



**Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
(RJMEC)**

REPORT

BY

**H.E. AMB. MAJ. GEN. GEORGE AGGREY OWINOW (rtd)
INTERIM CHAIRPERSON OF RJMEC**

**ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVITALISED
AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

FOR THE PERIOD

1st July to 30th September 2025

Report No. 028/25

Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
Plot 133, Block B-XV, Hai Motor First Class, Juba, South Sudan

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List of Acronyms

<i>AU</i>	<i>African Union</i>
<i>AUC</i>	<i>African Union Commission</i>
<i>AU PSC</i>	<i>African Union Peace and Security Council</i>
<i>CAMP</i>	<i>Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan</i>
<i>CoS</i>	<i>Council of States</i>
<i>CSOs</i>	<i>Civil Society Organizations</i>
<i>CRA</i>	<i>Compensation and Reparation Authority</i>
<i>CTRH</i>	<i>Commission for Truth Reconciliation and Healing</i>
<i>CTSAMVM</i>	<i>Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism</i>
<i>DDR</i>	<i>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</i>
<i>EITI</i>	<i>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</i>
<i>HNRP</i>	<i>Humanitarian National Response Plan</i>
<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Internally Displaced Persons</i>
<i>IGAD</i>	<i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>
<i>ITGoNU</i>	<i>Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>JDB</i>	<i>Joint Defense Board</i>
<i>JMCC</i>	<i>Joint Military Ceasefire Commission</i>
<i>JTSC</i>	<i>Joint Transitional Security Committee</i>
<i>JRC</i>	<i>Judicial Reform Committee</i>
<i>MGSCW</i>	<i>Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare</i>
<i>MVT</i>	<i>Mobile Verification Teams</i>
<i>NCAC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Amendment Committee</i>
<i>NCRC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Review Commission</i>
<i>NEC</i>	<i>National Elections Commission</i>
<i>NLI</i>	<i>National Transformational Leadership Institute</i>
<i>NSS</i>	<i>National Security Service</i>
<i>NUF</i>	<i>Necessary Unified Forces</i>
<i>PPC</i>	<i>Political Parties Council</i>
<i>R-ARCSS</i>	<i>Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</i>
<i>RJMEC</i>	<i>Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</i>
<i>RTGoNU</i>	<i>Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>SDSR</i>	<i>Strategic Defense and Security Review</i>
<i>SPLM-IO</i>	<i>Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition</i>
<i>SSPDF</i>	<i>South Sudan People's Defence Force</i>
<i>TNL</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislature</i>
<i>TNLA</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislative Assembly</i>
<i>UNDP</i>	<i>United Nations Development Programme</i>
<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</i>
<i>UNHCR</i>	<i>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</i>

Executive Summary

The RJMEC Quarterly Report provides an overview of the status of the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) for the period 1st July to 30th September 2025, assessing recent developments across political/governance, security, humanitarian, economic, and transitional justice, and constitution-making processes. The report builds on previous RJMEC quarterly reports submitted under Article 7.9 of the R-ARCSS and contains key observations, highlights challenges, and provides recommendations directed to the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), the Parties to the R-ARCSS, the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), regional guarantors, and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan.

During the reporting period, the political and security situation continued to deteriorate, significantly undermining the implementation of the Revitalised Peace Agreement. The R-ARCSS faced renewed pressures following the Nasir incident, a major violation of the Permanent Ceasefire, and its aftermath which triggered arrests, prolonged detention, and judicial processes as well as several political actions detrimental to trust building between the parties and the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

The Transitional National Legislature resumed sittings after a six-month recess and made some progress on its legislative priorities, while the implementation of judicial reforms, as contained in the recommendations of the *ad-hoc* Judicial Reform Committee (JRC) report, is pending. Elections related institutions such as the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC) continued with institutional strengthening and capacity-building activities but lacked sufficient funding to discharge their mandates.

Meanwhile, ceasefire violations significantly increased during the quarter, particularly involving the SSPDF and SPLA-IO across the Upper Nile, Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria States, signalling widespread breaches of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements. The CTSAMVM has been unable to investigate the reported clashes due to access challenges in some areas, and a high level of violence in others. The institution also reports challenges related to SPLA-IO representation in the CTSAMVM structures. Meanwhile, no progress yet was made towards commencement of Phase II of the unification of forces.

The humanitarian situation worsened, driven by ongoing conflict, climate shocks, and cross-border displacement from Sudan. Whereas the number of South Sudanese requiring humanitarian assistance increased, donor support continued to shrink, forcing international agencies to scale down key programmes. Basic service delivery, reliant mainly on humanitarian partners, remained deeply constrained.

On resource, economic and financial management, the RTGoNU Economic Cluster has approved a national budget of 5.2 trillion South Sudanese Pounds (approximately US \$1.116 billion) for the 2025–2026 fiscal year. Meanwhile, crude oil production in the Upper Nile fields has recommenced following the completion of repairs to the pipeline transporting oil to Port Sudan. Also, the market value of the oil has dropped due to high insurance costs geopolitics and interest rates, plus an additional discount of US \$1.50 per barrel being deducted from the value of crude oil because of the advances. However,

the legislations regulating the oil industry reviewed by the NCAC since 2022, have not been enacted.

Under transitional justice, some progress was made with nomination of persons to serve in the Selection Panel for establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH); while there was no new progress made towards establishment of the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA). There was no progress registered in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). In terms of the permanent constitution making process, some progress in terms of civic education and public consultations, including admission of a South Sudanese Women's Charter on the Permanent Constitution-making prepared by the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) and preparation for conduct of civic education and public consultation in the States and Administrative Areas.

In response to the precarious political and security situation in the country, RJMEC briefed the TNLA twice and intensified engagements with the RTGoNU, regional guarantors, and international stakeholders throughout the quarter in a bid to restore the sanctity of the R-ARCSS, and to appeal for de-escalation and inclusive dialogue, and a return to full implementation of the Revitalised Agreement in letter and spirit.

Recommendations

In light of the delicate political and security situation, serious violations of the R-ARCSS and the ongoing judicial process, RJMEC offers the following recommendations to the Parties to the R-ARCSS and Stakeholders; RTGoNU; TNLA; IGAD; African Union; United Nations; and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan for upholding the sanctity of the R-ARCSS and a return to its full implementation.

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- cease all forms of hostilities, embrace inclusive dialogue, re-activate the implementation mechanisms of the Agreement and fully adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements; and
- party leadership to desist from taking actions that further erode the political trust and confidence in the Revitalised Peace Agreement and ensure that the political disagreements are resolved through dialogue and disputes addressed through agreed mechanisms of the R-ARCSS.

b. To the RTGoNU:

- urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- expedite implementation of the *ad-hoc* Judicial Reform Committee's report and its recommendations, in letter and spirit, especially through the review and amendment of the Judiciary Act and reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission to implement the requisite reforms;

- further expedite the re-tabling of the National Security Service Act before the TNLA for reconsideration;
- expedite the enactment of the pending laws revised by the NCAC, such as the two Petroleum laws and the NGO Bill;
- avail sufficient funding to the NCRC in a timely manner to enable it to roll out the civic education and public consultation campaigns to all parts of the country;
- expedite convening the Council of Ministers to discuss the national budget and the Finance Bill for 2025/2026;
- expand and protect political and civic space to enable the return of some peace partners to the Agreement mechanisms and further the creation of a conducive environment for implementation of elections and constitution making-related tasks; and
- faithfully adhere to the mandate to implement the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit to realise free, fair and credible elections in December 2026.

c. To the TNLA:

- prevail on the Executive of the RTGoNU to restore full adherence to the R-ARCSS, urgently engage in an inclusive genuine dialogue, and recommit to full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in letter and spirit; and
- complete enactment of the pending laws.

d. To IGAD:

- urgently consider convening an IGAD Council of Ministers meeting on the situation in South Sudan and further recommend the convening of the IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit to consider and deliberate on the current situation and decide on timely and appropriate remedial actions; and
- prevail on the Parties to restore full adherence to the R-ARCSS, urgently engage in an inclusive genuine dialogue, and recommit to full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in letter and spirit within the remaining extended Transitional Period.

e. To the African Union:

- in consultation with the RTGoNU, expedite the establishment of the HCSS to investigate, and if necessary, to prosecute those bearing responsibility for any crimes committed during this Transitional Period.

f. To the United Nations:

- consider endorsing the call by the IGAD Summit and the AU PSC for the South Sudanese Government to de-escalate tensions, embrace dialogue, and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- consider undertaking an urgent high-level diplomatic mission to Juba to assess the situation and directly engage the Parties to the R-ARCSS;
- further consider supporting the regional efforts towards assisting the Parties to commence dialogue and expedite implementation of the critical pending tasks towards a permanent constitution-making and the conduct of elections in a timely manner;
- call upon the SSPDF and SPLA-IO commands to cease all hostilities and to urgently restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, and refrain from acts of violence; and
- consider all possible measures to hold peace spoilers and/or violators of the R-ARCSS accountable.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- consider providing support to the NCRC and the constitution-making process, including by directly funding some of the critical mechanisms and activities such as civic education through technical and logistical support; and
- continue sustained high-level diplomatic engagements with the leadership of RTGoNU, IGAD, AU and UN to ensure that the sanctity of the R-ARCSS is upheld by all the peace partners and call on all the Parties to recommit to inclusive implementation of the Agreement.

I. Introduction

1. This report covers the status of implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) during the period 1st July to 30th September 2025 and builds on similar previous Reports Nos. 001/19 - 027/25 since the R-ARCSS came into force on 12th September 2018. It also highlights the engagements of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) in the fulfilment of its oversight, monitoring and evaluation mandate within the R-ARCSS; and concludes by providing key recommendations to the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan.
2. The report notes that during the quarter, overall, South Sudan continued to experience political and security developments which heightened existing tensions between Parties to the R-ARCSS, thereby raising serious concerns about their adherence to the provisions of the R-ARCSS. Following the Nasir security incident of March 2025, there have been disruptions of the implementation of the R-ARCSS as a whole with its institutions and mechanisms negatively impacted.
3. Meanwhile, several political decisions have been taken during the reporting period, some of which are contrary to the principles of collegiality, consultation and consensus in decision-making provided for in the R-ARCSS. Some of the political developments pivotal to the peace process included the unilateral appointments of six judicial officers from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court and 18 judicial officers to the Court of Appeal from the High Court. These decisions collectively reflected a deepening lack of adherence to the R-ARCSS and the erosion of trust between ITGoNU and SPLM/A-IO peace partners.
4. In mid-July 2025, the TNL resumed sitting after nearly six months of recess. Regarding the judicial reforms process, no progress was made towards the implementation of the *ad hoc* Judicial Reform Committee (JRC) report. Even though the former Chief Justice and his deputy were replaced, and several new judges appointed or promoted, these appointments were contrary to the provisions of Article 1.9.2.1 of the R-ARCSS which requires shared decision-making of the Presidency. This development was not in furtherance of the recommended judicial reforms.
5. Preparations for the conduct for national elections have continued, albeit slowly, with the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC) focusing on strengthening their institutional capacity and operational readiness. However, lack of funding undermines these institutions' abilities to discharge their respective mandates effectively.
6. Regarding the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, there was a sharp increase in clashes between the South Sudan Peoples Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA -IO), especially in Upper Nile State, the northern part of Jonglei, and the States of Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria. As a result, the Permanent Ceasefire has been severely violated.

7. No progress has been registered in the unification and deployment of forces. Meanwhile, the Security Mechanisms, namely the JDB, JMCC; JTSC, the DDR Commission and the SDSR Board have been negatively affected by the current political and security situation, as their work stalled.
8. On the humanitarian situation in the country, the context has continued to worsen due to the deteriorating economic, security and political environment, inflows of returnees and refugees from Sudan, population displacement due to flooding and armed clashes, food insecurity, diseases, climate shocks, and limited access to basic essential services. The situation is compounded by diminishing funding for humanitarian action and the provision of basic services mainly covered by the international community and NGOs.
9. The Economic Cluster of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan has approved a national budget for the 2025–2026 fiscal year. Meanwhile, crude oil production has recommenced following the completion of repairs to the pipeline transporting oil to Port Sudan. However, due to several factors, the market value of the oil has dropped. Further, the legislation regulating the oil industry reviewed since 2022, have not been enacted.
10. The RTGoNU, in partnership with state and non-state stakeholders and development partners, is engaged in the implementation of the South Sudan Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan (CAMP). Additionally, the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism has established a comprehensive Tourism Policy for supporting and regulating tourism, meanwhile the *Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas Bill 2024*, awaited presidential approval.
11. On Transitional Justice, South Sudanese stakeholders submitted the names of their nominees to the RTGoNU for appointment as members to the Selection Panel. The AUC has also progressed in recruiting non-South Sudanese CTRH Commissioners. Regarding the establishment of HCSS, the AUC is yet to issue guidelines to the RTGoNU. Meanwhile, there was no further progress towards the establishment of the CRA.
12. Regarding the constitution-making process, the reconstituted NCRC conducted a series of pre-civic education and public consultation trainings, and public events in preparation for the commencement of phase one of the activities.
13. In response to the protracted deteriorating political and security situation in the country, RJMEC intensified its diplomatic engagements nationally, regionally and internationally. Despite these focused efforts, the challenges persist and continue to undermine the peace process.
14. This report is therefore structured as follows: Section I provides an overview of the report, followed by Section II, with an analysis of the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS, Section III highlights key observations and recommendations to the RTGoNU, the TNLA, the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS as well as to the United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan. Section IV concludes the report.

II. Status of Implementation of the Transitional Tasks of the R-ARCSS

Chapter 1: Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity

Recent Political Developments

15. Since the beginning of 2025, the political and security challenges have escalated and the following the Nasir incident have undermined effective implementation of the R-ARCSS, with the situation deteriorating further over the quarter under review. These setbacks have been compounded by some unilateral political actions, undertaken by the Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity (ITGoNU), contrary to the principles of collegiality, consultation and consensus in decision-making as provided for in the R-ARCSS.
16. On 9th July 2025, six judicial officers from the Court of Appeal were unilaterally appointed to the Supreme Court of South Sudan while 18 judicial offices were unilaterally appointed to the Court of Appeal from the High Court.¹ It should be noted that, in accordance with Article 1.9.2.1 of the R-ARCSS, appointment of judicial office holders during the Transitional Period is a shared responsibility which falls within the powers to be exercised by the Presidency. Decisions on judicial appointments are to be undertaken by the President, the First Vice President and other Vice Presidents through consultations and agreement.
17. On 1st September 2025, Hon. Dr Joseph Geng Akech was appointed the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, replacing Hon. Wek Mamer Kuol. On the same day, Hon. Chief Justice Benjamin Bak Deng established a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court as a Special Court to try the First Vice President and his co-accused, over the Nasir incident. The appointed Supreme Court judges include, among others, Justice Stephen Simon Benjingwa and Hon. Justice Isaac Pur Majak, who form part of the aforementioned Special Court.
18. On 11th September 2025, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs publicly announced a decision that, as the prosecuting authority, he would charge several individuals with various offences connected with the Nasir incidents of 3rd to 7th March 2025. According to the Minister, the charges emanated from investigations into the Nasir incident conducted by an Investigations Committee established by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. Details of this Investigations Committee and how it was constituted, membership and terms of reference were not made public.

¹ H.E. President Salva Kiir appointed six judges to the Supreme Court who were previously Court of Appeal judges: Stephen Simon Benjingwa, Bol Lul Wang, Isaac Pur Majak, William Kaya Pacifico, Makur Machok Manyon, and Kulang Jeroboam Machor. He also appointed 18 High Court judges to the Court of Appeal: Andrew Joshua Ladu, Duoth Kulang Bichiok, Malou Yel Akok, Garang Ajang Deng, Kuol Monytoch Deng, Obaj Denyong Anyong, Sumeya Sallah Abdallah, Noah Gabriel Kau, Aban Tor Onwar, Abrahm Majur Lat, Takimo Othuan Dak, Alexander Sabor Subek, Michael Atem Chol, Nicola Nyuol Makuach, Mathiang Kuach Mathiang, Bol Ayuel Akuei, John Yel Aleu, and Charles Oyoo Nyawelo.

19. Subsequently, the FVP Dr. Riek Machar and the SPLM/A-IO co-accused individuals² have been charged with offenses, namely: (a) murder, contrary to the Penal Code Act, 2008; (b) conspiracy and common intention, contrary the Penal Code Act, 2008 (coordination with White Army); (c) terrorism and financing terrorism, contrary to the Anti-money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2012, as amended in 2024; (d) treason and acts against State authority contrary to the Penal Code Act, 2008; (e) destruction of public property and military assets contrary to the Penal Code Act; and (f) crimes against humanity, contrary to the Penal Code Act, 2008.
20. On 11th September 2025, the President suspended Dr. Riek Machar, First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan and Hon. Puot Kang Chol, national Minister for Petroleum from their respective offices. On 22nd September 2025, the trial of the FVP and the SPLM/A-IO co-accused formally commenced in a Special Court established in Juba.
21. Regarding serious violations by the Parties to the R-ARCSS during the Transitional Period, the R-ARCSS provides for frameworks, institutions and mechanisms to deal with such matters, and these institutions have been relied upon before.
22. With respect to the serious crimes, Article 5.3.1 of the R-ARCSS provided for the establishment of an independent HCSS by the African Union Commission (AUC) to investigate and where necessary prosecute individuals bearing responsibility for violation of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law, committed from 15th December 2013 through the end of the Transitional Period. This Court is yet to be established.
23. The R-ARCSS further provides that the HCSS has jurisdiction over serious crimes during the Transitional Period and is supreme to any other courts in the Republic of South Sudan, including the Supreme Court. Article 5.3.2 of the R-ARCSS highlights:

“The HCSS shall have jurisdiction with respect to the following crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious crimes under international law and relevant laws of the Republic of South Sudan including gender-based crimes and sexual violence.” Furthermore, Article 5.3.2.2 of the R-ARCSS states that, “the HCSS shall be independent and distinct from the national judiciary in its operations, and shall carry out its own investigations, and shall have primacy over any national courts of Republic of South Sudan.”
24. Moreover, the judiciary of the Republic of South Sudan is still the subject of reforms to enable it to be independent and to subscribe to the principles of separation of powers and supremacy of the rule of law, pursuant to article 1.17 of the R-ARCSS. To that end, the recommendations contained in the final report of the *ad hoc* Judicial Reform Committee (JRC) submitted to the RTGoNU and endorsed by the Presidency in the last quarter of 2024 to initiate such reforms are yet to be implemented.

² The eight accused are: H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, FVP; Hon. Pout Kang Chol, Minister of Petroleum; Lt. Gen. Gabriel Duop Lam, CDF of the SPLM/A-IO; Mr. Mam Pal Dhuor, Businessman; Hon. Gatwich Lam Puoch, Member of TNLA representing Nasir; Brig. Gen Camilo Gatmai Kel, aide to FVP; Mr. Mading Riek Yak and Mr. Dominic Gatgok Riek, a generator operator in the Office of the FVP. The 13 other suspects were reported as still at large and might be tried in absentia.

The Executive of the RTGoNU

25. Following the house arrest of FVP Dr Riek Machar, announcement of his suspension from the Presidency and subsequent judicial process³ against him and his co-accused, the Governance Cluster which he chairs has not met during the quarter. In addition, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers have also not met. Two co-accused national ministers on the SPLM-IO tickets, namely Hon. Puot Kang, Minister of Petroleum and Hon. Pal Mai Deng (SPLM-IO), Minister for Irrigation and Water Resources were suspended from their respective ministries. Hon. Pal Mai Deng was replaced by Hon. James Mawich Makuac (SPLM-IO) meanwhile the position of Hon. Pot Kang has not been filled.
26. At the gubernatorial level, significant changes were made on agreed responsibility-sharing arrangements among the parties which affected the SPLM/A-IO positions. In August 2025, Hon. James Al-Tayib Jazz Birapai (ITGoNU) was unilaterally appointed as the new Governor of Western Equatoria State, replacing Governor Alfred Futuyo Karaba (SPLM/A-IO) who was relieved on 10th February 2025, a decision contested by the SPLM/A-IO. Furthermore, the unilateral appointment of Governor Gen. James Koang Chuol (ITGoNU) in March 2025, replacing Gen. James Odhok Oyai, violated the terms of the responsibility-sharing arrangement. Notwithstanding recommendations made to return the two gubernatorial positions to the SPLM/A-IO, no remedial steps were undertaken by the ITGoNU.

The Transitional National Legislature

27. The TNL, comprising the TNLA and the CoS, resumed sitting on 16th July 2025 after nearly six months of recess. At its opening session, H.E. President Salva Kiir Mayardit underscored, among others, that: “peace, security and national unity” remain the top priorities of his government’s agenda, “South Sudan will not go back to war” and all the parties to the Peace Agreement should recommit, without setting pre-conditions or reservations, to complete the remaining transitional tasks in time for free and credible elections in 2026. The President also called for dialogue for peace with the holdout groups.
28. During the quarter, some changes were made to the leadership of the TNL. Through a Presidential Decree, the President replaced Rt Hon. Oyet Nathaniel Pierino (SPLM/A-IO), 1st Deputy Speaker of the TNLA with Rt Hon. Ambrose Lomin Pitia (SPLM/A-IO). In addition, he revoked the appointment of Hon. Faruk Gatkuoth as the SPLM-IO Chief Whip at the TNLA. Meanwhile, at the CoS, its Speaker, Rt Hon. Deng Deng Akon (SPLM/A-IO) was replaced by Rt Hon. Daniel Awet Akot (SPLM/A-IO).

Legislative Reforms

29. In terms of legislative reforms, little progress was made during this reporting period. The TNLA reconvened and the National Audit Chambers Bill was moved from first to second reading stage. After a very long delay, the Audit Chamber Bill is now set for the third and final reading and enactment.
30. Even though the NCAC had completed all its tasks of reviewing and drafting amendments of relevant laws as per Article 1.18.1.2 of the R-ARCSS, some of its revised laws are still

awaiting Cabinet endorsement and subsequent enactment by the TNLA, for example *The Petroleum Bill*, *The Petroleum Revenue Management Bill*, *The NGO Bill* and *Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Bill* and others are at various stages of enactment.

31. With the Governance Cluster and the Council of Ministers not convening regularly since the onset of the current crisis, progress in these laws have stalled. It is expected that the resumption of the TNL sittings will pave the way for considerations of some of the pending laws.

Judicial Reforms

32. With regard to the judicial reforms process, there was no progress in terms of the implementation of the *ad hoc* JRC report. Even though, the President replaced the former Chief Justice and his deputy and appointed or promoted new judges, these appointments were not only contrary to the provisions of the R-ARCSS which requires consultation and agreement with the First Vice President and the other four Vice Presidents, but also it was not in furtherance of the recommended judicial reforms. Under the R-ARCSS, implementation of the JRC reforms requires, first, the review and amendment of the Judiciary Act, reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and then implementation of the recommended reforms with the advice and recommendations from the reconstituted JSC.

National Elections

33. Regarding the national elections, the National Elections Commission (NEC) is mandated to conduct the forthcoming elections under the provision of the permanent constitution in line with Article 1.20.5. of the R-ARCSS, with the National Elections Act to be amended within two months following the adoption of the Permanent Constitution (Article 1.20.6) to ensure the Act conforms to the provision of the Permanent Constitution. With barely 13 months left to the elections as scheduled, there is need for expeditious implementation of the pending tasks of the constitution-making and electoral processes as they are interlinked. Implementation of most of these tasks require funding.
34. In the meantime, the NEC continued to strengthen its institutional capacity and operational readiness for conducting elections as scheduled in December 2026. Accordingly, the NEC completed the Civic and Voter Education Curriculum, conducted a baseline survey on citizens' awareness of the electoral process and access to information in South Sudan, and prepared its Civic and Voter Education Strategy for 2025 – 2027.
35. The NEC has also drafted the Electoral Operations Timeline for the 2026 General Elections and reportedly shared the draft timeline with the Presidency and the High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee for the Implementation of R-ARCSS. Furthermore, the NEC trained its Commissioners, State High Elections Committees (SHEC) in all the States and the officials at the NEC headquarters on elections management and operationalisation. It has also reportedly completed an assessment of general electoral security in all the States and the Administrative Areas and procured vehicles for the Commissioners/Secretariat and the SHEC members.
36. The ongoing NEC activities include the construction of the Commission's warehouses in Juba and the four remaining State High Elections offices in Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei States. The pending tasks, however, include, formation of the elections

management structures in all the three Administrative Areas, procurement of equipment for the State High Elections Offices, procurement of Aida Hotel for the NEC headquarters, appointments of the State Returning Officers, determination of emoluments for the Commissioners and the State High Elections Committees, addressing the legal gaps in the National Elections Act 2023 as well as seeking political guidance and decisions from the Parties to the R-ARCSS on such matters which are beyond the powers of the NEC.

37. According to the NEC, the Commission is faced with several challenges, including lack of political will and commitment from the Parties to the Agreement; existence of gaps and contradictions in the legal framework; persistent security concerns in the country; inadequate and delayed funding disbursement; and environmental challenges occasioned by climate change.
38. With regard to the work of the PPC, it did not register any new political party during the reporting period. However, the PPC reviewed its work plan, priority activities and budget to align with the new timeline and discharge its mandate more effectively. Despite resource constraints, the PPC has continued with institutional strengthening, targeted engagements with the RTGoNU institutions, political parties, stakeholders and partners by updating them on the status of its work. In September 2025, the PPC presented its progress report to the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, highlighting its general status, achievements, challenges and action plan. The PPC also briefed the leadership of the High-Level Ad-Hoc Implementation Committee on the status of its work, including preparation for the 2026 elections.
39. During the reporting period, the PPC commissioned an analysis of the political parties' adherence to the 35 percent representation in the executive and membership of registered political parties. According to the PPC, the report will serve as a roadmap to ensure adherence to the agreed minimum threshold of women's representation in political parties as well as in identification of challenges and gaps that will inform programmatic interventions towards preparing women's participation and inclusion in the upcoming elections.
40. The Council received Mr. Graham-Maitland, the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs (UNMISS) who had paid a courtesy call on the Council. During the courtesy call, UNMISS donated two vehicles to the Council to support its institutional strengthening and ongoing activities.
41. The PPC's immediate priorities include, *inter alia*, registration of new political parties; vetting the registered political parties for compliance with the law; updating records and particulars of the registered political parties; continuous capacity-building of the Council members and political parties on laws governing registration and management of political parties so as to ensure informed and responsible participation; continuous dialogue with political parties through communication on its operations, decision-making and information sharing; and continuous capacity development of its personnel to equip them with the necessary skills to be more effective. In order for the Council to discharge its mandate effectively, it requires predictable funding disbursement from the RTGoNU.

Gender Considerations

42. On gender inclusivity, women's empowerment and participation are some of the gains of the Revitalized Peace Agreement which needs to be protected at all costs. The 35 percent minimum representation of women across the board, gender mainstreaming, equality, and women's participation, are critical requirements for the implementation of all provisions of the R-ARCSS. Pursuant to this goal, Hon. Advocate Sarah Peter Nyot Kok was appointed as the Counsel General in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, while Hon. Adut Salva Kiir, was appointed as Senior Presidential Envoy for Special Programs, adding to the number of women serving in decision making positions in Government. However, adherence to the 35 percent minimum representation of women across the board remained a concern during the reporting period.
43. The implementation of the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS has continued to be hampered by the marked slow implementation of the Agreement. It is paramount that relevant pieces of legislation and policies including the National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (WPS) and the Women Empowerment Bill, the Women Enterprise Fund Bill and the Youth Enterprise Fund Bill, among others, be passed to facilitate the creation of a conducive environment for women's empowerment, inclusion and participation in the peace process and preparation for the elections as scheduled.
44. Despite the challenges, women-led organizations and CSOs have continued to conduct activities that support women and youth empowerment and participation in the political, constitution making and transitional justice in preparation for the upcoming elections. During this reporting period the Centre for Inclusive Governance, Peace and Justice (CIGPJ) conducted a workshop on survivor-centered approach to transitional justice. The training targeted high court judges and magistrates across South Sudan on GBV and CRSV with the aim of strengthening adjudication and prosecution of GBV cases and prioritizing survivors' rights and dignity as part of a larger strategy to decentralize GBV courts and ensure survivors access to justice across South Sudan.
45. On 9th and 11th September, the National Transformational Leadership Institute (NTLI) at the University of Juba in collaboration with the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders targeted women leaders and stakeholders from diverse backgrounds across South Sudan. The objective was building a cross-partisan network to create a solidarity platform where women leaders across political divides can collaborate, strategize, and advocate for gender-responsive governance. It was noted that many women leaders are not fully familiar with the peace agreement and the gender provisions therein which offer solutions to the root causes of gender inequality, women disempowerment and limited participation and inclusion.
46. If women are to be actively and meaningfully engaged in the peace process, it is paramount that they fully understand the agreement as this will equip them with the ability to influence change, participation, and contribution towards the peace process. It is therefore paramount to intentionally create awareness among the women in general and women leaders, in particular, of the Peace Agreement to enhance their engagement and participation in influencing reforms. The RJMEC remains committed to collaborating with partners like UNWomen and UNMISS and women led organizations and CSOs to create awareness on the R-ARCSS and peace process using its expertise across the thematic chapters and identify gaps that require intervention.

Efforts to domesticate and implement the Maputo Protocol

47. Recognising the critical role played by the Maputo Protocol in the advancement of women's rights and gender equality, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), in partnership with the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and the Global Voices Organisation (GVO) organised a consultative workshop to develop a National Action Plan (2025-2030) to facilitate the domestication of the Protocol which was ratified by South Sudan in 2023. The workshop recognised the urgency of the implementation of the Maputo Protocol and its role in the envisioned South Sudan that is gender just, inclusive and respects the rights and dignity of all its citizens especially at this time as South Sudan is in the process of constitution making and preparing for elections.

Chapter 2: Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements

48. During the period of reporting, CTSAMVM reported a sharp increase in clashes between the SSPDF and the SPLA -IO⁴, especially in Upper Nile States, the northern part of Jonglei, and the States of Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria. Consequentially, the Permanent Ceasefire has been severely violated. In Western and Central Equatoria States, there has been a sharp increase in attacks and counterattacks between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO/National Salvation Front (NAS) alliance. In Upper Nile, especially in Maiwut, Nasir, Ulang and Longochuk Counties, there has been reported increases in clashes between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, which is allegedly supported by the local White Army.
49. CTSAMVM reported that in “the month of August 2025, 35 out of 120 daily reports from our Mobile Verification Teams (MVTs) contained reported violations, which constitutes 29% of the total reports. In September 2025, 60 out of 120 daily reports from our MVTs contained reported violations, which is 50% of the total reports. In relative terms this constitutes an increase of nearly 73%.”
50. As reported in the previous quarter, CTSAMVM has been unable to investigate the reported clashes due to access challenges in some areas, and a high level of violence in others. In addition, the split in the political wing of the SPLM/A-IO has interfered with their representation in CTSAMVM structures such as the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs), Joint Monitoring Coordination Office (JMCO) and the absence of an agreed Senior National Liaison Officer (SNLO) for the SPLA-IO at CTSAMVM HQ. In addition, the high number of ceasefire violations during the quarter, and those not investigated from the first and second quarters 2025 is threatening to overwhelm CTSAMVM's investigative capacity. The CTSAMVM Technical Committee (CTC) and the CTSAMVM Board, have not been able to regularly convene to process violation reports due to the aforementioned challenges.

⁴ It is important to note that the SPLA-IO forces currently fall into various groups such as those who have formed an alliance with NAS, those who have defected/surrendered to the SSPDF, and those who are still in some cantonments and not fighting the SSPDF.

51. CTSAMVM indicated that due to the very high volume of ceasefire violations, there is need to prioritize the investigation of the following: i) the alleged bombing in Ulang County by the SSPDF in February 2025; ii) the fighting in Nasir that led to the dislodging of the SSPDF and the subsequent death of Maj Gen. Majur Dak, UN staff and several soldiers in March 2025; iii) the alleged attack on the SPLA-IO Wunaliet Cantonment Site in March 2025; iv) alleged SSPDF attack on the Rumbor Training Center in March 2025; v) SSPDF attack on the Rajaf Training Center in March 2025; vi) clashes between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO supported by armed youth in Tonga, Panyikang County, Upper Nile State; vii) clashes between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO in Fangak and Pigg Counties of Jonglei State; and viii) alleged SSPDF attack on SPLA-IO at Panyume Cantonment Site in Morobo County Central Equatoria State.
52. In addition to the violent violations of the Permanent Ceasefire, CTSAMVM reported the recruitment and training of forces by the SSPDF outside the Peace Agreement. The SSPDF announced the recruitment and training of 4,000 troops in Wunaliet, Central Equatoria State. However, CTSAMVM has not been able to investigate this violation.

Transitional Security Arrangements

53. As a result of the serious violation of the permanent ceasefire by key signatory Parties, there has been no progress in the unification and deployment of forces. The little progress on the unification of forces that had been registered between August 2022 and January 2023, has been eroded by the ongoing fighting. In summary, the RTGoNU has been unable to complete Phase One deployment of the graduated forces and has been unable to make progress on Phase Two unification of forces despite several announcements indicating the potential commencement of the final phase of the unification of forces. Consequentially, the RTGoNU has also been unable to progress on the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process as well as the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) process since the crisis began in March 2025.

Status of Security Mechanisms

54. During the period of reporting, Security Mechanisms which are: the Joint Defence Board (JDB); the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC); the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC), and well as key institutions such as the DDR Commission and the SDSR Board have been negatively affected by the current political and security crisis. The JDB has been unable to stop the ceasefire violations as it used to do in the past six years when the top generals from the Parties used to meet regularly to exert joint command and control on their forces. Some senior SPLA-IO generals in the JMCC and the JTSC left Juba when the crisis began, allegedly for fear of arrest. The DDR Commission can only fulfill its mandate if all other security mechanisms are performing their duties. The SDSR Board which had completed the validation of the key defence and security policy documents has been unable to complete its work because the crisis has affected collegiality between the President and the First Vice President. Therefore, the key policy documents cannot be approved. The other perennial challenge to the Security Mechanism is the lack of funding.

Chapter 3: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

55. During the quarter, the humanitarian situation continued to worsen due to the deteriorating economic, security and political environment, inflows of returnees and refugees from Sudan, population displacement due to flooding and armed clashes, food insecurity, diseases, climate shocks, and limited access to basic essential services.
56. The situation was compounded by diminishing funding for humanitarian action and the provision of basic services mainly covered by the international community and NGOs. This led to the reprioritization of response plans to focus on the most acute needs, which resulted in a reduction of the number of people being targeted for assistance. By the end of September, the Humanitarian National Response Plan (HNRP) had only realized 30 percent of the US \$ 1.7 billion budget required to cover the needs in South Sudan.

Floods

57. According to UNOCHA, over 886,000⁵ people have been affected by flooding in 26 counties across six states, with Jonglei and Unity accounting for over 91 per cent of affected population. Flooding caused damage to homes, crops, public facilities including schools, and boreholes leading to disruption of livelihoods further eroding coping capacities and displacement of communities. Many roads were also rendered impassable, thus impeding movement and access to those in need. Limited healthcare access, due to submerged roads and damaged facilities hindered delivery of services and contributed to rising cases of cholera, malaria, and respiratory infections. Flood-affected populations including women, children, persons with disabilities, and displaced communities were exposed to increased risks of violence, exploitation, and abuse, particularly in overcrowded shelters and unstable environments. This calls for an urgent demand for mobile clinics, emergency care, and disease surveillance to deliver services and curb the spread of diseases and protection services for affected communities.

Humanitarian Access

58. The humanitarian situation continued to be exacerbated by the political situation as insecurity and conflict continued to drive significant and new displacement. During the quarter, humanitarian access became increasingly restricted with 70 access incidents reported in September alone. Of these, 53 involved violence against humanitarian staff, 5 operational interference, 6 restriction of movement and 3 active hostilities disrupting the delivery of critical humanitarian services. There is a need to urgently restore humanitarian access, particularly in conflict-affected areas, to avert a possible full-scale food and nutrition catastrophe.
59. Alleged airstrikes and ongoing ground confrontations severely restricted humanitarian access to thousands of food-insecure displaced people across Upper Nile (Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, and Panyikang counties) and parts of Jonglei (Canal Pigi and Fangak counties). Notably, areas east of Nasir Town have remained inaccessible for over six months. Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Unity states remain hotspots for violence against humanitarian personnel, assets, and facilities. In Unity State, armed youth attacked

⁵ <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-6-10-october-2025>

humanitarian workers, resulting in the death of one staff member, injuries to two others, and the looting of relief supplies.

60. In Jonglei State, several serious security incidents further compromised aid delivery. In Fangak, 18 metric tons of food were looted by SSPDF forces. and five health and nutrition facilities were vandalized in Pigi Canal County. In Eastern Equatoria, humanitarian operations faced increased threats due to armed attacks and robberies targeting aid vehicles the Juba–Torit, Torit–Magwi, and Kapoeta–Torit main roads increasing risks to field staff and logistics.
61. Bureaucratic access impediments continued to delay humanitarian response. For example, the County Commissioner of Canal Pigi suspended the operations of aid organizations working in opposition-held areas, cutting off services for more than 15,000 vulnerable people while in Renk County, the labour office-imposed fees to approve recruitment advertisements for humanitarian staff and the Malakal, civil aviation authorities restricted vehicle access to the airport without paid permits and identification. Seasonal rains severely impacted infrastructure and humanitarian mobility. Roads became impassable across parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states, hampering access to remote areas. Flash floods forced the closure of schools, and primary health care units damaged aid organization compounds, interrupting services and further restricting access to those in need.

Food Security

62. Acute food insecurity and malnutrition continued to be driven by the severe impacts of persistent conflict, expanding flood extent, economic deterioration, and a high returnee and refugee burden on household access to local food sources and life-saving humanitarian food assistance. Areas of greatest concern were cited as parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei states – particularly Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, Longochuk, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi counties where widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes and pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected through the end of the projection period in January 2026.

Return, Resettlement and Reintegration

63. By the end of August 2025, 1.17 million returnees, refugees and asylum-seekers had crossed into South Sudan from Sudan since April 2023 with children and women comprising 76 percent of the refugees. The biggest challenge to returnee's resettlement and reintegration remains limited funding, insecurity and lack of services at the points of final return. There is a need for urgent funding to support the resettlement and reintegration of returnees and IDPs in order to improve their chances of participating in the socio – economic as well as political arena.

Chapter 4: Resource Economic and Financial Management

Resource Management

Oil/Petroleum

64. Crude oil production in the Upper Nile fields has recommenced following the completion of repairs to the pipeline transporting oil to Port Sudan. The sale of DAR blend subsequently began in May 2025. According to the Ministry of Petroleum, the Government had taken advances on presumed available cargoes to support public expenditures over the past months. These advances have now been cleared up by the proceeds of these sales. Moreover, the market value of the oil has dropped due to high insurance costs geopolitics and interest rates, plus an additional discount of US \$1.50 per barrel being deducted from the value of crude oil because of the advances.
65. The legislations regulating the oil industry have been under review by the NCAC since 2022, but they have not yet been submitted to the TNLA for consideration. These are the *Petroleum Act 2012*, which outlines the framework for contracting, exploration, development, and production of petroleum, and the *Petroleum and Revenue Management Act 2012*, which specifies how oil revenue is distributed and managed. The latter also creates reserve funds such as the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and the Future Generations Fund and provides compensation to oil-producing states and communities. These bills are pending legislation and implementation of their revenue distribution provisions.
66. To further ensure transparency and accountability in the sector the R-ARCSS (Article 4.8.1.14.11) calls for the RTGoNU to expedite the process of joining Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) This initiative is based on close cooperation between governments, companies and civil to ensure public disclose of information on tax payments, licenses, quantities extracted and other important data about the extraction of mineral resources. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Corporation organised a one-day conference (28/04/21) to sensitize South Sudanese Stake holders of the Benefits of joining Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative. The EITI Office in Oslo presented the steps required for becoming a member, the benefits and offered to provide technical support to assist the government. The implementation of this has stalled and needs to be addressed expeditiously.

Livestock and Fisheries

67. The RTGoNU is engaged in the implementation of the South Sudan Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan (CAMP). This process is coordinated to involve state and non-state stakeholders, with support from the government and development partners.
68. The CAMP Implementation Coordination Task Team which comprise technical personnel from the Ministries of Environment, Livestock and Fisheries, Wildlife and Tourism, Agriculture and Food Security and Water Resources and Irrigation and the Land Commission, with support of an inter-ministerial Technical Team has reviewed The National Agriculture and livestock Extension Policy, The Agriculture Mechanization Policy the Small and Medium Enterprise Policy, The National Seeds Policy (in its final draft) and the Natural Resource Strategy (aimed at addressing the challenges within the strategy).

69. The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries has reviewed the *Livestock Development Policy* and the *National Fisheries Policy*, which have been submitted to the Economic Cluster. The Animal Breeding Policy has been drafted, approved, and validated, and is scheduled for submission to the Economic Cluster for approval. Work on the National Blue Economy Strategy is underway, aiming to boost social and economic benefits through food security, poverty reduction, better livelihoods, more jobs and income, and support for health, safety, equity, and political stability. Simultaneously, work is progressing on the Animal Welfare Strategy.
70. The Ministry of Livestock is in the process of developing 15 additional bills aimed at regulating the sector more effectively and efficiently. Currently, it has prioritized seven bills and has so far developed the following four: *The Animal Health Bill*, *Veterinary Bill*, *Meat Control and Slaughter Facilities Bill*, and the *Livestock and Livestock Product Bill*. These bills are currently under review by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.

Wildlife and Tourism

71. The Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism has established a comprehensive Tourism Policy that outlines the government's framework for supporting and regulating tourism. This policy facilitates interactions among stakeholders, manages competing interests, and promotes equitable competition within the tourism sector. A comprehensive Wildlife Policy has also been developed to establish laws focused on the protection of wildlife and their habitats, as well as the maintenance of biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources. This policy offers a framework for effective conservation and addresses key challenges, including habitat loss and climate change. Both policies are pending Council of Ministers approval.
72. With regards to the key legislations for the sector, the Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas Bill, 2024 is awaiting presidential approval, and the Tourism Act was enacted in March 2025. Regulations for these laws are currently being developed to support their implementation.

Public Financial Management

Public Expenditure

73. The Economic Cluster of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan has approved a national budget of 5.2 trillion South Sudanese Pounds (approximately US \$1.116 billion) for the 2025–2026 fiscal year. In comparison, the transitional parliament previously approved a budget of 4.2 trillion South Sudanese Pounds (about US \$1.4 billion) for the 2024/25 financial year. Although the nominal amount in local currency has increased, its equivalent value in US dollars has declined, indicating a depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound. This devaluation is likely attributable to factors such as trade deficits resulting from reduced oil production, ongoing insecurity, and inflation.
74. Following approval by the Cluster, the draft budget book for the 2025/26 financial year was prepared on 12 June 2025. The presentation of this draft budget to the Council of Ministers is still pending. In accordance with the *Public Financial Management and Accountability Act*, the Draft National Budget proposal, along with the *Draft Appropriation Bill*, the *Draft Financial Bill* for the same fiscal year, and a Statement of the Overall Indebtedness of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, should have been submitted to the Transitional

National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) in May 2025 for review and approval within 45 days.

75. The RTGoNU endeavour to adhere to the budget timetable provided for the PFMAA 2024, the Draft Constitution, and R-ARCSS (Article 4.12.1.7) as this has non-adherence dire consequences for the implementation of the R-ARCSS and the Strategic Economic Development Roadmap (Article 4.4.1.1).

Chapter 5: Transitional Justice Accountability Reconciliation and Healing

76. On Transitional Justice, there has been some progress in the formation of the CTRH. Stakeholders (academia, women, youth, persons with disabilities, civil society, religious and eminent personalities) submitted their respective nominees to the new Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for appointment as members to the Selection Panel. The new Minister, Hon. Joseph Geng Akec, appointed on 1st September 2025, is expected to submit a compiled list of nominees to the President. The subsequent step is for the President to formally appoint the nominees and establish the Selection Panel.
77. The Selection Panel once established is primarily required to recruit four South Sudanese Commissioners to the CTRH. In addition, the Chairperson of African Union Commission, in collaboration with the Secretary General of the United Nations, has established a transparent and consultative process of recruiting the three non-South Sudanese African Commissioners to the CTRH. The Chair of the AUC is required to submit six (06) names of shortlisted candidates to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs out of which three (03) names shall be submitted to the Executive and thereafter the TNLA for approval before appointment by the President.
78. On the question of the HCSS, the AUC is yet to issue guidelines to the RTGoNU on its establishment. In this reporting period and following the Nasir incident of March 2025, the Special Court in the Supreme Court was established by the Chief Justice of the South Sudan to try the First Vice President H.E. Riek Machar and seven others for serious crimes such as murder, terrorism and financing terrorism, contrary to the Anti-money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2012, and crimes against humanity, contrary to the Penal Code Act, 2008.
79. In the intervening period the AUC and RTGoNU should urgently act, and South Sudan should urgently undertake judicial reforms to realize an independent Judiciary to be able to realize fair trials guarantees for all as per international law standards. This is also critically in line with the findings of the *ad hoc* JRC report which found that the Judiciary of South Sudan is not independent. South Sudan should therefore urgently review the Judiciary Act, reconstitute the JSC that then consequently should spearhead judicial reforms which includes restructuring of the Judiciary.
80. There has been no further progress on establishment of the Compensation and Repatriation Authority (CRA).

Chapter 6: Parameters of Permanent Constitution

81. In terms of the permanent constitution making process, some progress was registered during this reporting period. The reconstituted NCRC conducted a series of pre-civic education and public consultation trainings and public events in preparation for the commencement of phase one civic education and public consultation, scheduled to take place in four States and one Administrative Area. This follows the successful national launch of civic education and public consultation event held at the Freedom Hall, Juba, in March this year. As part of this process, the NCRC received the Women's Charter on Constitution Making Process in the Republic of South Sudan prepared by the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) and the UN Women containing South Sudanese women and girls' priorities and concerns to be addressed in the constitution-making process. The Charter was developed through a consultative process with women in all the ten states and the three administrative areas.
82. In addition, three new members were appointed by the President to fill the vacancies within the NCRC, due to the demise of two former members and replacement of one double appointee. However, the new appointees have not yet been sworn in and no additional funding has been received by the NCRC from the government during this reporting period. The Commission attempts to meet with the Vice President and Chair of the Economic Cluster to lobby for funding has not yet materialised.
83. The ongoing activities of the NCRC, including facilitation for the planned civic education and public consultation are largely coming from partners such as the UNDP, UNMISS and UN Women. Finally, even though the commission membership has not been affected by the prevailing political crisis, the Commission reports that their activities are impacted by the overall political and security situation which is not conducive for the permanent constitution making process, especially country wide civic education and public consultations.

Chapter 7: Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

84. The RJMEC has continued to intensify its diplomatic engagements with the aim of addressing the current political impasse and deteriorating security situation in the Republic of South Sudan. In doing so, it engaged with the RTGoNU leadership, the Parties to the R-ARCSS, Stakeholders and Adherents, the Regional Guarantors, International Partners and Friends of South Sudan in an effort to address what has now become a protracted crisis.
85. During its regional engagements, the RJMEC briefed H.E. Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti, and Chairperson of the Assembly of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, as well as H.E Abdoukader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti, and Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers. In addition, RJMEC briefed H.E. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya and senior government of Uganda officials on the prevailing crisis. RJMEC also briefed the AU Peace and Security Council on the situation in South Sudan and drew attention to

the deteriorating political and security situation in the country and ongoing serious political and ceasefire violations.

86. On 18th August 2025, RJMEC briefed the UN Security Council on its assessment of the status of the implementation of the R-ARCSS, noting how the political and security situation in the Republic of South Sudan has substantially deteriorated following the Nasir security incident and its aftermath. In its recommendation, RJMEC appealed to the Security Council to endorse the call by the IGAD Summit and the AU PSC to the South Sudanese Government to de-escalate tensions, address the issue of the FVP and all the other detainees, embrace dialogue, and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS and adhere to its letter and spirit.
87. Furthermore, it recommended that the Council considers the following actions: (i) undertaking an urgent high-level diplomatic mission to Juba to assess the situation and directly engage the Parties to the R-ARCSS; (ii) supporting the regional efforts towards assisting the Parties to commence dialogue and expedite implementation of the critical pending tasks towards a permanent constitution-making and the conduct of elections in a timely manner; (iii) calling upon the SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO commands to cease all hostilities and to urgently restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, and refrain from acts of violence; and (iv) adopt all possible measures to hold peace spoilers and/or violators of the R-ARCSS accountable.
88. Pursuant to Article 7.9 of the Agreement, RJMEC briefed the TNLA twice during the quarter. The first briefing was done on 29th July 2025 on the RJMEC Quarterly Report covering the period 1st October 2024 – 31st December 2024 while the second briefing was on 15th September covering the first and second quarterly reports for 2025. The delays in briefing the TNL was occasioned by the extended TNLA recess which extended from mid- December 2024 to mid-June 2025.
89. During the briefings, RJMEC reiterated its clarion call on the legislature to, among others, prevail upon the Parties to the R-ARCSS and the RTGoNU to implement all the recommended remedial actions, including urgently restoring and fully adhering to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements; refraining from all acts of violence; embracing dialogue and returning to inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS towards the path of stability and prosperity; expediting enactment of all pending bills; and completing the constitution-making process.
90. From the RJMEC's engagements, there is a shared general concern that despite progress made in the implementation of the R-ARCSS since its signing, South Sudan is once more at a crossroads due to the current political and security impasse. Its continuous appeal for immediate cessation of hostilities, an inclusive dialogue and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS was widely supported by the national, regional, and international peace actors.
91. Despite the concerted efforts exerted by the national actors, regional guarantors, and international partners to restore full fidelity to the R-ARCSS so as to safeguard its gains and prevent a relapse to violence, it is disheartening to note the challenges continue to persist particularly in the aftermath of the Nasir incident. To ascertain the extent of the impact of the crisis on the R-ARCSS, RJMEC commissioned an audit of the implementing institutions and mechanisms of the Agreement and confirmed that the current political and security situation has taken a heavy toll on many institutions and mechanisms of the

Agreement at the national and State levels, in terms of representation and participation of the Parties to the R-ARCSS as provided for in the responsibility-sharing arrangements.

III. Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations

92. The R-ARCSS faces a critical juncture at this point of its implementation. To ascertain the extent of the impact of the crisis on the R-ARCSS, RJMEC conducted an audit of the implementing institutions and mechanisms of the Agreement and confirmed that the current political and security situation has taken a heavy toll on many institutions and mechanisms of the Agreement at the national and State levels, in terms of representation and participation of the Parties to the R-ARCSS as provided for in the responsibility-sharing arrangements.
93. Moreover, this period witnessed the emergence of systematic violation of the responsibility-sharing arrangements across all crucial bodies, including functionality of the executive and legislature. The violation must be addressed urgently to return the implementation process back on track in order to safeguard the gains of the peace Agreement and to prevent a relapse to violence in South Sudan.
94. With respect to the worsening humanitarian situation and in the context of shrinking aid funding, it is imperative that the RTGoNU demonstrates its commitment to providing essential basic services and creating long-term conditions of stability to ensure service delivery to communities in need. During the reporting period, the primary drivers of conflict-related violence affecting civilians were persistent intra/inter-communal violence by community based militias and/or civil defense groups, predominantly in Warrap followed by Jonglei State; increased attacks on civilians by the conventional parties to the armed conflict and other armed groups, primarily in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Western Equatoria States; and sporadic attacks on civilians by unidentified and/or other opportunistic armed elements.
95. There is an urgent need for the lifting of access restrictions by armed actors and assurance of safety of humanitarian workers to enable the urgent delivery of assistance to the affected communities. Projections indicate that the sustained convergence of conflict, insecurity, and flood waters could further isolate populations from accessing food sources and worsen the prevalence of waterborne diseases such as cholera. Therefore, to avert a possible catastrophe, there is an urgent need to deescalate conflict and increase services to the populations in need.
96. Overall, the implementation of the Peace Agreement continued to be hampered by the political and security impasse. Relevant bills and policies for the creation of a conducive environment for women's empowerment and participation have stagnated despite concerted lobbying and advocacy efforts. The wellbeing of citizens and especially women and children continued to be affected by the deteriorating humanitarian, economic, security and political environment, inflows of returnees and refugees from Sudan, population displacement due to flooding and armed clashes, food insecurity, diseases, and limited access to basic essential services worsened by diminishing funding.

97. Notwithstanding the numerous setbacks which faced the implementation of the R-ARCSS during the reporting period, South Sudan was not left alone. All diplomatic concerted efforts by the partners at the regional and international levels were invested in restoring the sanctity of the R-ARCSS. The efforts are a clear demonstration of their political goodwill towards the quest for sustainable peace and stability of South Sudan. South Sudanese leaders should reciprocate the goodwill by dialoguing with each other and return to inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS to enable a smooth end of the transitional period.

Recommendations

98. In light of the precarious political and security situation, RJMEC offers the following recommendations to the Parties to the R-ARCSS and Stakeholders; RTGoNU; TNLA; IGAD; African Union; United Nations; and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan for upholding the sanctity of the R-ARCSS and a return to its full implementation.

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- cease all forms of hostilities, embrace inclusive dialogue, re-activate the implementation mechanisms of the Agreement and fully adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement; and
- party leadership to desist from taking actions that further erode the political trust and confidence in the Revitalised Peace Agreement and ensure that the political disagreements are resolved through dialogue.

b. To the RTGoNU:

- urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- expedite implementation of the *ad-hoc* JRC's report and its recommendations, in letter and spirit, especially through the review and amendment of the Judiciary Act and reconstitution of the JSC to implement the requisite reforms;
- further expedite the re-tabling of the National Security Service Act before the TNLA for reconsideration;
- expedite the enactment of the pending laws revised by the NCAC, such as the two Petroleum laws and the NGO Bill;
- avail sufficient funding to the NCRC in a timely manner to enable it to roll out the civic education and public consultation campaigns to all parts of the country;
- expedite convening the Council of Ministers to discuss the national budget and the Finance Bill for 2025/2026;
- expand and protect political and civic space to enable the return of some peace partners to the Agreement mechanisms and further the creation of a conducive environment for implementation of elections and constitution making-related tasks; and
- faithfully adhere to the mandate to implement the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit to realise free, fair and credible elections in December 2026.

c. To the TNLA:

- prevail on the Executive of the RTGoNU to restore full adherence to the R-ARCSS, urgently engage in an inclusive genuine dialogue, and recommit to full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in letter and spirit;
- complete enactment of the pending laws.

d. To IGAD:

- urgently consider convening an IGAD Council of Ministers meeting on the situation in South Sudan and further recommend the convening of the IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit to consider and deliberate on the current situation and decide on timely and appropriate remedial actions; and
- prevail on the Parties to restore full adherence to the R-ARCSS, urgently engage in an inclusive genuine dialogue, and recommit to full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in letter and spirit within the remaining extended Transitional Period.

e. To the African Union:

- in consultation with the RTGoNU, expedite the establishment of the HCSS to investigate, and if necessary, to prosecute those bearing responsibility for any crimes committed during the Transitional Period.

f. To the United Nations:

- consider endorsing the call by the IGAD Summit and the AU PSC for the South Sudanese Government to de-escalate tensions, embrace dialogue, and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- consider undertaking an urgent high-level diplomatic mission to Juba to assess the situation and directly engage the Parties to the R-ARCSS;
- further consider supporting the regional efforts towards assisting the Parties to commence dialogue and expedite implementation of the critical pending tasks towards a permanent constitution-making and the conduct of elections in a timely manner;
- call upon the SSPDF and SPLA-IO commands to cease all hostilities and to urgently restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, and refrain from acts of violence; and
- consider all possible measures to hold peace spoilers and/or violators of the R-ARCSS accountable.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- consider providing support to the NCRC and the constitution-making process, including by directly funding some of the critical mechanisms and activities such as civic education through technical and logistical support; and

- continue sustained high-level diplomatic engagements with the leadership of RTGoNU, IGAD, AU and UN to ensure that the sanctity of the R-ARCSS is upheld by all the peace partners and call on all the Parties to recommit to inclusive implementation of the Agreement.

IV. Conclusion

99. In conclusion, the report notes that the year 2025 has been the most challenging for the implementation of R-ARCSS since it was signed in 2018. The persistent political and security violations by the signatory parties have systematically affected the implementation of key agreement provisions and weakened the implementing institutions and mechanisms.
100. As the country prepares for the conduct of its first democratic elections in less than 15 months, there is need for a deliberate effort for all the parties to dialogue and return to inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS, failure of which risks putting the South Sudan peace process at risk and will set a bad precedence for the future peace processes.
101. As provided for in Chapter 7 of the R-ARCSS, the RJMEC will continue to monitor, evaluate, and report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS, as circumstances demand, intervene to break any deadlock that may emerge during implementation. It will regularly provide reports and briefings to the RTGoNU, the reconstituted TNLA, the Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations.

END