security Services (NSS) to mobilize and deal with this situation.
17. During the period under review CTSAMVM reported thirty-one (31) incidents of denial of access by the SSPDF linked mainly to force verification. It is important to note that continued denial of access poses a real challenge to CTSAMVM in the carrying out of their mandate.

Humanitarian Situation

18. According to the UN and partners' Humanitarian Response Plan for 2019, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is approximately 7.1 million, a small increase by about 100,000 from 2018. Data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)⁴, estimate that some 6.5 million people are currently severely food insecure. This is an increase of 2 million compared to the end of 2018. The number is expected to increase to close to 7 million by mid-2019.
19. In addition, data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) show that the number of displaced people is approximately four million, or roughly the same level at end-2018. A recent report from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) shows that some displaced people have started returning spontaneously to their communities. UNMISS estimates that as much as 12 000 have left the POC camps to return home. Unfortunately, some displacements continue, most notably in and around Yei on account

⁴ The IPC is a multi-agency initiative globally led by 12 partners: Action Against Hunger, CARE International, CILSS, FEWS, FAO, the Global Food Security Cluster (GFSC), IGAD, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, OXFAM, Save the Children, SICA, UNICEF, and WFP. South Sudanese Government entities, NGOs, and the UN are involved in the collection of data and analysis in South Sudan.

of the previous hostilities. The UNHCR reports that the current conditions are not yet conducive for large scale, durable, safe and dignified returns.

20. There remain concerns with regards to the rights of returnees as per chapter III of the peace agreement. The capacity to ensure protection of returnees as stipulated in *Articles 3.1.1.2 to 3.1.1.4* is limited. Particularly there are concerns from some of the displaced persons as to whether they will be able to access their property upon return.
21. There has recently been a reduction in the number of humanitarian access impediments reported to OCHA. In December 2018 and January 2019 the number of impediments reported were 37 and 35 respectively as compared to earlier figures of 50 or more impediments per month. Any access impediment, however, remains a violation of *Article 3.1.1.1* of the R-ARCSS.
22. To further reduce the number of access impediments, RJMEC has been appealing particularly during the monthly plenaries that the quarterly Humanitarian High-Level Oversight Committee meetings, as directed by Presidential Decree, are held. RJMEC has also proposed that the monthly Humanitarian Coordination Forum meetings be convened. During the January 2019 RJMEC plenary, a TGoNU representative to RJMEC committed himself to ensure that the meetings were held. To date the meetings have not been scheduled.

The Economic Situation

23. There are some signs of economic normalcy returning. Oil fields in Unity that had been closed during the fighting are now being reopened, which boosted total production by 33,000 barrels per day in January 2019, an increase of 25% over the average daily production in 2018. Furthermore, the reopening of the Nile river route from Juba to Renk paves the way for new transport opportunities. There was a jump in the overall prices in January reflecting to a large extent the extreme price hikes on a few food commodities (especially bread and cereals) in parts of the country. This may not necessarily reflect a broad surge in inflation.
24. Agriculture is a crucial sector to be prioritised as it is the mainstay of the economy. The conflict-related displacement has seriously impacted that sector. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, production continues to be severely depressed compared with the pre-conflict period. In order to underpin recovery, there is need for the displaced people to return.
25. The national Budget for fiscal year 2018/19 was designed to avoid deficits and keep public expenditure stable even in the event of low oil prices. However, the budget estimates were not based on realistic assumptions on the repayment of advances for future oil deliveries. Consequently, the cash flow available to finance the budget proved to be significantly lower than budgeted.
26. On the financing side of the budget the National Revenue Authority has reported significant improvements in non-oil revenue collection through the first 8 months of FY2018/19. However,

non-oil revenues are not likely to exceed 25 per cent of net revenues this budget year. Oil revenues will remain the dominant source of income for the Government in many years to come.

27. In that regard, the development of the oil price and production will be the main determinants of the resources that the government can allocate to implement the Peace Agreement. For instance, a sustained increase in the oil price of US \$10 may increase annual revenues by more than US \$ 250M at present production levels; and a sustained increase in production of 10 000 barrels per day will increase net oil revenues by around US\$ 60M. Since 2015, part of the net oil revenues has been allocated to pay transfer payments arrears to Sudan. These arrears have now been cleared, and the cash flow from oil available for financing the budget will increase in the coming budget years.

III. Progress in Implementation of Tasks by the Agreement Institutions and Mechanisms

28. During the current reporting period, IGAD successfully established the TBC and the IBC. The reconstitution of the DDR Commission is expected to be accomplished during the Pre-Transitional Period. All other R-ARCSS institutions and mechanisms⁵ were established and/or reconstituted during the last reporting period (See Annex C).

RJMEC Dissemination of the Revitalized Peace Agreement

29. Effective monitoring and oversight of implementation of the R-ARCSS necessitates that the Parties and Stakeholders are cognizant of their obligations as well as for other responsible entities with specific tasks to implement them. This can be achieved if it is widely disseminated. The RJMEC understands that its contribution in disseminating the R-ARCSS to the South Sudanese community compliments the ongoing efforts of the Parties⁶ and Stakeholders.
30. Accordingly, the RJMEC undertook substantive steps towards dissemination to as many South Sudanese as possible. It reprinted sixteen thousand copies of the R-ARCSS, produced summaries of the R-ARCSS translated into various languages, which are easy to record and broadcast as public service announcements in local electronic media. More specifically, the summaries consist of publications in English and classical Arabic (printed versions), and audio recordings and broadcast of public service announcements in English, Juba Arabic, Dinka and Nuer. Summaries in Bari, Zande and Shilluk languages, are expected to be completed in early

⁵ Refer to the Fourth Quarterly Report of 2018 on dates of reconstitution and establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC), Joint Defense Board (JDB), Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC), National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), the Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM).

⁶ Article 1.4.3.1 of the R-ARCSS gives the primary obligation of dissemination of the R-ARCSS to the Parties. Given the broad expectations the R-ARCSS has, reaching out to South Sudanese people inside the country, in different cities and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and in the Diaspora, is a huge responsibility for a few entities.

April. There have also been monthly coordination meetings held with a growing number of actors in the communication space including the NPTC, CTSAMVM, UNMISS, and representatives of civil society.

31. In addition to the RJMEC led dissemination and outreach program, there has been significant collaboration with various organisations to hold outreach workshops on the Agreement including UNMISS, Journalists for Human Rights, the Community Radio Network and Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation. These workshops have primarily focussed on an orientation on the contents of the R-ARCSS as well as providing the participants a platform to discuss ways in which they can engage in the peace process. The participants for these activities were drawn from the media, lawmakers and elders from Jubek State, women representatives and the youth.

The National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC)

32. Consistent with *Article 1.4.7.2* of the R-ARCSS the NPTC has been engaged in oversight and coordination of the implementation of the activities of the Pre-Transitional Period.⁷ At the January RJMEC meeting, members appealed to the Interim Chairman to convene an extraordinary meeting of the RJMEC with partners, friends and all interested actors, to discuss the serious financial and other challenges impacting on the smooth implementation of the Peace Agreement and to chart practical ways forward.
33. By the time of the appeal the NPTC had only received 100 million South Sudanese pounds from the incumbent TGoNU and was unable to meet a mounting financial challenge of providing for the needs of the various institutions and implementation mechanisms. This included accommodation and transportation costs for scores of opposition members who had returned to Juba to participate in the work of the institutions.
34. The RJMEC extraordinary meeting took place on 19th February at which the NPTC presented a detailed budget of US \$285 million with the I-TGoNU pledging US \$10 million for immediate disbursement. The government of Japan also contributed an initial sum of US \$1 million, while pledges of support towards cantonment of forces were received from the governments of Egypt and South Africa.

⁷ The NPTC was established in October 2018 in Khartoum and is comprised of ten members, 5 from the incumbent TGoNU, 2 from the SPLM -A/IO, and one each from the SSOA, OPP and FD's, comprising the Parties to the Agreement. All subsequent meetings of the Committee have been held in Juba with the participation of all ten members. It has established a Secretariat and constituted different committees responsible for the various tasks to be undertaken by the mechanism.

The National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC)⁸

35. The Committee convened continuously from 9th January to 25th February 2019 conducting an initial review of the country's security laws in accordance with Chapter 1, *Article 1.18.1.2* of the R-ARCSS.⁹ The process is intended to establish the legal framework for the security sector reform during the Pre-Transitional and Transitional periods. As part of the review the Committee called for submissions of proposed amendments from the Parties and Stakeholders to the Agreement and relevant institutions. A two-day workshop was consequently conducted to validate the proposed amendments to the laws as well as receive additional input from the Parties and Stakeholders.
36. Following the workshop, the Committee convened meetings with the Police, National Security, Prisons and the Wildlife Services. The purpose of the meetings was to seek clarity from the institutions on some of the proposed amendments. Agreed changes were incorporated into the marked-up versions of the laws. Since then first and second drafts of the bills have been developed and considered by the members of the Committee. It is estimated that the NCAC will finalize the bills before end of April and submit the same to the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs as stipulated in the R-ARCSS.
37. The Committee has also written to RJMEC regarding the issue of the review of the Fire Brigade Service Act, 2009 as provided in Chapter 1, *Article 1.18.1.2* of the R-ARCSS. The Act as referred to in the Agreement is non-existent. South Sudan currently has no fire brigade law, which suggests the Committee will have to draft new legislation instead of reviewing an existing one as contemplated by the Agreement. The Committee will proceed on this matter based on guidance from RJMEC.
38. During this reporting period the Committee also embarked on the review of the Political Parties Act, 2012 to ensure that it complies with international best practices for the free and democratic registration of political parties as provided for in the R-ARCSS. Comparative analysis of political parties' legislation in Africa and Europe have also been developed by the NCAC Secretariat to facilitate the review of the law. The Committee has received and is considering a joint submission on proposed amendments from the 14 registered political parties as well as those submitted by civil society and women representatives. The finalization of this Bill will mark the end of the tasks that the Committee is mandated to undertake during the Pre-Transitional Period.

⁸ The NCAC was reconstituted on 22nd October 2018 in Khartoum and shortly thereafter members reconvened in Juba where at least three weeks were spent incorporating the R-ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS) 2011.

⁹ These are the SPLA Act (2009), Police Service Act (2009), Prisons Service Act (2011), National Security Service Act (2014), and the Wildlife Service Act (2011).

The Technical Boundary Committee (TBC)

39. The TBC was officially established on 9th January 2019 in Juba by the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan. The TBC's mandate as provided for in *Article 1.15.18* of the R-ARCSS was to “define and demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1st January 1956, and the tribal areas in dispute in the country”. When this article is read together with Annex E (p.122), the TBC's mandate specifically involved drawing “a list of tribal boundaries in dispute as a consequence of introducing the 32 states” in the Republic of South Sudan.
40. Accordingly, the TBC's work was restricted to addressing the tribal boundaries violated as a consequence of the establishment of the 32 States (See Box 2). In effect, the TBC was not required to list or map tribal boundaries not affected by the establishment of the 32 States (see par.1 of Annex E). At the time of its establishment the TBC consisted of eight (8) members, one of whom was a woman¹⁰ – six from IGAD member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and two jointly nominated by the Troika countries (See Annex B). Three Sub-Committees: Historical Records and Archival Retrieval, Outreach and Consultations and

Box 2: Summary of the Key Points on the TBC Report

The Technical Boundary Committee (TBC), through its three Sub-committees, simultaneously collected, collated, analysed and triangulated the requisite data from various sources, and prepared a detailed mission report as per its mandate of listing, describing and mapping tribal boundary areas of 1 January 1956 currently in disputes as a consequence of establishment of 32 States in the Republic of South Sudan. The Report was submitted to the IGAD Mediation, in line with article 1.15.18.5 of the R-ARCSS. Attached to the report are maps produced by the TBC depicting 32 States as described in the Establishment Orders No. 36/2015 and 2/2017 for the creation of 28 States and 32 States respectively and maps depicting approximate tribal areas in dispute as per the mandate of the TBC.

The TBC could not undertake the ‘demarcation’ component of its mandate. This is due to the fact that the actual task of internal boundaries demarcation is not an easy one; it is labour intensive and a time-consuming exercise, requiring adequate financial and requisite expertise to be at the disposal of those to engage in the process. A specific recommendation was offered on how the government of South Sudan can undertake such a huge task in the future.

Upon completion of its task, the TBC briefed the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan on the main findings. It also briefed the Independent Boundaries Commission on the same. A common thread of view among the majority of the South Sudanese stakeholders consulted is the assertion that they are able and willing to resolve the internal ethnic boundary disputes amongst themselves should they be facilitated to do so by a neutral body. This also resonates with one of the findings of the South Sudan National Dialogue Committee in 2018. This means the resolution of the internal boundary disputes between and within ethnic communities is not a technical issue, but political.

Throughout its work, the TBC was ably supported by the RJMEC Secretariat through a dedicated Advisor who was the Head of the Secretariat. With support from the IGAD communication expert, the Head of TBC Secretariat has digitalized all the submissions of the South Sudanese stakeholders to the TBC for ease of future reference.

¹⁰ The TBC established its leadership structure as follows: Chairperson (Sudan), Vice Chairperson (Uganda) and Rapporteur (Kenya).

Cartographic Sub-Committees were established. The Committee received Secretariat support from the IGAD South Sudan Liaison Office in Juba where it was housed and from the RJMEC Secretariat by dedicating an advisor throughout its term.

41. The TBC conducted a mid-term review of its progress on 9th February 2019. The review provided an opportunity for the Committee to: assess progress to-date; review institutional administrative, organizational and financial aspects of its work; improve TBC design; recommend remedial measures and make changes where appropriate. The TBC ultimately completed its report and submitted to the IGAD Mediation.

The Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC)

42. Members of the IBC were appointed by the Executive Secretary of IGAD on 28th February 2019 pursuant to Article 1.15.1. of the R-ARCSS. Consequently, the IBC held its constitutive meetings on 18th to 19th March 2019 in Juba, South Sudan and 26th to 27th March in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The IBC is required to have fifteen (15) members¹¹: five (5) members nominated by the incumbent TGoNU, additional five (5) members nominated by opposition groups: two (2) from SPLM/A-IO, and one (1) each from SSOA, FDs, and OPP, and the remaining five (5) nominated by Member States of the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan from South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda, Algeria and Chad. The members from South Africa and Nigeria have been appointed as Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson respectively (See Annex B).
43. The mandate of the IBC, which is expected to be accomplished within the Pre-Transitional Period, is to consider the number of States of the Republic of South Sudan, their boundaries, the composition and restructuring of the Council of States and to make recommendations on the same (*Article 1.15.7*). Once complete, the IBC will submit its report to the IGAD Executive Secretary, which shall be immediately communicated to the Parties and enshrined in the R-ARCSS as an addendum (*Article 1.15.10 and 1.15.11*). If it fails to make its final report before the end of its term, the IBC shall be automatically transformed into a Referendum Commission on Number and Boundaries of States (RCNBS) of the Republic of South Sudan (*Article 1.15.14*).

The Security Mechanisms

44. The work of all security mechanisms is way behind schedule due to their delayed establishment or reconstitution until late 2018. The main Pre-Transitional Period tasks such as disengagement of forces, assembly and cantonment, screening, training and unification of forces are months behind schedule, mainly due to the lack of initial funding. Implementation of these security tasks has only now started.

¹¹ To date, the Commission consists of fourteen (14) members, three (3) of whom are women representing 21%. Ambassador Thembisile Cheryl Majola from South Africa and Hon. Adamu Chindo from Nigeria have been appointed as Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson respectively.

The Joint Defence Board (JDB)¹²

45. The JDB conducted several confidence building measures among field commanders in areas such as Yei, Wau, and parts of Jonglei. The three Chiefs of Defence Staff, that is SSPDF, SPLA-IO, and SSOA conducted joint visits during which they disseminated Chapter II of the Agreement that covers security matters and resolved some problems on the ground. In addition, they issued orders to field commanders to disengage and redeploy forces to barracks and cantonments as well as allow CTSAMVM to verify forces in these locations.
46. These actions by the JDB contributed to the reduction in armed combat among the various forces and relative peace in most parts of the country. All these efforts notwithstanding, fighting between the NAS forces of Thomas Cirillo and the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO forces continued for some time in Yei River and surrounding areas. At the time of this report, armed violence in Yei was reduced, but tension remained high.
47. The JDB working with the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) have put in place plans for cantonment and the unification of forces. Phase One of Cantonment is planned to entail twenty-five (25) sites dedicated to the SPLA-IO and SSOA, and ten (10) major barracks assigned for the SSPDF. Each of the 25 sites is planned to hold a maximum of 3,750 troops, up to a total of approximately 94,000. A pilot site for SPLA-IO and SSOA has been assigned in Panyume. SPLA-IO forces already in the location are waiting for food and medical supplies to be delivered. Financial and logistical constraints have delayed the start of the cantonment process at Panyume, but JDB expects it to begin by the middle of April.
48. In the meantime, SPLA-IO and SSOA troops are reported to be moving to locations closer to the proposed cantonment sites across the country. This movement, conducted under the initiative of local commanders and the aegis of local government authorities, is being monitored by the SSPDF leadership, which has issued orders to all their field commanders to facilitate opposition forces and allow safe passage to those going through government held areas.
49. The JDB has also been flexible enough to change cantonment sites, wherever the proposed location of cantonments interferes with local communities' day-to-day activities. Where possible, CTSAMVM is also monitoring the movement of personnel. RJMEC and CTSAMVM are in constant communication with the SSPDF leadership with the aim of monitoring movement and advising on measures to de-conflict and sensitize local populations on the cantonment process.
50. *Article 2.2.1* of Chapter II of the R-ARCSS provides for "the training and redeployment of the necessary unified forces" during the Pre-Transitional Period. Pursuant to this article, the JDB in

¹² The JDB is composed of the Chief of Defence Forces from all former fighting South Sudanese armed factions namely: the SSPDF; SPLA-IO; and SSOA which is an alliance of the FDP, NAS (under Khalid Boutros), NDM, SSNMC/A, SSPM/A, SSLM/A, SSUM/A.

mid-February, announced a plan to select and train a joint force of five thousand (5,000) that will provide the external protection of Juba, and will be stationed outside of the city. This force forms the nucleus of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) referred to in *Article 2.2.1* and will be trained at Morobo as soon as suitable candidates from the three forces are identified at the cantonment sites. The plan envisages a balanced force, 50% SSPDF and 50% SPLA-IO/SSOA.

51. The JDB aims to begin implementing policy being formulated by the SDSR Board, to demilitarize the cities and move towards police primacy. To this end, the JDB have developed a plan to identify and train a force of three thousand (3,000) South Sudan National Police Forces to provide security and law enforcement in Juba.
52. In efforts to meet the immediate needs of security for all VIPs (opposition and incumbent TGoNU), the JDB has started the selection and training of a battalion-size force to be called the Immediate Protection Unit (IPU). The planned unit of 700 troops will be a balanced force. Three hundred and fifty (350) will be drawn from the SSPDF and three hundred and fifty (350) will come jointly from the SPLA-IO and SSOA¹³.
53. The enlisted soldiers will be trained at Rajaf Police Training Center and the officers at Rambo Training Center, both of which are close to Juba. The IPU will be commanded by a Colonel from SPLA-IO with two Second-in-Command from the SSPDF and SSOA. There is an undertaking by the JDB to include in the Force as many women soldiers as possible, to meet the 35 percent gender participation as outlined in the R-ARCSS.

The Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC)

54. The JTSC is mandated under *Article 2.2.8* to set eligibility criteria for candidates willing to serve in the unified forces, as well as plan and execute the unification of all forces. Pursuant to its mandate, the JTSC established thirty-seven (37) centers across the country with a capacity of 5,000 recruits in each for the SSPDF, NSS, and organised forces that include the SSNPF, State Police Forces, Wildlife, National Fire Brigade and Prison Services (to be renamed Civil Defence Force). The JTSC has finalized the eligibility criteria for each of the organised forces.

Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB)

55. The SDSRB was reconstituted under *Article 2.5* of Chapter II and mandated to develop policies that would guide the professionalization of all defence and security services in South Sudan. The Board held several meetings during the reporting period, and in the process reviewed three documents: a) the Strategic Security Assessment; b) the Security Policy Framework; and c) the Revised Defence Policy. In addition, the Board has been collecting information that would inform the development of policies that integrate a gender dimension for all security services.

¹³ In their deliberations SSOA agreed to provide fifty (50) and SPLA-IO three hundred (300). Some SPLA-IO will come from Wau and others from Panyume.

In this regard, the Board convened two workshops, one with women in the organised forces, and the other with civil society women. Lack of funding and dedicated expertise slowed down the Board's progress, but RJMEC working closely with UNMISS and the Board has identified a dedicated expert to support the SDSRB in its future work.

Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC)

56. The JMCC was reconstituted as per *Article 2.4.4* and is charged with the responsibility to exert command and control of all forces in the field and contribute to the operationalization of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement through close liaison with CTSAMVM and all other security mechanisms. The JMCC has not accomplished much so far due to lack of funding and other administrative challenges.

The Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM)

57. Reconstituted pursuant to *Article 2.4.5* of Chapter II, CTSAMVM is an IGAD institution responsible for monitoring and verification of the Parties' compliance with and violations of the provisions of Chapter II. CTSAMVM's operations during the period of reporting were heavily affected by insufficient funding and availability of rotary aircraft. These challenges notwithstanding, it has effectively adopted a proactive concept of operations. This is done by initiating conflict preventive measures such as facilitating direct liaison among field commanders of the former warring Parties.
58. CTSAMVM has facilitated confidence building measures among field commanders by conducting joint field visits and convening problem solving meetings in hotspots such as in the Yei River area, Wau, Leer and some areas in Jonglei. By so doing, CTSAMVM's operations have contributed to efforts leading to the general reduction in military skirmishes in those areas of the country.
59. In addition, where violations occurred, CTSAMVM teams have engaged field commanders in dispute resolution activities such as urgent joint meetings to de-escalate violence and tensions. These meetings tend to create confidence among the factions at the field level. Only matters difficult to resolve at the field level have been referred to the Parties' political leadership, IGAD, and RJMEC. The most significant violations referred to these political institutions have been the mass SGBV incidents in Bentiu, the arrest, robbing and physical humiliation of the CTSAMVM team at Luri Training Center, and the violence in the Yei River area.
60. On 31st January – 1st February 2019, RJMEC convened a two-day Security Mechanisms Orientation and Coordination Workshop attended by 118 members of the four security mechanisms, members of the NPTC, Civil Society, the IGAD representative in Juba, CTSAMVM leadership, UNMISS, and the International Community. The aim was to create a common understanding of the provisions of the R-ARCSS, particularly Chapter II, improve

coordination between the security mechanisms as well as their planning capabilities. The workshop also discussed the role of women in the future organised forces. It was considered a successful event, which by common agreement among the four mechanisms, should be repeated in the coming months.

IV. Engagements of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

61. In January the RJMEC leadership continued with its round of consultations with the leadership of the various Agreement institutions and implementation mechanisms. This time it met with Madam Angelina Teny, Hon Gen. Malek Rueben Riak and Denay Jock Chagor the Chairperson and Co-Chairs respectively of the SDSRB. Discussions revolved around: (i) the challenges faced by the SDSRB; (ii) insight into its roles and functions; and (iii) a request to the RJMEC for assistance to their Secretariat.
62. The SDSRB Chairperson pointed to the lack of funding for the cantonment of forces and government's limited resources as a key challenge to accomplishing the goal of having one unified army at the end of the Pre-Transitional Period. The security concerns of the opposition returning to Juba were also noted and RJMEC was assured that everything possible was being done by the government to allay their fears. A decision was also taken to return to opposition members homes that were previously seized by the security forces following the events of July 2016.
63. The RJMEC leadership met with that of the Parties to the Agreement¹⁴ to discuss an issue relating to the governance structure that would obtain during the Pre-Transitional Period. It was decided that the proper description of the system of government envisaged by the R-ARCSS for the Pre-Transitional and Transitional periods remain a decentralized system of government as provided for under Article 1 (4) of the TCRSS 2011 (as amended). Furthermore, the R-ARCSS explicitly mandates the revitalized TGoNU to devolve more powers and resources to the States and lower levels of government.
64. As part of its continuing efforts to reconcile various factions of the SSOA, the RJMEC leadership met with Gabriel Changson its current Chairman. SSOA has been caught up in a dispute over the naming of a Chairman for the organization. The party attempted to hold elections in November 2018, but these were interrupted and since then the party has been split between groups loyal to Changson and those loyal to Peter Gadette. After meeting with leaders of three of the eight parties the RJMEC leadership referred the matter to Ambassador Wais for further mediation.
65. In a similar manner the RJMEC leadership held discussions with the Chairmen of the six parties that constitute the OPP, one of the five Parties to the R-ARCSS. There continues to be major disagreement and lack of cohesiveness of the parties. Discussions centered around the need for the OPP to remain united in the face of competing pressures within their organizations. It was made very clear to the OPP representatives that going forward the IGAD and RJMEC would only recognize the OPP as a group and not the individual parties constituting the OPP. In that regard it was important to get consensus on a focal point for the parties.

¹⁴ Discussions were held with the senior leadership of the Incumbent TGoNU, SPLM-A/IO, SSOA, FDs and OPP.

66. In early February the RJMEC leadership conducted a series of consultations with several members of the diplomatic corps in Juba. The meetings were requested by the RJMEC Interim Chairman to get their views on the progress of implementation of the Peace Agreement and feedback on various issues of concern to the leadership¹⁵. On the question of progress, it was agreed that it was not too early to think about the start of the Transitional Period and how this may be impacted by current events. Should consideration for example be given on how to stretch or adjust the start without breaking the Agreement.
67. Serious concern was expressed about possible military action against Cirillo and how this could impact the Peace implementation. There appears to be a willingness to provide resources to the implementation process, if there is a clear commitment from TGoNU and a roadmap to implementation as well as transparency, particularly with the handling of available oil revenues. Finally, support was expressed for the work of the RJMEC and its continued role in monitoring and evaluating the Peace Agreement.
68. The RJMEC leadership consulted with the Chairman of CTSAMVM on issues ranging from the current situation in the Yei River area to the holding of technical committee meetings in Juba, verification of forces, to that of local monitors and the financing of CTSAMVM, as well as investigation of the rapes in Bentiu and the Luri incident. CTSAMVM continues to experience access impediments in parts of Yei River area and was unable to report conclusively on the strengths of the forces build up.
69. As part of its ongoing efforts to more actively engage the public on issues surrounding implementation of the Peace Agreement, the RJMEC issued three press releases¹⁶ focused on a condemnation of the military build-up in Yei River, the need for soldiers to be disciplined and not interfere with politics, and an upbeat analysis of the overall security situation.
70. Discussions took place between the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Mrs. Hirut Zemene Kassa and the RJMEC leadership. The minister was briefed on the status of implementation and the need to engage non-signatories to the Agreement such as General Cirillo. Following these discussions, the RJMEC leadership joined with the IGAD Special Envoy to meet with General Cirillo on two separate occasions in Addis Ababa and once with General Paul Malong in Nairobi.¹⁷

¹⁵ Included were Amb. Tom Hushek (United States), Amb. Dr Sinead Walsh (European Union), Amb. Prof. Joram Biswaro (African Union Mission), Amb. Lars Andersen (Norway), Amb. Jan Hendrick van Thiel (Germany) Deputy Head of Mission Charles Moore (United Kingdom) and the Egyptian Ambassador.

¹⁶<https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/press-release/item/414-rjmec-expresses-concern-at-reports-of-military-build-up>

<https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/press-release/item/415-leave-politics-to-politicians-rjmec-advises-generals-in-s-sudan>

<https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/media-center/news/item/412-security-atmosphere-remains-conducive-for-the-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-say-rjmec>

¹⁷ The meeting was attended by Ambassador Ismail Wais, IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan; Ambassador Lt. Gen. Augustino S.K. Njoroge, RJMEC Interim Chairperson; Ambassador Fre Tesfa Michael, Office of the Chairperson of IGAD - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia; Ambassador Rebecca Mugateno, Uganda

71. Prior to the meetings the Special Envoy laid out several principles to guide the discussions: (i) there will be no re-negotiation or reopening of the R-ARCSS; (ii) IGAD recognizes the old groups/parties as at the HLRF; (iii) the R-ARCSS and its PCTSA has subsumed the CoHA 2017, and therefore no party can claim adherence to CoHA without being bound by the R-ARCSS; (iv) a non-signatory to the R-ARCSS cannot claim adherence or protection by CoHA, in as far as the actions are inconsistent with the PCTSA under R-ARCSS; (v) any group unwilling to join R-ARCSS and whose activities impede its full implementation shall be considered as a spoiler and held accountable; and (vi) any activity attributable to forces allied to a non-signatory group shall be deemed duly authorized by the leadership of that group.
72. Following the first meeting in Addis it was agreed that General Cirillo would give a formal written response to the proposals on 14th March at the other scheduled meeting with the team in Addis. General Cirillo did not show up to the meeting but instead sent his proposals to the team. No further action has to date been undertaken by the IGAD Special Envoy.¹⁸
73. The RJMEC Leadership met with a visiting delegation of the African Union Peace and Security Council headed by Ambassador Catherine Muigai Mwangi. Issues discussed ranged from a closer involvement of the AU in liaising with the international community in support of the peace agreement; and AU countries stepping up their financial and other support for the implementation process.
74. Discussions were also held with a visiting IMF delegation and revolved around the lack of transparency in the reporting and recording of oil revenues and its negative impact on the donor community and their willingness to provide funding to implementation. It was agreed that the authorities must do more to inspire confidence in their management of this critical resource. Other aspects of the discussion focused on the dire state of the economy, political developments around implementation, and the potential timing of the return of the IMF to South Sudan. On the latter the delegation informed RJMEC that they are still in a wait and see posture before committing to a full return.

V. Observations and Recommendations

75. In accordance with the implementation matrix of the R-ARCSS some of the key tasks completed to date are: (i) the establishment or reconstituting of all except one of the Agreement institutions and implementation mechanisms; (ii) selection of cantonment sites in accordance with agreed criteria; (iii) opening of humanitarian corridors; (iv) establishment and carrying out of the work of the TBC; (v) observation of the ceasefire throughout the country by the Parties; and (vi)

Ambassador to Ethiopia; representatives of the Embassies of Sudan and Kenya; Ambassador Berhanu Kebede, RJMEC Chief-of-Staff and members of the Special Envoy's Taskforce.

¹⁸ As a way forward he suggested: (1) re-opening of R-ARCSS for inclusive discussion and conclusion in a conducive secure environment accessible to all; (2) coercing of the Non-Signatories to sign R-ARCSS and labelling them as 'Spoilers' would not achieve the desired result for a comprehensive agreement in the Republic South Sudan. (3) the office of the IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan should adhere to its Terms of Reference (TOR) as directed by the IGAD Council of Ministers at its 66th Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, to engage with all the parties who didn't sign the R-ARCSS, 2018 rather than being selective in its engagements.

establishment of a Fund and the drawing up of a roadmap for implementation of the Pre-Transitional activities.

76. The main tasks that are ongoing during the Pre-Transitional Period include dissemination of the R-ARCSS, the work of the IBC, delivery of humanitarian assistance, release of political prisoners and detainees, and disengagement of forces, and the beginning of a process of national healing and reconciliation.
77. However, some Pre-Transitional tasks are pending including: (i) cantonment and training of unified forces (ii) reconstituting of the DDR Commission; (iii) security issues related to new recruitment of forces; (iv) ongoing incidents of SGBV; and (v) the appointment of an RJMEC Chairperson.
78. After a prolonged delay the JDB has started the process of cantonment and training of forces. RJMEC stresses the critical importance of this engagement in determining the way forward. The unification of forces, which involves the process of cantonment and training, should be expedited by all parties involved. In particular, the forces of SSOA and SPLM-A/IO should report to the cantonment sites and the SSPDF to the assigned barracks. At the same time the NPTC should make available the required resources, while CTSAMVM undertakes the necessary verification.
79. RJMEC applauds the establishment of both the TBC and IBC, and welcomes the final report of the TBC, which will inform the work of the IBC. RJMEC therefore urges the IBC to expedite their work during the available time period.
80. Despite an apparent reduction in reported cases, sexual and gender-based violence remains a serious concern and needs to be urgently addressed. RJMEC renews its call to the Parties to adhere to their obligations to refrain from all acts and forms of SGBV and ensure protection and safety of women in areas under their control. It also recommends that the fight against SGBV be made a priority. RJMEC also welcomes the launching of the SSPDF's Action Plan to counter SGBV and encourages other parties to do the same.
81. RJMEC recommends the promotion and dissemination of the Peace Agreement to be sustained into the future. In particular, political leaders need to adopt a unified and coordinated awareness campaign to send a strong message of unity to the people of South Sudan and to demonstrate their continued commitment to the implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit.
82. RJMEC welcomes the UNSC Resolution 2459, which accepted IGAD's recommendation to expand the troop contributing countries to include Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, in order to fill the deficit in the RPF. RJMEC therefore urges the said troop contributing countries to take the necessary action for the deployment of the remainder of the forces as soon as practically possible.

83. The tensions reported in the Yei River area and the continued rise in cattle rustling incidents pose a serious threat to the stability of that region, notwithstanding the relative peace that is evident across most of the country. The RJMEC commends the efforts of the IGAD Special Envoy in engaging General Cirillo to re-join the peace process. In the same vein RJMEC calls on the international partners to assist in these efforts.
84. Chapter IV of the R-ARCSS recommend policies geared at economic stability and sustainability of government finances. This will require that some of the petroleum revenues are set aside to preserve economic stability and for long-term investments. Consequently, a medium-term fiscal framework incorporating policy targets, including R-ARCSS commitments will constitute the best starting point for discussions with international partners.
85. Further, the I-TGoNU and its successor RTGoNU have to ensure that appropriate institutions, mechanisms and systems are in place to bring about accountability and transparency in the management of oil and non-oil revenues. RJMEC believes that this is vital to promote trust and confidence between the government of South Sudan its people and the development partners.
86. At this important stage of the Pre-Transitional Period, the RJMEC urges the leadership of all the Parties to the Agreement to meet urgently in order to review progress in the implementation of the RARCSS, and come up with a roadmap on the way forward.
87. Finally, RJMEC recommends that IGAD convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers and a Summit to take stock of the status of implementation of the pre transitional tasks and make a determination on the way forward.

VI. Conclusion

88. With less than two months to go to the end of the Pre-Transitional Period stipulated in the R-ARCSS attention is rightly focused on the work of the IBC and the JDB's attempt to canton and train forces i.e. to determine the number of states and set up unified forces respectively. While both activities started later than anticipated they remain important considerations that need to be taken into account as the Parties deliberate on the way forward.
89. In RJMEC's considered opinion, commendable progress has already been in the last months of the Pre-Transitional Period and the Parties appear determined to make even better progress in the weeks and months ahead, which is very encouraging. The renewed efforts and momentum will be accelerated by the availability of financial resources, if made available by the NPTC.
90. Unlike in the past, there is demonstrable political will among the Parties to implement the R-ARCSS and for this, the parties must be commended and encouraged. This bodes well for a favourable outcome and for the delivery of lasting peace to South Sudan.

91. Lastly, the current progress can be further bolstered by the authorities granting complete access to the humanitarian organizations and allowing unfettered access to CTSAMVM to conduct its activities and with the support of the regional partners and the international community extending financial and other support-moral and political. The steps already taken, and commitment expressed by the Parties to address the prevalence of SGBV is also worthy of note even though much remains to be done. Undoubtedly success in those areas will lay the groundwork for the heightened pace of return for the internally displaced and the refugees and help set the stage for an improved economy and a better future for the people of South Sudan.
92. RJMEC on its part shall continue to impartially monitor, evaluate and report as it vigorously carries out its oversight responsibilities with regards to the R-ARCSS, and make interventions when necessary. It will also continue regular reporting in writing to the incumbent TGoNU, the TNLA, the Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council of the AU, and to the Secretary General and Security Council of the UN.

Annex A: Status of Implementation of Various Pre-Transitional Tasks as of 31st March 2019

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
1.	1.4.3.1	Dissemination of the signed R-ARCSS to South Sudanese people inside the country, in different cities and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and in Diaspora.			√	<p>The I-TGoNU and a number of institutions and agencies are doing dissemination, including NPTC, RJMEC, UNMISS, UNDP, Civil Society Organisations, etc.</p> <p>RJMEC alone has reprinted and distributed over 33,000 copies of the R-ARCSS in full and summarised versions.</p>
2.		Nominations by Parties and Stakeholders of the representatives to the various R-ARCSS institutions and mechanisms and their reconstitutions/establishment.	√			All Parties and Stakeholders made their nominations to the various R-ARCSS institutions/mechanisms which has enabled formation.
3.	1.4.7	Appointment of the National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC)	√			NPTC was appointed and operational.
4.	1.4.7.3	Drawing of a roadmap for implementing the various pre-transitional tasks and budget	√			NPTC has been meeting and has developed a work plan and budget. It is actively supporting opposition representatives to participate in R-ARCSS implementation.
5.	1.4.7.4	NPTC submission of monthly written report to RJMEC	√			NPTC has been reporting monthly at RJMEC meetings and the reports are submitted in advance.
6.	1.4.8	Establishment of a Fund for the implementation of the Pre-Transitional Period activities	√			The NPTC has established a Fund and appealed for support but resourcing this fund has been a huge challenge. So far, only the RTGoNU and Japan have made direct contributions to the Fund.
7.	1.4.3.3	Initiate a process of national healing and reconciliation led by the parties, faith-based groups and civil society groups			√	<p>Some confidence building measures have taken, including the Peace Celebration in Khartoum and Juba, and joint confidence building measures within the States, Presidential tours, and gradual return of opposition representatives to Juba.</p> <p>These efforts are envisaged to continue into the Transitional Period and climax with the implementation of Commission for</p>

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
						Truth, Healing and Reconciliation and other Chapter V mechanisms.
8.	1.15.1	Establishment of IBC to determine the number and boundaries of state and restructuring or composition of Council of States.	√			IBC was established belatedly and its work is ongoing. It has now held 02 meetings so far.
9.	1.15.10 & 1.4.3.2	IBC to complete and present its recommendation to the IGAD Executive Secretary			√	IBC work is ongoing.
10.	1.15.18.1	Appointment of a Technical Boundary Committee (TBC)	√			TBC was appointed
11.	1.15.18.5	TBC to complete its work and present its report to IGAD Mediation.	√			TBC successfully concluded its work and presented its report to the IGAD Mediation on 26 th March 2019 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
12.	1.4.3.5 & 1.18.1.1	Draft and complete a constitutional Amendment Bill that incorporates the Revitalised ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS, 2011) (as amended)			√	The NCAC finalised its incorporation of R-ARCSS into TCRSS; the Bill was handed over to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The Minister tabled the Bill to Cabinet which endorsed and now pending ratification by the TNLA.
13.	1.18.8	The President shall assent to the amendments no later than the end of the Pre-Transitional period		√		Amendment Bill is yet to be ratified by TNLA before signature by the President.
14.	1.18.1.2	Review and complete amendments to relevant national security legislation to bring their provisions into conformity with the R-ARCSS			√	NCAC finalised review and amendment of relevant four national security legislation SPLA Act, Police Act, Prisons Act and Wildlife Act, except Fire Brigade which doesn't exist. The amendments have subjected to stakeholders' validation and their comments are being incorporated.
15.	1.7.1, 1.18	The IGAD to reconstitute or establish the following institutions: The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) etc.	√			All Agreement mechanisms and institutions meant to be established or reconstituted by the IGAD Mediation have been complete. The DDR Commission is yet to be reconstituted by incumbent TGoNU, NPTC and the Parties.
16.	2.1.1	Observation of the Permanent Ceasefire throughout the country	√			The Permanent Ceasefire is largely holding across the country as amongst the Parties. Incidents of clashes reported in and around Yei River areas are attributed to clashes

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
						between SSPDF and/or SPLA-IO with NAS forces of Gen. Cirillo, a non-signatory armed group not adhering to the R-ARCSS.
17.	2.1.3	Dissemination of the provisions of the Permanent Ceasefire to all forces, allies and affiliates under their command			√	Some joint dissemination of the R-ARCSS have taken place but reports by CTSAMVM of continued denial of access by some commanders on the ground is evidence that more needs to be done in this regard.
18.	2.2.4, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5	The IGAD to reconstitute or establish the following Security institutions and mechanisms: Joint Defence Board (JDB), Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) and CTSAMVM	√			The IGAD Mediation has completed establishment and reconstitution of all security related institutions and mechanisms.
19.	2.1.4	Forces of the warring parties and allied forces observe provisions of Permanent Ceasefire	√			Permanent Ceasefire largely holds amongst the Parties and their allied groups.
20.	2.1.5	Completion of disengagement and separation of forces by the Parties, withdrawal of allied troops and opening of humanitarian corridors			√	Some disengagements and withdrawal of forces have taken place but cannot be deemed complete until there is full cantonment of all forces.
21.	2.1.6	Release of all prisoners of war and political detainees by all Parties under ICRC supervision			√	Some prisoners have been released but apparently not all. SPLM/A-IO insists that not all their supporters have been released.
22.	2.1.7	All non-South Sudanese armed groups leave the country within the Pre-Transitional period	√			There is no evidence of any unauthorised foreign force currently in the country.
23.	2.1.8	Cease recruitment and training of the recruits			√	There is allegations of ongoing recruitment and training of forces by some of the Parties, apparently to raise the numbers of forces declared.
24.	2.1.9	No revenge, vengeance or retribution and any kind of violation of the Permanent ceasefire			√	No direct evidence of vengeance but some incidents of violence in contravention of the Permanent Ceasefire provisions reported by CTSAMVM.
25.	2.1.10.1	Parties should refrain from actions that may impede or delay the			√	Generally positive trend in improvement of delivery of

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
		provision of humanitarian assistance, or protection of civilians and restrict free movement of people				humanitarian assistance but some incidents of impediments reported.
26.	2.1.10.2	Parties should refrain from acts and forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and harassments		√		There have been recent alarming reports of prevalence of SGBV in Bentiu for example but no conclusive report on the investigations and action on alleged perpetrator as yet.
27.	2.1.10.3	Parties should refrain from recruitment and/or use of child soldiers by armed forces or militias in contravention of international conventions			√	Some Parties have released child soldiers but certainly not all and attempts by CTSAMVM to verify the forces have been impeded by some Parties.
28.	2.1.10.4	Parties should refrain from offensive provocative or retaliatory actions such as recruitment, mobilization, etc.			√	The Parties have largely observed this provision, but allegations of recruitment and potential mobilisation means it is incomplete.
29.	2.1.10.5	Parties should refrain from acts of hostility intimidation against IDPs etc.	√			There has since been no reported attack against IDPs by the Parties to the R-ARCSS except incidents in and around Yei River area which is fermented by action of a non-signatory armed group.
30.	2.1.10.7	Parties should adhere to the obligations outlined in the CoHA of 21 st December 2017			√	Parties have largely adhered to this provision except for positive obligations towards IDPs and refugees which are yet to take shape and actions of NAS forces who signed CoHA but not adhering to R-ARCSS and are no represented in PCTSA mechanisms.
31.	2.1.10.8	Free movement of citizens, commodities and services shall be guaranteed.			√	Some trade routes remain insecure and inaccessible; Existence of numerous roadblocks undermines this provision.
32.	2.1.10.9	Humanitarian corridors for relief shall be immediately re-opened.	√			All major humanitarian corridors into South Sudan have been opened.
33.	2.1.11	Workshop in Khartoum on a Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA)	√			Workshop completed.

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
34.	2.2.1	Completion of training and redeployment of the necessary unified forces within 8 months		√		Training of unified forces have not yet begun.
35.	2.2.3	Implementation of tasks such as demilitarisation of civilians' centres, disarmament, cantonment of forces, screening of forces, etc.		√		Major towns and cities, including Juba have not yet been demilitarised.
36.	2.2.2 & 2.2.3	Disengagement, separation and cantonment of forces		√		Forces have disengaged, been separated but are yet to report to cantonment sites.
37.	2.2.5 -7	Formation of JTSC and commencement of its meetings	√			JTSC established but operation have been hampered by lack of funding.
38.	2.2.8	JTSC sets eligibility criteria for candidates willing to serve in the unified national army and security organs	√			JTSC have set some eligibility criteria but these have not been rolled out.
39.	2.2.9	Commencement of joint training of the necessary unified forces of the military, police and other security services		√		Only Government forces have as yet reported to training sites. Opposition forces are yet to report, and training have not yet begun.
40.	2.2.10	Redeployment of the unified forces		√		Pending cantonment, training and unification of forces which have not yet begun.
41.	2.2.11	Selection of cantonment sites in accordance with agreed criteria	√			Parties have selected and agreed on 40 cantonments, 25 for opposition and 15 barracks for government forces but actual cantonment of forces is yet to begin.
42.	2.4.5	Reconstitution and restructuring of CTSAMVM	√			CTSAMVM has been fully reconstituted but its operation and effectiveness has been impeded by financial and logistical challenges.
43.	2.4.6	CTSAMVM performing monitoring, verification, compliance and reporting to IGAD and RJMEC on PCTSA implementation	√			<p>CTSAMVM is undertaking monitoring and verification as required but continues to face challenges due to lack of free access especially when it comes to force verification.</p> <p>Its overall operation and effectiveness have been impeded by financial and logistical challenges.</p>

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
44.	2.4.8	Reconstitution and convening of the CTSAMVM Board	√			CTSAMVM Board has been reconstituted and reconvened by its revised ToR is yet to be endorsed by the IGAD Council of Ministers.
45.	2.4.9	Reconstitution of the DDR Commission		√		DDR Commission is yet to be reconstituted by the incumbent TGoNU, NPTC and the Parties.
46.	2.5.1	Reconstitution of the SDSR Board	√			SDSR Board is in place but its work hampered by financial challenges affecting its meeting of set targets.
47.	2.5.3	SDSR Board completes a Strategic Security Assessment		√		SDSR Board is still reviewing its previous security assessment.
48.	2.5.4	SDSR Board complete stage 1-3 of its work including security assessment, develops security policy framework and conducts analysis of operational capabilities of the national army and security forces.		√		SDSR Board is seriously lagging behind due largely to financial and logistical constraints.
49.	3.1.1	Creation of an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection.			√	Overall, an improved political and security environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance but a few legal and administrative requirement poses continuing to pose challenges either at national or state levels.
50.	3.1.1.1	Secure access to civilian population in need of emergency humanitarian assistance and protection			√	Civilians in all part of the country can now be accessed by humanitarian actors but access incidents remain in some cases.
51.	3.1.1.2	Guarantee right of refugees and IDPs to return in safety and dignity and to be afforded physical, legal and psychological protection			√	IDPs and refugees have the right to return by choice but there is limited legal and psychological support being extended to those in need.
52.	3.1.1.3	Respect rights of returnees in accordance with the Bill of Rights under the TCRSS 2011 as amended.			√	No reported incident of violation of rights of returnees but full enjoyment is subject to overall improvement in the economy and security throughout the country.
53.	3.1.1.4	Right of refugees and IDPs to citizenship and the establishment of mechanisms for registration and appropriate identification and/or documentation of affected population.		√		No mechanisms have yet established for registration and appropriate identification/documentation of affected populations.

No.	Articles	Activities	Complete	Pending	Ongoing	Remarks
54.	3.1.1.5	Exercise of right of returnees and IDPs to return to their places of origin and /or live in areas of their choice in safety and dignity.			√	Some areas in the country like around Yei River area remains inaccessible and the issue of dignity requires intervention for some vulnerable groups.
55.	7.1 & 7.2	Reconstitution of the JMEC	√			RJMEC reconstituted with 43 members and chaired by an interim chairperson appointed by JGAD.
56.	7.3	IGAD to appoint a Chairperson for the RJMEC		√		IGAD Heads of State and Government are making consultation on the substantive Chairperson of the RJMEC to be appointed.
57.	7.9	RJMEC submits quarterly report on status of implementation of R-ARCSS	√			Two quarterly reports submitted to date.
58.	7.12	RJMEC holds monthly meetings and extra-ordinary meetings.	√			Five (05) monthly meetings held so far and 01 extra-ordinary meetings.
59.	8.1	Ratification of the R-ARCSS by TNLA and leadership organs of the Parties	√			All Parties have ratified the R-ARCSS

Note: From the Implementation Matrix as provided by the R-ARCSS, a series of important tasks were required to be implemented during the eight (8) months Pre-Transitional Period. The above table summarises fifty-seven (57) key activities which were to be implemented.

The above tasks were categorised into three broad categories and assessed to determine their current status of implementation i.e. completed, pending or ongoing.

- **Completed** tasks are one-time action required to produce results.
- **Pending** tasks denotes where no action has been taken and no result is available.
- **Ongoing** denotes some process have begun or partially undertaken but further actions are required in order to deliver the expected results or ensure full compliance.

Observations

From the above table, 27 out of 59 tasks have been completed. This represents approximately 44% of the overall tasks. Fifteen (17) out of 57 have started but still ongoing with different levels and timelines to expected completion. This accounts for approximately 26%. Seventeen (15) out of 57 tasks are yet to begin or be undertaken representing 30% of the required tasks.

However, the few unimplemented tasks are very critical for the formation of the RTGoNU and effective implementation of the R-ARCSS going forward. The completed tasks relate largely to the establishment or reconstitution of institutions and mechanisms of the R-ARCSS. Even though these have been established or reconstituted accordingly, their functionality has been a big challenge.

Most of the institutions and mechanisms have not been able to implement their assigned tasks effectively due to resource constraints and other impediments. These gaps have serious ramifications for the transition from Pre-Transitional Period into the Transitional Period.

Some of the tasks, including the unification of forces and determination of number of States and boundaries issues by IBC are critical for the formation of the RTGoNU. Lack of coordination and evidence of close cooperation amongst the key principles at the highest level continue to cast doubts and undermine confidence in the peace process.

There has been inadequate support from partners to the NPTC which partly accounts for the lagging behind. The Pre-Transitional Period tasks were expected to be funded by the incumbent TGoNU with support of international partners. Even though some support has been provided, the partners' contribution has generally not been forthcoming. There is need to match words with action if the R-ARCSS is to be fully implemented.

Conclusion

Therefore, even though the Transitional Period is expected to commence immediately at the end of the eight (8) months after the signing of this Agreement (Art. 1.1.2; Art.2.2.1 and Art. 2.3.1 of the R-ARCSS), the decision to be taken in the next couple of weeks as we near the end of the Pre-Transitional Period is to determine to what extent, these critical pending tasks can be expedited to enable timely formation of the RTGoNU, at all levels, and whether or not the tasks can be done concurrently into the Transitional Period by the RTGoNU without jeopardising full implementation of the peace agreement.

Annex B. Members of the Technical Boundary Committee and the Independent Boundaries Commission

Name of Member	Designation in TBC	Nationality
Mr Ali Gragandi Naiem	Chairperson	Sudan
Dr. Edith Nsubuga,	<i>Vice Chairperson</i>	<i>Uganda</i>
Mr Gilbert. K. Ngeno	<i>Rapporteur</i>	<i>Kenya</i>
Mr. Gebrekiros Haile	<i>Member</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>
Mr. Ibrahim Hussein Osman	Member	Somalia
Col. Ali Aden,	Member	Djibouti
Dr. Mathew Pritchard,	Member	Troika/UK
Prof. Leif Manger	Member	Troika/Norway

Name of Member	Designation in IBC	Affiliation
Amb. Thembisile Majola	Chairperson	South Africa
Amb. Adam Chindo	Deputy Chairperson	Nigeria
Lt. Colonel Rafik NAILI	Representative	Algeria
Mr. Augustin Kampayana	Representative	Rwanda
Hon. Onyoti Adigo Nyikwec	<i>Representative</i>	<i>TGoNU</i>
Hon. Wek Mamer Kuol	<i>Representative</i>	<i>TGoNU</i>
Hon. Kur Lual Kur	Representative	TGoNU
Hon. Ajonye Perpetua	Representative	TGoNU
Hon. Martin Majut Yak	Representative	TGoNU
Mr. Budhok Ayang Aney Kur	Representative	SPLM/A-IO
Mr. Peter Marcello Nassir Jeleng	Representative	SPLM/A-IO
Ms. Nyenagwek Kuol Mareng	Representative	FDs
Dr. Lam Akol	Representative	SSOA
Mr. Joseph Wol Modesto	Representative	OPP

Annex C. Members of the Agreement Institutions and Implementation Mechanisms

Institutions/Mechanisms	I-TGoNU	SPLM/A -IO	SSOA	FDP	OPP
National Pre-Transition Committee (NPTC) (10 Members)	1. Hon Tut Gatluak Manimee (Chair) 2. Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro 3. Hon Michael Makuei Lueth 4. Dr Dhieu Mathok Diing 5. Hon Awut Deng Acuil	1. Mr. Henry Dilah Odwar (Dep Chair) 2. Mr. Puot Kang Chol	Mr Gabriel Changson Chang (Dep Chair)	Hon Deng Alor Kuol	Mr. Peter Mayen Majongdit
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) (43 Members)	1. Hon. Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro 2. Hon. Michael Makuei Lueth 3. Dr. Dhujei Mathok Diig 4. Hon. Awut Deng Achuil 5. Hon. Sophia Pal Gai	1. Mr. Stephen Par Kuol 2. Ms Sandra Bona Malual	Dr Hon Hussien Abel Bagi Akol	Mr. Kosti Manibe	Hon. Wilson Lodiong Sebit
Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) (15 Members)	1. Hon Onyoti Adigo Nyikwac 2. Hon Kur Lual Kur 3. Hon Wek Mamer Kuol 4. Hon Martin Majut Yak 5. Hon Preptua Ajonyi	1. Mr. Peter Marcello Nasir Jelenge 2. Mr. Budhok Ayang Aney Kur	1. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin	Ms. Nyenagwek Kuol Mareng	Mr. Joseph Wol Moddesto
National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) (15 Members)	1. Dr. Richard Kabi Mulla 2. Hon Deng Awur Mecnyin 3. Hon Abraham Biar Deng 4. Dr Salwa Gabriel Barbary 5. Hon Robert Benjamin Loki	1. Mr. Oyet Nathaniel Penono 2. Dr Riang Yar Dhuor	1. Hon Clement Juma Mbugoniwa	Hon. John Luke	Hon. Prof.Ajang Bior Duot Bior
Joint Defense Board (JDB)	1. Gen Jok Riak Makol (Chair) 2. Gen Majak Akec Makol 3. Lt. Gen Akol Koor Kuc 4. Lt. Gen. Thomas Duoth Guet 5. Gen Henry Kuag Aguar 6. Gen Jameson Losuk Lopai	1. Gen Simon Gatwech Dual 2. Gen John Jo k Gai Bipal 3. Lt Gen Yiey Dak Wie 4. Lt. Gen. James Koang Chol Co-Chair)	1. John Akich Chol 2. JAngelo Faustino Nabiso 3. Agany Abdelbagi Akol 4. Abdalla Ali Auromo 5. Julius Mai Manyluony 6. William Matiek Yidet	None	None

Institutions/Mechanisms	I-TGoNU	SPLM/A -IO	SSOA	FDP	OPP
Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) (20 Members)	1. Lt. Gen. Malek Ruben Riak 2. Lt. Gn Johnson Juma Akot 3. Maj. Gen. Ayor Akuoch Anak	1. Mrs Angelina Teny 2. Lt Gen Koang Gatkuoth Kerjiok 3. Maj Gen Nyagwal Deng Ajak	1. Lt. Gen Bapiny Momytuil Wejang 2. Hon. Denay Jock Chagor 3. Maj. Gen. Bernard Tito Pula Abaya	1. Gen. Oyay D. Ajak 2. Gen. Madut Biar	Hon. Martin Aligo Abe
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) (31 Members) - Board	1. Maj Gen. Ernest Dut Akol 2. Maj. Gen. Ochucholo Lemu 3. Maj. Gen. Juac Nathan Garang	1. Hon Manasseh Daniel Zindo 2. Hon Regina Joseph Kapa 3. Lt Gen Monto Abdulla Bonjo	1. Ms Josephine Lagu Yanga 2. Brig. Gen. Eddy Ukele 3. Lt. Col. Samson Machod Yoak	1. Gen. Mach Paul	1. Hon. Martin Tako 2. Ms Victoria Benjamin 3. Ms Susan Kiden
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) (31 Members) - CTC	1. Maj. Gen. Rabi Mujung Emmanuel 2. Maj Gen Akol Majok Nyigan 3. Maj. Gen. Wuoi Mayom Deng 4. Maj. Gen. Thomas Gador Kic 5. Maj. Gen. John Daniel Kipa 6. Rep from National Police Services	1. Maj Gen. Matin Gama Abucha 2. Brig. Gen. Dr. Chuol Ruey Kumpuok 3. Brig. Gen. Andrea Mangu Adal 4. Col. Ezekiel How Kuol Gatluk 5. Col Juma jackson Lasu	1. Maj Gen. James Gai Gatduel 2. Brig. Gen. Amos Amin Elia Lupe 3. Brig. Gen. Peter Riiny Mabior 4. Brig. Gen Peter Gatkuoth Thot Bakam	1. Maj. Gen. Bior Leek Kuareng	None
Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC)	1. Lt. Gen. Charles Dut Akol(Chair) 2. Maj. Gen. Mayen Kulang 3. Maj. Gen. John Maluit Wic 4. Maj. Gen. Gabriel Goor Mawar 5. Brig. Top Riek 6. Brig. Ayuen Dot	1. Lt Gen Gabriel Duop Lam 2. Maj Gen Gatkhor Gatluak Koryom (Co-Chair) 3. Maj Gen John Sabateri Mamido 4. Maj Gen Paul Galerio Modi Ohrinyang 5. Maj Gen Buda John Aban Yor Rcd/ 29/9	1. Lt. Gen. Garang Ayii Akol 2. Gen. Ali Kur Ajak 3. Maj. Gen. Isaac Moro Jenesio (Co-Chair) 4. John Pam Gatjiet Pech	None	None
Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) (16 Members)	1. Maj Gen Chokrac Alith (Chair) 2. Maj Gen Abraham Keat Bichok 3. Maj. Gen Michael Majur Aleer 4. Maj. Gen Ajak Deng Biar 5. Representative from National Police Services 6. Representative from National Prison Services 7. Representative from National Wildlife Services 8. Representative from Natioonal Civil Defence Services 9. Secretariat Nominee from SSOA	1. Lt Gen James Koang Chuol Ranley 2. Lt Gen Wesley Welebe Samson (Co Chair) 3. Maj Gen Dheling Keah Chuol 4. Maj Gen James Duop Gatlack 5. Maj Gen Wang Chany Thian	1. Dr. Olaw Adiang Nijok (Head of Secretariat) 2. Maj Gen. Thomas Onyango Yiel 3. Brig Gen. Matiek Koang Yidet	None	None
Memo					
Date of Ratification		22-Sep-18	28-Sep-18	25-Sep-18	

Source: Parties to the Agreement and JMEC Staff

Institutions/Mechanisms	Civil Society	Youth	Women	FBL	E. Persons	Business	Academia
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) - 43 Members	1. <i>Akuoch Ajang Nyanhom</i> 2. <i>Rajab John Mohandis</i>	1. <i>Dr Emily Koiti</i> 2. <i>Malish John Peter</i>	1. <i>Rita Lopidia</i> 2. <i>Mary Akech Bior</i>	1. <i>Shiekh Mohamed Hassan Morjan</i> 2. <i>Rev. John Okumu Hakim</i>	1. <i>Professor Moses Machar</i> 2. <i>Prof Francis Deng</i>	1. <i>Simon Akuei Deng</i> 2. <i>Yar Manoa Majok</i>	1. <i>Prof. Pauline Riak</i>
National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) - (15 Members)	1. <i>Molana Reech Ring Bol</i> 2. <i>Chol Majur Nhom</i>	1. <i>Wani Michael Saki</i>	1. <i>Ms Merakaje Lorna</i>	None	None	None	None
Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) (20 Members)	1. <i>Dudu Sebit Abbdhalah</i> 2. <i>Geofrey Lou Duke</i>	1. <i>Angelo Madut Agoth</i>	1. <i>Minagano Lydia</i> 2. <i>Nyamai Joluong</i>	1. <i>Rev. Lomeling Francis Philip Lado</i>	None	None	1. <i>Rt. Lt. Gen Malwal Bol</i>
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) (31 Members) Board	1. <i>Shiek Vitale Aligo Samson</i> 2. <i>Edmund Yakani</i>	1. <i>Augustino Deng</i> 2. <i>Ms Nyaura Bol</i>	1. <i>Aluel Noami</i> 2. <i>Atong Amos Agook</i>	None		1. <i>Juma Charles</i>	1. <i>Dr. Siham Mohammed Osman</i>