



**Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
(RJMEC)**

REPORT

BY

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**ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVITALISED
AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

FOR THE PERIOD

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Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
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List of Acronyms

<i>AU</i>	<i>African Union</i>
<i>AUC</i>	<i>African Union Commission</i>
<i>AU PSC</i>	<i>African Union Peace and Security Council</i>
<i>CoS</i>	<i>Council of States</i>
<i>CSOs</i>	<i>Civil Society Organizations</i>
<i>CRA</i>	<i>Compensation and Reparation Authority</i>
<i>CTRH</i>	<i>Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing</i>
<i>CTSAMVM</i>	<i>Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism</i>
<i>DDR</i>	<i>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</i>
<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Internally Displaced Persons</i>
<i>IGAD</i>	<i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>
<i>ITGoNU</i>	<i>Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>JDB</i>	<i>Joint Defense Board</i>
<i>JMCC</i>	<i>Joint Military Ceasefire Commission</i>
<i>JTSC</i>	<i>Joint Transitional Security Committee</i>
<i>JRC</i>	<i>Judicial Reform Committee</i>
<i>MVTs</i>	<i>Mobile Verification Teams</i>
<i>NCAC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Amendment Committee</i>
<i>NCRC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Review Commission</i>
<i>NEC</i>	<i>National Elections Commission</i>
<i>NSS</i>	<i>National Security Service</i>
<i>NUF</i>	<i>Necessary Unified Forces</i>
<i>PFMRS</i>	<i>Public Financial Management Reform Strategy</i>
<i>PPC</i>	<i>Political Parties Council</i>
<i>R-ARCSS</i>	<i>Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</i>
<i>RJMEC</i>	<i>Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</i>
<i>RTGoNU</i>	<i>Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>SDSR</i>	<i>Strategic Defense and Security Review</i>
<i>SPLM-IO</i>	<i>Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition</i>
<i>SSPDF</i>	<i>South Sudan People's Defence Force</i>
<i>TNL</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislature</i>
<i>TNLA</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislative Assembly</i>
<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</i>
<i>UNHCR</i>	<i>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</i>

Executive Summary

This RJMEC Quarterly Report highlights the status of the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) for the period 1st April to 30th June 2026, and builds on the previous RJMEC quarterly reports. The report assesses the recent developments across political/governance, security, humanitarian, economic, transitional justice, and constitution-making processes. The report further highlights key observations and concludes with actionable recommendations.

The report notes that, overall, implementation of the R-ARCSS during the reporting period remained characterized by modest institutional progress amid a challenging political, security, humanitarian, and economic environment. The persistent political and security impasse that has continued since March 2025 adversely affected trust and confidence among the Parties, weakened agreed responsibility-sharing arrangements, and significantly impacted the implementation of the R-ARCSS, especially its governance and security provisions.

Of particular concern was the decision by the RTGoNU to directly submit the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for ratification without the consent of the RJMEC as required under Article 8.4 of the Agreement. Whereas the Council of Ministers subsequently dropped amendments to Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the R-ARCSS as recommended by the RJMEC, the amendment did not follow the due process as per the R-ARCSS.

Although preparations continued for the anticipated general elections announced by the National Elections Commission for 22nd December 2026, there are unresolved legal and political issues, incomplete Transitional Security Arrangements, restrictions on civic and political space, inadequate funding, population displacement, insecurity in various parts of the country, and uncertainty surrounding the inclusivity of the political process.

The security situation remained fragile during this period. While some areas experienced relative calm, repeated clashes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces were reported in parts of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, and Equatoria regions. Consequently, implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire remains partial and inconsistent. Key security mechanisms remained non-operational, while Phase II of the unification of forces, DDR activities, and security sector reforms remained stalled.

The humanitarian situation deteriorated further during the reporting period. Renewed violence, displacement, access restrictions, and food insecurity significantly increased humanitarian needs. More than 7.8 million people were projected to face crisis-level or worse food insecurity, while internal displacements are now over 2.5 million people. These challenges continue to undermine implementation of Chapter III of the Agreement

and also present serious implications for the inclusivity and credibility of the planned elections.

Progress on gender provisions remained limited. Women's representation remained below the minimum threshold of 35 percent affirmative action threshold required by the R-ARCSS. However, the deteriorating security conditions in some parts of the country continued to expose women and girls to heightened protection risks and constrained their participation in political and electoral processes.

Meanwhile, some progress was recorded in resource management and public financial management reforms. Oil production remained above 170,000 barrels per day during the second and third quarters of FY 2025/26, while measures were initiated to improve transparency in oil revenue management. Efforts were also made to strengthen public financial management in the areas of procurement, oversight, development cooperation, and economic governance.

However, no substantive progress was recorded under the transitional justice chapter of the R-ARCSS. The establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA), and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) remained pending.

The permanent constitution-making process recorded notable progress. The NCRC completed civic education and public consultations across the country. Consultations with the national institutions were ongoing, including preparation for the next phase of its work, subject to availability of funding.

Meanwhile, the RJMEC continued to perform its oversight mandate throughout the quarter, including by conducting high-level engagements with various stakeholders, members of the Presidency, Executive, Legislature, Parties to the R-ARCSS, Agreement Institutions and Mechanisms, regional guarantors, AU High Representative to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, as well as the RJMEC members. These engagements were intended to explore ways of addressing the ongoing political and security impasse in the country through an all-inclusive political dialogue.

Recommendations

In light of the above, the report proposes the following measures for consideration by the Parties to the Agreement and relevant stakeholders, including the Executive of the RTGoNU, TNL, IGAD, the African Union, and the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan, to reinforce adherence to the R-ARCSS, mitigate the risk of renewed conflict, and support the timely conduct of elections at the end of December 2026:

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- immediately cease hostile rhetoric, halt all military confrontations, and recommit to full implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit;
- adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire, prioritize completion of Transitional Security Arrangements and support the reactivation of all Security Mechanisms;
- refrain from unilateral actions that undermine responsibility-sharing arrangements and consensus-based decision-making under the Agreement;
- embrace an all-inclusive political dialogue on unresolved political and security-related issues as recommended by the AU C5 Plus Declaration;
- ensure meaningful participation of women, youth, displaced populations, and other vulnerable groups in political and electoral processes; and
- To safeguard the legitimacy of transitional justice institutions and ensure compliance with the R-ARCSS, the Parties to the RTGoNU should urgently restore inclusive political participation by reinstating, consulting, or formally engaging all parties originally signatory to the peace agreement in decision-making processes.

b. To the Executive of the RTGoNU:

- fully recommit to the implementation of the R-ARCSS in both letter and spirit and take urgent steps to restore trust and confidence among the Parties;
- support the urgent convening of an all-inclusive and meaningful political dialogue, consistent with the AU C5 Plus Declaration aimed at resolving the prevailing political impasse, restoring consensus among the Parties, and reaching agreement on the peaceful and democratic conclusion of the transitional period;
- ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the R-ARCSS, and reverse unilateral decisions that undermine the integrity of the peace process;
- urgently engage in dialogue to address all pending elections-related concerns, including legal, political, security, logistical, and operational requirements necessary for the conduct of credible, peaceful, and inclusive elections;
- expedite the provision of adequate and predictable funding to all relevant Agreement Institutions and Mechanisms to enable timely implementation of their respective mandates;
- fast-track implementation of Transitional Security Arrangements, including cantonment, training, redeployment, and unification of forces;
- remove impediments to humanitarian access and ensure the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and assets;

- accelerate the implementation of the durable solution framework and fund reconstruction efforts;
- take immediate measures to achieve the minimum threshold of 35 percent women's representation across all institutions and electoral processes;
- accelerate implementation of return, reintegration, recovery, and reconstruction programmes for displaced populations; and
- approve seven nominees to be CTRH Commissioners as required by the CTRH Act and submit their names to the TNLA for parliamentary vetting.

c. To the TNL:

- continue exercising enhanced oversight of the implementation of the R-ARCSS through legislative actions that support implementation of the Agreement;
- ensure that all amendments to the R-ARCSS are initiated through inclusive, consensus-based consultations involving all signatory Parties, pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS;
- prioritize the enactment of all outstanding Agreement-related legislation, including the NGO Amendment Bill, Petroleum Bills, and other pending reforms, including reconsideration of the NSS Act;
- ensure timely approval of adequate budgetary allocations and disbursements for the implementation of the Agreement;
- exercise oversight regarding protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and the preparation for the conduct of elections; and,
- promote legislative measures that protect and advance women's political participation in line with the 35 percent affirmative action requirement.

d. To IGAD:

- provide guidance on the way forward regarding the recent amendment to the R-ARCSS;
- intensify high-level engagements with the AU C5 to ensure the realisation of the outcomes of the AU C5 Plus Declaration; and
- mobilize political and logistical support from the region and international partners for the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

e. To the African Union:

- continue supporting implementation of the AU C5 Plus Declaration and facilitate the convening of an inclusive and meaningful South Sudanese political dialogue;

- mobilize regional and international support towards resolving the current political impasse and restoring full adherence to and implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- expedite support for transitional justice mechanisms, including submission of guidelines to the RTGoNU for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan;
- continue engaging the Parties to promote adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and recommitment to full implementation of the R-ARCSS; and,
- support efforts aimed at ensuring peaceful, inclusive, and credible elections consistent with the provisions of the R-ARCSS.

f. To the United Nations:

- continue supporting the full implementation of the R-ARCSS through sustained political engagement, good offices, technical assistance, and coordination with regional and international stakeholders;
- support the implementation of the R-ARCSS, the AU C5 Plus Declaration by working closely with the African Union, IGAD, RJMEC, and the Parties to facilitate an inclusive South Sudanese political dialogue;
- assist the Parties to de-escalate tensions, restore trust among the Parties, and build consensus on the completion of the transition and the conduct of peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections;
- enhance technical and operational support to electoral institutions, particularly the NEC and PPC, including voter and civic education, electoral logistics, participation of women and youth, and measures to promote peaceful elections;
- continue supporting the permanent constitution-making process, including resource mobilization and technical assistance for the reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) once established; and
- strengthen support for transitional justice, reconciliation, and social cohesion initiatives, including the establishment and operationalization of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), and initiatives that promote national healing, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- continue supporting implementation of the R-ARCSS through sustained political engagement and coordinated diplomatic efforts;
- support the convening of the proposed AU C5 Plus inclusive South Sudanese political dialogue aimed at resolving the current impasse and building consensus on the peaceful and democratic conclusion of the transitional period;

- continue providing technical support for election preparations, particularly civic and voter education, electoral operations, inclusion of displaced populations, women and youth participation;
- enhance support for humanitarian operations, recovery programmes, food security interventions, and durable solutions for displaced populations;
- provide targeted support for implementation of the R-ARCSS through supporting institution-building, economic governance reforms, and public financial management initiatives that strengthen state capacity and accountability; and,
- enhance support for initiatives promoting civic space, human rights, gender equality, transitional justice and inclusive political participation in the lead-up to the December 2026 elections.

I. Introduction

1. This report covers the status of implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) during the period 1st April to 30th June 2026 and builds on previous reports numbers 001/19 - 030/26 since the R-ARCSS was signed on 12th September 2018. It also highlights the engagements of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) in the fulfilment of its oversight, monitoring and evaluation mandate within the R-ARCSS; and concludes by providing key recommendations to the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan.
2. During the reporting period, the implementation of the R-ARCSS progressed within a complex political, security, humanitarian and economic environment. While some institutions established under the Agreement continued to function and registered limited advances in the implementation of selected transitional tasks, overall progress remained uneven and significantly constrained by the persistent political and security challenges facing the country. Notwithstanding these challenges, several institutions mandated under the R-ARCSS continued to discharge their responsibilities.
3. Under the governance chapter of the R-ARCSS, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) maintained executive, legislative and judicial functions at the national and State levels. The National Elections Commission (NEC) declared 22nd December 2026 as the date for elections, received additional funding from the RTGoNU and announced it was planning to launch civic and voter education activities in preparation for the scheduled general elections. The Political Parties Council (PPC) continued with the registration of political parties, and by the end of the June 2026 deadline, 39 political parties were declared as duly registered.
4. Of particular concern was the decision by the RTGoNU to directly submit the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for ratification without the consent of the RJMEC as required under Article 8.4 of the Agreement. Whereas the Council of Ministers subsequently dropped amendments to Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the R-ARCSS as recommended by the RJMEC, the amendment did not follow the due process as per the R-ARCSS.
5. In terms of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA), the implementation of the Transitional Security Arrangements stalled. The Permanent Ceasefire was partially observed, with continued reports of armed clashes and alleged ceasefire violations in several parts of the country. Consequently, key security mechanisms remained non-operational, while Phase II of the unification, as well as the

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform processes, continued to face significant delays.

6. Humanitarian conditions further deteriorated during the quarter due to renewed violence, large-scale displacement, restricted humanitarian access, and persistent food insecurity. The ongoing conflict in Sudan, combined with internal displacement and climate-related shocks, continued to place considerable pressure on humanitarian resources and host communities. These factors, together with limited progress in reconstruction and recovery efforts, posed additional challenges to the implementation of the Agreement and preparations for credible, peaceful and inclusive elections.
7. On Resource, Economic and Financial Management, some institutional and financial reform initiatives were undertaken to enhance transparency, accountability and economic governance. South Sudan's oil sector remained the primary source of government revenue, with combined DAR and Nile Blend production exceeding 170,000 barrels per day. Although the Government received substantial entitlements under production-sharing agreements, these were reduced by allocations for downstream facilities and payments to Sudan under the inland lifting programme. The Government's entitlement for October 2025 to March 2026 is an estimated 7.9 million barrels of crude oil; however, revenues were negatively affected by discounted sales prices, driven by advance oil sales arrangements, international sanctions affecting Sudanese export routes, and costly logistical challenges associated with "distress cargo" shipments. In response, the Ministry of Finance and Planning established a high-level committee to strengthen transparency and oversight in crude oil marketing.
8. Meanwhile, the Bank of South Sudan continued to face significant liquidity and macroeconomic pressures arising from declining oil revenues, trade disruptions, flooding, conflict, and inadequate capitalization, prompting calls for recapitalization and stronger fiscal discipline. Notwithstanding these challenges, modest progress was made in public financial management reforms through enhanced engagement with development partners, capacity-building initiatives, procurement transparency measures, and the establishment of a Ministerial High-Level Committee on Economic Reforms aimed at improving revenue mobilization, public financial management, and overall economic stability.
9. Progress in the Transitional Justice chapter has been slow towards the establishment of its three mechanisms, especially towards completing the recruitment of the members to the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). Moreover, no progress was made to establish the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA), and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) during this reporting period.
10. Regarding the permanent constitution-making process, the reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) completed civic education and public consultations in all the 10 States and three Administrative Areas. In addition, the NCRC launched national-level consultations with key institutions and stakeholders.

11. RJMEC continued to perform its oversight mandate throughout the quarter, including by conducting high-level engagements with various stakeholders, members of the Presidency, Executive, Legislature, Parties to the R-ARCSS, Agreement Institutions and Mechanisms, regional guarantors, AU High Representative to the Horn of Africa and Red Sea and the RJMEC members. These engagements were intended to explore ways of addressing the ongoing political and security impasse in the country through an all-inclusive political dialogue.
12. Key observations during the quarter included the persistent political and security impasse which remained unresolved, unilateral actions which continued to undermine trust and cohesion between the parties, lack of adherence to procedural safeguards within the Agreement, insufficient funding for implementation of the R-ARCSS and delayed commencement of all-inclusive political dialogue.
13. This report is therefore structured as follows: Section I provides an overview of the report, followed by Section II, with thematic analysis of the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS, Section III highlights key observations and recommendations to the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS, the RTGoNU, the TNLA, IGAD, African Union, United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan. Section IV provides the conclusion of the report.

II. Status of Implementation of the Transitional Tasks of the R-ARCSS

Chapter 1: Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity

14. During the reporting period, overall, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), as currently constituted¹, continued to perform executive, legislative and judicial functions of government at the national and state levels, with modest progress made in the implementation of some provisions of Chapter I of the R-ARCSS. The arrest, detention and continued prosecution of H.E. Dr Machar Teny, the First Vice President and chairperson and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/A-IO, resulted in a lack of cohesive leadership within the SPLM/A-IO. Its participation and representation within the peace process continued to face major challenges.
15. Furthermore, the recurrent political and security impasse continued to negatively impact the smooth implementation of the R-ARCSS, especially the governance and the security chapters. Directly impacted are the agreed responsibility-sharing arrangements, the office

¹ Unilateral decisions affected the responsibility-sharing arrangements agreed upon by the Parties to the R-ARCSS, especially in the Executive and Legislature of the RTGoNU.

of the First Vice President, and cohesion and trust between the Parties to the R-ARCSS. Meanwhile, this period also witnessed the revocation and appointments of some members of the executive and legislature at the national and state levels.

The Executive of the RTGoNU

16. The Executive of the RTGoNU continued to conduct business throughout the reporting period pursuant to its mandate. In the meantime, some remarkable changes were made to the composition of the Council of Ministers through a cabinet reshuffle². These included the appointments of the following officials: Hon. Wek Mamer Kuol as the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA), replacing Hon. Michael Makuei Lueth who was reassigned from the same Ministry to the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; Hon. Kuol Daniel Ayulo, Minister of Finance and Planning, succeeding Hon. Salvatore Garang Mabiordit; Hon. Dr. James Pia Morgan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Hon. Dr. Alaba Margaret, Minister of Trade and Industry; Hon. Atong Kuol Manyang, Minister of Youth and Sports; Hon. Clement Juma Ongonae, Minister of Agriculture and Food Security; Hon. Mahjoub Biel Turuk replaced Hon. Julius Tabuley Daniel, as the Deputy Minister of Public Service and Human Resources Development and Gen. Dr. Paul Nang Majok, Undersecretary for Veteran Affairs in the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. Changes have also occurred at the State level³ during the reporting period.
17. On 20th April 2026, the RTGoNU Council of Ministers, vide Resolution No. 12/2026, resolved to proceed with the proposed amendments of the R-ARCSS and decided to “bypass” the RJMEC consent as required under Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. It further authorized the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs to submit the proposed amendments to the TNL for ratification. This followed RJMEC’s earlier guidance to the RTGoNU in its letter in response to the proposed amendments, in which it observed that some of the proposed amendments are beyond the scope of elections and may have far-reaching implications as they risk altering the structure and integrity of the R-ARCSS.
18. RJMEC, in its response to the RTGoNU, guided that out of the 10 proposed amendments, only four (04) were substantive amendments, namely: Articles 1.2.5 on delinking the Permanent Constitution-making process from the conduct of elections; Article 2.2.14 to repeal the conduct of Population and Housing Census; Article 8.2 to delink R-ARCSS from the TCRSS 2011, as amended; and Article 8.3 to repeal the Supremacy of the R-ARCSS and that only the first two articles actually related to the conduct of elections and the justification given but the latter two articles risked to annul the sanctity and supremacy of the R-ARCSS in the whole peace process.

² Note the appointment of Gen. Santino Deng Wol as the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) of the SSPDF, replacing Gen. Dr. Paul Nang Majok was also made at the same time changes were made to the aforementioned members of the Executive of the RTGoNU.

³ In Upper Nile State, changes were made to the state government in April 2026.

19. On the 11th May 2026, the national Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs directly submitted the proposed bill seeking to amend the R-ARCSS to the reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for its consideration without the consent of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) as provided for under the provisions of Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. The initial proposals submitted to the TNLA were to amend Articles 1.2.5, 1.2.14, 1.20.5, 1.20.6, 1.20.10, 6.4, 8.2, and 8.3 and Annexure D, item #42 of the R-ARCSS as submitted to RJMEC.
20. However, on 22nd May 2026, the Council of Ministers of the RTGoNU belatedly reconsidered its previous proposals as, *inter-alia*, guided by the RJMEC recommendation and decided to amend only provisions supposedly relevant for the timely conduct of elections and retained the provisions of Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the R-ARCSS, which incorporates the R-ARCSS into the TCRSS 2011, as amended, and its supremacy over all national legislation.

The Transitional National Legislature

21. The Transitional National Legislature, comprising the TNLA and the Council of States, continued to perform their respective mandates during the reporting period. At the same time, some changes were made to both houses through dismissal and replacements of their members. On 11th May 2026, 11 members⁴ of the Council of States were relieved from their portfolios and replaced with new members.
22. Following the tabling of the proposed R-ARCSS amendment bill in the TNLA, political tensions intensified when SPLM-IO legislators staged a walkout from the reconstituted TNLA during the presentation of the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The opposition objected to the amendment bill, arguing that the amendments fundamentally altered the peace framework without the required political consensus and without the consent of the RJMEC. The protest resulted in the dismissal of 47 SPLM-IO parliamentarians allied to the First Vice President, H.E. Dr Riek Machar, from the TNLA and their positions were subsequently filled by members affiliated to the SPLM-IO faction led by Hon. Stephen Par Kuol, national Minister for

⁴ SPLM-IO members appointed to, and replaced from, the Council of States (Source: Presidential Decree of 4th May 2026):

Appointed MPs

- Hon. Ayieny Luka Athian
- Hon. Martin Oting Saturlino
- Hon. William Kur Chol
- Hon. Thomas Thok Rill
- Hon. Daniel Akwang Bowla
- Hon. John Dut A
- Hon. Susan Evaristo Ali
- Hon. Tabitha Manguet Gai
- Hon. Dr Achol Marial Deng
- Hon. Richard Paulino Azizi
- Hon. Moses Malek Chol

Revoked Appointments

- Hon. Mador Wol James
- Hon. John Joyul Yoal
- Hon. Chirio Chol Dut Noon
- Hon. Margaret Vito Akwar
- Hon. Santino Opieu Mathieu
- Hon. John Urach Nyiker
- Hon. Simon Ruot Duol
- Hon. Khamis Simon Aburi
- Hon. Monica Juan Lino
- Hon. Judith Nagbodo

Peacebuilding. By the end of the quarter, the TNLA passed the contested amendments and awaited Presidential assent.

Legislative Reforms

23. In terms of the amendment of the Agreement-related laws, especially those reviewed and amended by the NCAC, no progress was registered during this reporting period. The Petroleum Bills were reportedly still with Cabinet, and the NGO Bill was before the TNLA Committee. The proposed reconsideration of the contested National Security Services (NSS) Act also remained pending.

Judicial Reforms

24. Regarding the judicial reforms process as provided for under Article 1.17 of the R-ARCSS, there was no progress in implementing the report of the *ad hoc* Judicial Reform Committee (JRC) which was submitted to the RTGoNU in December 2024 and endorsed by the President. However, its proper implementation requires, first, the review of the Judicial Act, and the reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to implement the requisite judicial reforms. These tasks, including the establishment of an independent Constitutional Court for the Republic of South Sudan as required by the R-ARCSS, remained pending.

Political Parties Council

25. During the quarter, the Political Parties Council (PPC) made some progress pursuant to its mandate. The Political Parties Council (PPC) continued with the registration of political parties, and by the end of the June 2026 deadline set for the December 2026 elections, 39 political parties were declared as registered. The PPC also enacted the Elections Code of Conduct for all the registered political parties, deployed State Inspectors to all the States and Administrative Areas, and harmonized its internal deadlines with the National Elections Commission statutory elections benchmarks.
26. Below is an extract from the official list of the political parties currently registered in South Sudan and their respective leaders as published by the Council as of 30th June 2026.

Table 1: List of registered political parties in the Republic of South Sudan as at 30th June 2026

No.	Political Party	Acronym	Party Leader
1.	African National Congress	ANC	Gen. (Rtd) George Kongor Arop
2.	Sudan People's Liberation Movement	SPLM	Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit
3.	United Sudan African Party	USAP	Prof. Ajang Bior
4.	United Democratic Salvation Front – Mainstream	UDSF-M	Francis Ben Ataba
5.	National Liberation Party	NLP	Nkurumah Anai K.
6.	National Congress Party	NCP	Agnes Poni Lukudu
7.	Democratic Change Party	DC	Onyoti Adigo Nyikuac
8.	South Sudan Democratic Forum	SSDF	Dr Martin Elia Lomuro
9.	United South Sudan Party	USSP	Paulino Lukudu Obede
10.	National United Democratic Front	NUDF	Kornelio Kon Ngu
11.	South Sudan Democratic Alliance	SSDA	Pasqulina Phillip Waden
12.	Sudan African National Union – National	SANU-N	Theresa Ciricio Iro
13.	United Democratic Salvation Front	UDSF	Rev. Emmanuel Sokiri
14.	National Democratic Party	NDP	James Aniceto
15.	United Democratic Party	UDP	Tong Lual Ayat
16.	Federal Democratic Party	FDP	Galdong Nganyek Bhok
17.	United Democratic Front	UDF	Bona Deng
18.	Communist Party of South Sudan	CPSS	Joseph Wol Modesto
19.	Democratic Unionist Party	DUP	Albino John Lako
20.	South Sudan African National Union	SSANU	Philip Palet
21.	Generation Party	GP	Looth Mah Tang
22.	South Sudan National Party	SSNP	Juma Said W.
23.	National Democratic Front	NDF	Stephen Goro
24.	Republican Party of South Sudan	RPSS	Anthony Agiem
25.	Akut Bam Party	ABP	Makuac Akol
26.	Popular Congress Party	PCP	Abdalla Deng Nhial
27.	South Sudan Generation Party	SSGP	Mayen Jeremiah Turc
28.	National Justice Movement Party	NJMP	Mater Mayind
29.	South Sudan National Labor Party	SSNLP	James Andrea Anyak
30.	Social Democratic Party	SDP	Rain Ayen Deng
31.	National Patriotic Movement	NPM	Dr. Isaa Muzamil
32.	South Sudan Democratic Front	SSDF	Prof. David De Chan
33.	People's United Forum	PUF	Dr Gai Chol Paul
34.	People's Democratic Movement	PDM	Josephine Lagu
35.	IO Party	IOP	Amb. Stephen Par Kuol
36.	National Democratic Movement	NDM	Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin
37.	South Sudan National Movement for Change	SSNMC	Moro Isaac Jenesis
38.	People's Liberal Party	PLP	Peter Mayen Majongdit
39.	Revive South Sudan Party	RSSP	Mawien Dot Pheot

27. On 30th June 2026, the Political Parties Council announced the registration of IO Party, formerly SPLM/A-IO, led by Hon. Amb. Stephen Par Kuol, Minister for Peacebuilding. However, the SPLM/A-IO, led by H.E. Dr Riek Machar Teny, First Vice President, distanced itself from the reported registered IO Party, asserting that the new political entity has no affiliation with its SPLM/A-IO. According to the Political Bureau, the SPLM/A-

IO led by H.E. Dr Machar remained a military-political organization and had not registered with the PPC.

Preparations for Elections

28. During the quarter, the National Elections Commission (NEC) continued to make some progress towards the holding of general elections pursuant to its mandate. On 15th June 2026, NEC announced it was launching civic and voter education across the ten States and three Administrative Areas in order to increase public awareness and prepare citizens for participation in the electoral process, after receiving some additional funding from the RTGoNU. Given that South Sudan has never conducted a post-independence national election, civic education constitutes a critical component of election readiness. The Commission also continued with institutional strengthening through acquisition of a permanent headquarters, and work on electoral planning.
29. On 22nd June 2026, the Commission declared 22nd December 2026 as the date for holding South Sudan's general elections, in fulfillment of the legal requirement under the National Elections Act 2023 that elections be announced at least six months before polling day. However, progress remained constrained by substantial funding gaps, unresolved legal reforms, limited time, and security concerns.

Chapter 2: Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements

Permanent Ceasefire

30. On the Permanent Ceasefire, CTSAMVM reports covering the second quarter indicated sporadic violent incidents between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region, suggesting a relatively calmer security situation, notwithstanding intermittent intercommunal incidents unrelated to the signatory Parties. However, more intense deliberately planned battles between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO (with White Army support) were reported in Nasir and Longochuk Counties of Upper Nile State, and Akobo, Uror, and Nyirol Counties in Jonglei State. In Unity State, sporadic skirmishes between the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO were reported. In the Greater Equatoria region, there were more clashes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO-NAS alliance in Central Equatoria State than in Western and Eastern Equatoria States. This indicated a more volatile security situation in the southern part of Central Equatoria State, especially in the Yei River, Morobo, Lainya and Kajo-Keji Counties.
31. Although Western Equatoria State had been relatively stable, the Bazia – Tumbura road corridor experienced skirmishes between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, mostly in the form of ambushes, attacks and counter-attacks. Eastern Equatoria State was relatively calm

despite episodes of random attacks on government forces by the SPLA-IO, as was witnessed in Northern Kapoeta County, and ambushes on some roads leading into and out of Kapoeta town. During the 2nd quarter, CTSAMVM summarized alleged ceasefire violations by the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO as follows: 29; 23; and 27 for April, May and June, respectively. Most alleged violations were concentrated in the Greater Upper Nile region, especially Nasir, Longochuk, and Ulang Counties in Upper Nile State, and Akobo, Urur and Nyirol Counties in Jonglei State. In all CTSAMVM reports, there were no alleged or verified ceasefire violations by any forces affiliated with the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).

32. On 7th May 2026, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), General Santino Deng Wol, announced a unilateral ceasefire and ordered the SSPDF to remain in their positions and not to attack opposition forces. On 8th May 2026, the SPLM/A-IO, as represented by Rt Hon. Nathaniel Oyet, in a letter addressed to the RJMEC Chairperson, rejected the CDF's unilateral ceasefire, arguing that it was not negotiated or agreed through a political dialogue of the Parties. On 11th May 2026, Lt Gen Koang Gatkuoth Kerjok, SSPDF Acting Deputy Chief of Defence Forces and Acting Chief of General Staff for SPLA-IO forces, in reciprocation to the CDF's unilateral ceasefire, issued orders to SSPDF and Opposition forces to stop attacking each other, but to remain in their respective positions. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the continuation of fighting between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, the orders were not followed. Therefore, at the time of reporting, the status of the ceasefire could be described as partially respected in some parts of the country, but severely violated in Greater Upper Nile and Greater Equatoria regions as referenced above.
33. As reported in the previous quarter, CTSAMVM continued to work with only three (03) MVTs on the ground, which is extremely constraining given the size of the country, limited road infrastructure and climatic challenges. Despite these challenges, CTSAMVM continued to fulfil its mandate with continuous monitoring and verification of the parties' compliance with the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements. During the reporting period, CTSAMVM submitted a total of 14 reports⁵ to the RJMEC

⁵ The 14 violation reports are as follows:

1. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/01: *Alleged Killing of Two Girls (Mundari Community), Central Equatoria State (CES).*
2. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/02: *Armed Clashes at Athony Checkpoint, Warrap State.*
3. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/03: *Armed Confrontation and Civilian Abuses, Jur River County, Western Bahr El Ghazal State (WBEGS).*
4. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/04: *Detention, Property Destruction, and Displacement, Nagero County, Western Equatoria State (WES).*
5. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/05: *Clashes and Insecurity along Yei-Morobo-Kaya Corridor, Central Equatoria State (CES).*
6. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/06: *Widespread Violations and Insecurity, Tambur County.*
7. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/07: *Structural Insecurity in Maridi – Greater Mundri Corridor.*
8. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/08: *Illegal Checkpoints and Riverine Attack, Upper Nile State.*
9. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/09: *Alleged Killing of Civilians in Pankur, Ayod County, Jonglei State Between 21-23 February 2026*
10. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/10: *Alleged Attack on Abeimnom County Headquarters Resulting in over 160 Civilian Fatalities, Including the County Commissioner and Executive Director*

and IGAD Secretariat, which the RJMEC subsequently submitted to the Chairperson of the Joint Defence Board (JDB) and RJMEC Party Representatives for accountability purposes.

34. On the status of Security Mechanisms, the JDB, the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) remained non-operational due to the political and security crisis following the arrest of the SPLM/A- IO Chairman, Dr Riek Machar Teny and senior SPLA-IO officers. The DDR Commission and the SDSR Board remained non-functional as well, due to the challenging security and political situation.

Transitional Security Arrangements

35. As a consequence of the Parties' failure to fully implement the Permanent Ceasefire, Transitional Security Arrangements, including the cantonment and barracking of forces, selection, training, and the final unification and deployment of forces have stalled. The DDR process remained unimplemented, and SDSR Board policy documents have not yet been reviewed by the leaders of the signatory Parties.

Chapter 3: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

Humanitarian Status

36. During the second quarter, humanitarian and recovery efforts remained constrained by renewed insecurity, political tensions, and inadequate funding. Overall, implementation was characterized by the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance with little progress in reconstruction and durable solutions.

Humanitarian Assistance

37. Despite operational constraints, humanitarian organizations continued to provide emergency food assistance, health services, nutrition support, water, sanitation, and protection services to conflict-affected populations. However, access to vulnerable communities was frequently disrupted by insecurity and logistical challenges.

11. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/11: *Reported Clashes Between SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO in Bazia Payam, Western Bahr El Ghazal State (WBGs), on 08-09 April 2026.*

12. CTSAMVM Violation Report 2026/12: *The Alleged Arrest and Detentions of Wives and Relatives of SPLM/A-IO Commanders in Torit County on 14 March 2026.*

13. CTSAMVM Report 2026/13: *Aerial Bombardments in Civilian Populated Areas of Panyijiar County, Unity State (23-24 June and 6 July 2025): Pachenjock Payam and Kotlier Check Point Along the Nile River; and*

14. CTSAMVM Report 2026/14: *Alleged Attacks by SPLM/A-IO Forces and White Army on Ulang County Headquarters and SSPDF Positions, Ulang County, Upper Nile State, 21-24 February 2026.*

Protection of Civilians

38. Renewed clashes in several parts of the country, particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, resulted in fresh displacement, civilian casualties, and destruction of livelihoods, increasing humanitarian needs and limiting progress towards durable recovery.

Humanitarian Access

39. Humanitarian access deteriorated significantly due to escalating insecurity, administrative impediments, and logistical challenges. Humanitarian agencies reported restrictions on movement, insecurity along transport routes, and looting of humanitarian facilities in some areas, reducing the effectiveness of aid delivery, humanitarian response, protection, peacebuilding, and the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
40. Renewed fighting in parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity States significantly constrained humanitarian operations. Armed clashes, insecurity along transport routes, and the displacement of civilians forced several humanitarian organizations to suspend or scale back operations.
41. Humanitarian organizations reported delays in travel authorizations, restrictions on movement into conflict-affected areas, bureaucratic requirements that slowed emergency responses and occasional denials of access to communities requiring urgent assistance. These constraints compounded the impact of insecurity and delayed the delivery of lifesaving aid. Aid agencies also documented threats and intimidation of humanitarian personnel, looting of humanitarian supplies, destruction of health facilities and interference with medical evacuations, which heightened risks to civilians and humanitarian workers.

Food Security

42. During the reporting period, more than 7.8 million people were projected to face crisis or worse levels of food insecurity. One of the most serious incidents was reported in Nyatim in Jonglei State, where displaced civilians reportedly remained without humanitarian assistance after aid agencies were unable to obtain authorization to reach them. Reports described severe shortages of food and safe drinking water, while humanitarian organizations sounded warnings of preventable deaths.

Displacement Dynamics

43. Although stakeholders continued to advocate for the voluntary, safe, and dignified return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the prevailing insecurity impacted voluntary returns and undermined reconstruction efforts. During the quarter, renewed armed conflict, the continued impact of the conflict in Sudan, and protracted internal displacement continued to shape the displacement dynamics in South

Sudan. This led to increased humanitarian needs and challenges in the implementation of the peace process and preparations for elections.

44. The most significant new displacements occurred in Jonglei State, particularly in Akobo County, where months of armed violence triggered one of the country's largest recent displacement crises. Approximately 140,000 people were displaced in Akobo County, adding to the high protracted internal displacement figures. According to a joint UN and Government of South Sudan report, by June 2026, more than 2.5 million people were internally displaced, with nearly 964,000 in camps and displacement sites⁶. Many of these households have been displaced for several years, with limited prospects for durable solutions due to insecurity, flooding, and lack of basic services.
45. The conflict in Sudan continued to drive large cross-border movements. Since April 2023, more than 1.3 million refugees, returnees and asylum-seekers had crossed into South Sudan, exerting significant pressure on reception centres, and host communities, thereby straining already limited humanitarian resources. The situation was further aggravated by climate-related shocks and inadequate access to services.
46. Displacement heightened protection risks, including separation of families, increased exposure of women and girls to gender-based violence, child protection concerns, including interrupted education, limited access to healthcare, food, clean water, livelihoods, and greater vulnerability for older persons and persons with disabilities.
47. In light of these challenges, the electoral and constitution-making institutions need to adopt inclusive and conflict-sensitive planning approaches to ensure that internally displaced persons, returnees, refugees, and host communities are able to participate fully in constitution-making and electoral processes.
48. Furthermore, these dynamics highlight the urgent need for closer integration of humanitarian action, durable solutions, peacebuilding initiatives, and electoral and constitution-making support by all stakeholders.

Progress Against Gender Provisions

49. During this reporting period, progress on the gender provisions of the R-ARCSS was minimal, with most developments focused on protecting women and girls from the effects of conflict rather than advancing women's political participation or meeting the Agreement's gender commitments.
50. Humanitarian agencies, including UN partners, expanded programmes addressing gender-based violence (GBV). These included mobile GBV courts, psychosocial support, safe spaces for survivors, integration of GBV services into health care, awareness campaigns on GBV prevention and women's rights, and community dialogues to address harmful

⁶ UN and Government of South Sudan Press Release dated 16th June 2026.

social norms. Livelihood and economic empowerment initiatives for women also continued in some locations.

51. Despite these efforts, women's representation remained below the R-ARCSS requirement of at least 35% in the Executive, Legislature, and other decision-making bodies. Progress towards meeting the affirmative action target remained limited, with concerns that gains were being eroded through the replacement of women in leadership positions by men.
52. The deteriorating security environment exposed women and girls to heightened risks of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly in conflict-affected and displacement settings. Reports from the UN and its partners highlighted attacks during routine activities such as collecting firewood, fetching water, and travelling to markets, while GBV response services remained overstretched.
53. The scale of humanitarian needs exceeded available resources, limiting funding for gender focused programmes. This led to insufficient coverage of GBV services, while persistent social stigma continued to restrict survivors' access to justice, health care, and psychosocial support.

Gender Related Challenges

54. Women's participation and inclusion in social and political processes continue to be constrained by the combined effects of insecurity, displacement, humanitarian challenges, weak protection systems and structural gender inequalities. Ongoing conflict and displacement could limit women's participation and access to civic and voter education.
55. The disproportionate impact of food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and economic and institutional barriers continued to limit women's engagement in the constitution-making and electoral processes. Slow implementation of the R-ARCSS provisions on women's inclusion risks undermining the commitment to at least 35 percent representation in governance institutions, electoral management bodies, and political party leadership.
56. Addressing these concerns will require targeted measures such as enhanced protection for women, accessible gender-responsive civic and voter education, enforcement of measures against electoral violence targeting women, and stronger implementation of the R-ARCSS gender provisions.

Chapter 4: Resource Economic and Financial Management

Oil Production and Government Entitlements

57. Total production from DAR Blend and Nile Blend exceeded 170,000 barrels per day during the second and third quarters of FY 2025/26. Under the production-sharing agreements between the government and the joint oil operating companies, the government's entitlement is based on production volumes.

Government Share by Operator

- GPOC: 48% of 60,000 barrels per day.
- SPOC: 43% of 16,000 barrels per day.
- DAR: 44% of 100,750 barrels per day.

Deductions and Payments

58. These entitlements are reduced by 4,000 barrels per day for downstream oilfield facilities from both Nile Blend and DAR Blend. The Republic of South Sudan (RSS) also continues to pay Sudan 6,000 barrels per day from DAR Blend under the inland lifting programme through the Kosti power plant in Sudan.

Lifted Volumes and Pricing Challenges

59. The Government's entitlement for October 2025 to March 2026 was estimated at 7.9 million barrels of DAR Blend and 4.36 million barrels of Nile Blend. Sales trends indicate that crude oil was sold below market value.
60. The discount could reach as high as 16%, mainly due to government advances and UAE sanctions on crude exported from Sudan since 2023, which reduced the number of buyers. Shipments were also often classified as "distress cargo," exposing them to unexpected delivery complications, high interest rates, and demurrage charges imposed by Sudanese authorities at Port Sudan.
61. The Ministry of Finance and Planning issued a Ministerial Order establishing a high-level committee from the Ministries of Petroleum and Finance and Planning, together with the Bank of South Sudan, to review crude oil sales and marketing processes and promote transparency and accountability.
62. The reviewed legislations regulating the petroleum industry are yet to be enacted. These are the Petroleum Act 2012, which provides the regulatory framework for the development and management of petroleum activities in conformity with the national Constitution, and the Petroleum and Revenue Management Act 2012, which ensures ethical, efficient, transparent and accountable management of petroleum resources. The latter also creates reserve funds, namely the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and the

Future Generations Fund and supports entitlements to oil-producing states and communities.

Institutional Reforms

Bank of South Sudan (BoSS)

63. Under Article 4.2.2.2 of the R-ARCSS and the Bank of South Sudan Act, 2011, as amended in 2023, the Bank of South Sudan is mandated to formulate monetary policy, maintain price stability, issue currency, regulate the financial sector, and perform other functions assigned by law. It currently uses a monetary aggregate targeting regime anchored in a reserve money targeting framework, applying tools such as open market operations, foreign exchange interventions, the Term Deposit Facility, and reserve requirements to steer money supply toward non-inflationary output growth.
64. The Bank has, however, faced a liquidity crisis driven by macroeconomic shocks, including falling crude oil prices, trade disruptions, flooding, humanitarian pressures, and conflict. These challenges have been worsened by inadequate capitalization, with the Bank of South Sudan's capital still at its 2011 level despite expanded responsibilities; continued government reliance on central bank borrowing, which fuels inflation; leadership instability caused by frequent senior management changes; and a mismatch between the supply of banknotes and coins and the pace of economic growth.
65. The Bank of South Sudan therefore needs recapitalization, while the Government should enforce strict fiscal discipline, ensure timely budget preparation and execution, and introduce Treasury bills and bonds to replace direct borrowing from the Central Bank.

Public Financial Management

66. The R-ARCSS Chapter IV requires the RTGoNU to ensure that legal and institutional frameworks, policies, and procedures are fully functional to support sustainable development. With support from development partners, capacity-building activities are underway to strengthen these institutions and implement the required reforms.
67. In line with Article 4.3.1.6 of the R-ARCSS, which calls for stronger partnerships, coordination, and mutual accountability with development and humanitarian partners, the Ministry of Finance and Planning convened a dialogue with development partners through the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The dialogue focused on effective development cooperation and South Sudan's efforts to monitor development results. Through this process, the Ministry will be able to strengthen its institutional frameworks, improve aid alignment, and advance mutual accountability between the Government and its partners. This is expected to strengthen national budgeting and expenditure processes by prioritizing and tracking development outcomes.

68. To strengthen transparency and accountability in public financial management, the Ministry of Finance and Planning held a three-week Monitoring and Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) training. The training aimed to equip accountants with leadership skills in monitoring systems, standard operating procedures, public expenditure accountability, and the development of practical action plans to support monitoring reforms.
69. Since the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Authority was inaugurated in March 2023 under Article 4.6.1.1 of the R-ARCSS, the Government and its partners have worked to strengthen the public service's capacity to conduct procurement transparently. As part of these efforts, a workshop themed "Enhancing Beneficial Ownership Disclosure in Public Procurement Systems" was held in Juba, bringing together participants from the East African Community to discuss ways to improve South Sudan's public procurement system.
70. The President established, and the Council of Ministers endorsed, a nine-member Ministerial High-Level Committee on Economic Reforms to restore economic stability, strengthen public financial management, improve cash circulation, ensure regular and timely salary payments, and increase revenue collection. The Committee has prioritized enhanced revenue mobilization to enable the Government to implement its annual budget as approved by Parliament.

Chapter 5: Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing

71. On Transitional Justice, Accountability, Healing and Reconciliation, there have been some limited developments since the last quarter.
72. With respect to the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), the AUC Chairperson submitted to the RTGoNU the names of the six competitively selected nominees, as was required by section 10(5) of the CTRH Act. In line with both the R-ARCSS and the CTRH Act, the RTGoNU Executive must urgently select and approve three of the six non-South Sudanese nominees and transmit their names — together with the four South Sudanese nominees identified by the Selection Panel — to the TNLA for parliamentary vetting before presidential appointment.
73. On the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) establishment, its Board is yet to be constituted. Article 5.4.2.2 of the R-ARCSS and section 11 of the CRA Act provide the process of constituting the Board, which includes nominations of 17 persons by the following stakeholder groups:
 - a. seven (07) representatives from political parties in the RTGoNU;

- b. two (02) representatives from civil society organizations;
 - c. two (02) representatives from women groups;
 - d. two (02) representatives from faith-based leaders;
 - e. one (01) representative of youth;
 - f. one (01) representative of business community;
 - g. one (01) representative of traditional leaders; and
 - h. one (01) representative of persons with disabilities.
74. On the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS), there have been no new developments since the last quarter. The AUC is yet to share with RTGoNU guidelines on HCSS establishment.
75. A major challenge arising from the current political crisis was the increasingly contested legitimacy of the RTGoNU's composition. The unilateral removal of opposition representatives from both the Executive and Legislature might effectively exclude key R-ARCSS signatories from participating in critical decisions, particularly those related to the establishment of transitional justice institutions under Chapter V. Any decisions made by the RTGoNU in its present form regarding the design, membership, or operational framework of transitional justice mechanisms are potentially vulnerable to disputes by the excluded parties, who could argue that such decisions lack lawful representation and political consensus. This situation risks undermining the credibility of transitional justice bodies once established and could compromise their ability to fulfil core objectives such as truth-seeking, national reconciliation, and healing.

Chapter 6: Parameters of Permanent Constitution

76. In terms of the permanent constitution-making process, some progress was made during this reporting period. The reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (R-NCRC), supported by various partners, UN agencies and government at national and state levels, completed the first phase of civic education and public consultation campaigns in all the ten (10) States and three (03) Administrative Areas. This follows the public launch of civic education and public consultation in Juba on the 27th March 2025.
77. From 15th – 20th June 2026, the NCRC launched and commenced civic education and public consultation with national institutions and key stakeholders at the national level. The five-day event drew participants from the judiciary, legislature, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and various national-level organisations such as the Bar Association, FIDA, Women groups, Media and academia etc. Further civic education and public consultations engagements are planned with the armed forces, police and security agencies, as well as refugees, IDPs and returnees.

78. After conclusion of civic education and public consultations at national level, the NCRC will embark on analysing and drafting its reports as it awaits funding to recruit the Constitution-Drafting Committee (CDC). According to the Commission, advertisement for the CDC was completed a few months ago, and several applications have been received awaiting shortlisting, interviews and recruitment. The Commission is waiting for funding guarantees from the RTGoNU to make progress in this regard.
79. Still pending are the recruitment of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) to draft the constitutional text, formation of the Preparatory Sub-Committee (PSC) for the convening of the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), adoption of the constitution by the national constitutional conference, and transformation of the TNLA into a Constituent Assembly to ratify the constitution.

Chapter 7: Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

80. Pursuant to its mandate, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) continued to perform its mandate throughout the quarter. RJMEC continued to enhance its high-level diplomatic engagements on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS with various stakeholders, including members of the Presidency, Executive, Legislature, Parties to the R-ARCSS, RJMEC members, Agreement institutions and Mechanisms, regional guarantors, H.E. Jakaya Kikwete, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, and the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, including during his high-level diplomatic missions to South Sudan. The engagements were aimed at exploring ways of addressing the ongoing political and security impasse in the country through all-inclusive dialogue.
81. Furthermore, the RJMEC briefed the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) delegation while on a mission in Juba to engage the RTGoNU and various stakeholders on the peace process, including the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS. The Commission recommended that the Council considers, among others, the following: prevailing upon the South Sudanese authorities and all the Parties to the Agreement to immediately halt hostilities, de-escalate tensions, restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and recommit to the full implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit; urging the RTGoNU to abandon the push to amend the R-ARCSS, without due process, and to engage in inclusive consultations and build consensus with all signatory Parties, stakeholders, and guarantors pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS; pursuant to the AU C5 Plus Declaration, that the Council considers mobilising the requisite regional and international support to the appointed AU High Representative to the Horn of African and the Red Sea to expedite the convening of an all-inclusive South Sudanese dialogue to reach consensus on the nature, sequencing, and modalities of conduct the elections.

82. Subsequently, in its communique of 30th April 2026, the AUPSC guided that any amendment to the R-ARCSS should follow due process as per the R-ARCSS and that the RJMEC, in consultation with RTGoNU, should coordinate with the IGAD Secretariat to ensure the urgent convening of an extraordinary IGAD Ministerial meeting to provide guidance on the way forward. Pursuant to this guidance, RJMEC wrote a letter to the IGAD Executive Secretary, drawing his attention to this AUPSC's decision and requesting the Executive Secretary to engage the IGAD leadership to convene this urgent IGAD ministerial meeting on the situation in South Sudan.

Proposed amendment to the R-ARCSS

83. Regarding the RTGoNU's proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS of 2018, a few significant developments took place. Although RJMEC was still awaiting an official response from the RTGoNU to the recommendations it submitted on 26th February 2026 following consultations with its members, reports indicated that the RTGoNU Council of Ministers had decided to withdraw the two controversial proposed amendments to Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the R-ARCSS. This Cabinet decision has, however, not yet been officially communicated to RJMEC for its consideration and action going forward.
84. Prior to the aforementioned Council of Ministers' decision, the RJMEC had provided detailed briefings to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly pursuant to Article 7.9 of the R-ARCSS, on 20th April and 20th May 2026 on its quarterly reports covering the 4th quarter of 2025 and the 1st quarter of 2026 respectively, and guided the House members on legal ramifications of the proposed amendments and proper procedure for its amendment.
85. During the briefings, RJMEC underscored, among others, the need for the TNLA to continue exercising an enhanced oversight role to ensure that any proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS, particularly those relating to elections, are subjected to broad, inclusive consultation involving all signatory Parties, stakeholders, and guarantors. In that regard, the TNLA was urged to guard against unilateral actions that violate the R-ARCSS or risk undermining its integrity and core commitments.
86. Further, RJMEC reiterated its call to the TNLA to ensure that all proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS strictly adhere to the procedures set out in the Agreement and are undertaken through consensus-based consultations among all signatory parties and the Guarantors; support an all-inclusive political dialogue aimed at de-escalating tensions and addressing the prevailing political impasse in line with the recent AU C5 Plus Declaration; and to prioritise the passage of elections-related legislation and ensure adequate budgetary allocations to the National Elections Commission to enable timely and credible preparations for the December 2026 elections.
87. Additionally, the Commission appealed for enhanced TNLA's oversight role in relation to the protection of civilians and humanitarian access, including through regular hearings and engagements with relevant ministries and humanitarian actors, to ensure that

legislative action supports improved humanitarian conditions; and expedite the enactment of the NGO Amendment Bill to create the necessary civic and political space needed for the conduct of elections.

III. Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations

88. The reporting period was characterized by a combination of limited institutional progress amidst political, security, humanitarian and economic challenges that continued to impact implementation of the R-ARCSS. While some transitional institutions remained operational and a number of important activities were undertaken, particularly in electoral preparations, political party registration, public financial management, and the permanent constitution-making process, the overall pace of implementation remained insufficient in light of the rapidly approaching elections scheduled for 22nd December 2026.
89. A key observation is that the political environment did not improve during the quarter, largely as a result of the continued unilateralism, security and political impasse between the Parties to the Agreement, which contributed to a decline in trust and confidence among the Parties, which weakened the spirit of cooperative governance envisaged under the Agreement and has negatively affected responsibility-sharing arrangements and consensus-based decision-making.
90. Particularly concerning was the controversy surrounding the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS. Even though the RTGoNU subsequently agreed with RJMEC's guidance on the implications of the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS and dropped amendments to Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the R-ARCSS, the decision to proceed with the amendment without the prior consent of the RJMEC, as provided for under Article 8.4 of the Agreement, flouted due process and generated significant tensions among the Parties and stakeholders. This development highlighted the broader challenge of maintaining adherence to due process under the law and respect for agreed implementation mechanisms and underscored the need for all Parties to uphold both the letter and spirit of the Agreement.
91. Against the backdrop of the aforementioned, there is an urgent need for an inclusive political dialogue to de-escalate tensions and restore trust among the Parties and chart the way forward for a smooth conclusion of the transitional period. Such dialogue should be undertaken in line with the AU C5 Plus Declaration and subsequent recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council, which called for broad-based consultations to address the political impasse and build consensus on the conduct of the transition and the forthcoming elections. Given the widening divisions among political actors and growing uncertainty surrounding the implementation process, dialogue remains the most

viable mechanism for restoring political confidence and preserving the gains made under the peace agreement.

92. The report also demonstrates that although preparations for elections have continued to be undertaken, major outstanding issues remain unresolved. Critical prerequisites for credible, peaceful, and inclusive elections remain outstanding. These include, among others, unresolved legal questions, incomplete Transitional Security Arrangements, uncertainty regarding political inclusivity, continued displacement of citizens, restrictions on civic and political space, and inadequate funding for electoral preparations.
93. The report also observes that the slow implementation of Chapter III of the R-ARCSS could have a direct and destabilizing impact on the credibility and inclusivity of the anticipated elections in South Sudan as millions of citizens remain displaced, lack documentation, or live in areas without basic infrastructure and services.
94. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation poses a serious threat to the inclusiveness, credibility, and legitimacy of South Sudan's electoral process, particularly in parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity States.
95. Continued insecurity, displacement, lack of basic services, and restrictions on freedom of movement are also likely to impact the prospect of participation of the affected populations, particularly women, youth, and persons with disabilities in electoral processes, including political campaigns, voter education, and elections.
96. A major concern is the limited time remaining before the scheduled elections. With barely six months left before the announced polling day, there is a narrowing window within which to address critical electoral benchmarks and outstanding provisions of the R-ARCSS, including timely availability of the requisite resources to the implementing institutions and mechanisms. The lack of progress in key areas raises serious questions regarding readiness for elections, and further delays in resolving these issues may affect the credibility, inclusivity, and legitimacy of the electoral process and could become a source of future contestation.
97. Furthermore, it is observed that the unresolved dispute within the SPLM/A-IO party could negatively impact implementation of critical benchmarks of the peace process, particularly those related to the completion of unification of forces, inclusive political dialogue, responsibility-sharing arrangements among the signatory parties to the R-ARCSS, and preparations for elections.

Recommendations

98. In light of the above, the following measures are proposed for consideration by the Parties to the Agreement and relevant stakeholders, including the Executive of the RTGoNU, TNL, IGAD, the African Union, and the International Partners and Friends of South

Sudan, to reinforce adherence to the R-ARCSS, mitigate the risk of renewed conflict, and support the timely conduct of elections at the end of December 2026:

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- immediately cease hostile rhetoric, halt all military confrontations, recommit to full implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit;
- adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire, prioritize completion of Transitional Security Arrangements and support the reactivation of all Security Mechanisms;
- refrain from unilateral actions that undermine responsibility-sharing arrangements and consensus-based decision-making under the Agreement;
- embrace an all-inclusive political dialogue on unresolved political and security-related issues as recommended by the AU C5 Plus Declaration;
- ensure meaningful participation of women, youth, displaced populations, and other vulnerable groups in political and electoral processes; and
- To safeguard the legitimacy of transitional justice institutions and ensure compliance with the R-ARCSS, the Parties to the RTGoNU should urgently restore inclusive political participation by reinstating, consulting, or formally engaging all parties originally signatory to the peace agreement in decision-making processes.

b. To the Executive of the RTGoNU:

- fully recommit to the implementation of the R-ARCSS in both letter and spirit and take urgent steps to restore trust and confidence among the Parties;
- support the urgent convening of an all-inclusive and meaningful political dialogue, consistent with the AU C5 Plus Declaration aimed at resolving the prevailing political impasse, restoring consensus among the Parties, and reaching agreement on the peaceful and democratic conclusion of the transitional period;
- ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the R-ARCSS, and reverse unilateral decisions that undermine the integrity of the peace process;
- urgently engage in dialogue to address all pending elections-related concerns, including legal, political, security, logistical, and operational requirements necessary for the conduct of credible, peaceful, and inclusive elections;
- expedite the provision of adequate and predictable funding to all relevant Agreement Institutions and Mechanisms to enable timely implementation of their respective mandates;
- fast-track implementation of Transitional Security Arrangements, including cantonment, training, redeployment, and unification of forces;

- remove impediments to humanitarian access and ensure the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and assets;
- accelerate the implementation of the durable solution framework and fund reconstruction efforts;
- take immediate measures to achieve the minimum threshold of 35 percent women's representation across all institutions and electoral processes;
- accelerate implementation of return, reintegration, recovery, and reconstruction programmes for displaced populations; and
- approve seven nominees to be CTRH Commissioners as required by the CTRH Act and submit their names to the TNLA for parliamentary vetting.

c. To the TNL:

- continue exercising enhanced oversight of the implementation of the R-ARCSS through legislative actions that support implementation of the Agreement;
- ensure that all amendments to the R-ARCSS are initiated through inclusive, consensus-based consultations involving all signatory Parties, pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS;
- prioritize the enactment of all outstanding Agreement-related legislation, including the NGO Amendment Bill, Petroleum Bills, and other pending reforms, including reconsideration of the NSS Act;
- ensure timely approval of adequate budgetary allocations and disbursements for the implementation of the Agreement;
- exercise oversight regarding protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and the preparation for the conduct of elections; and,
- promote legislative measures that protect and advance women's political participation in line with the 35 percent affirmative action requirement.

d. To IGAD:

- provide guidance on the way forward regarding the recent amendment to the R-ARCSS;
- intensify high-level engagements with the AU C5 to ensure the realisation of the outcomes of the AU C5 Plus Declaration; and
- mobilize political and logistical support from the region and international partners for the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

e. To the African Union:

- continue supporting implementation of the AU C5 Plus Declaration and facilitate the convening of an inclusive and meaningful South Sudanese political dialogue;
- mobilize regional and international support towards resolving the current political impasse and restoring full adherence to and implementation of the R-ARCSS;
- expedite support for transitional justice mechanisms, including the submission of guidelines to the RTGoNU for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan;
- continue engaging the Parties to promote adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and recommitment to full implementation of the R-ARCSS; and,
- support efforts aimed at ensuring peaceful, inclusive, and credible elections consistent with the provisions of the R-ARCSS.

f. To the United Nations:

- continue supporting the full implementation of the R-ARCSS through sustained political engagement, good offices, technical assistance, and coordination with regional and international stakeholders;
- support the implementation of the R-ARCSS, the AU C5 Plus Declaration by working closely with the African Union, IGAD, RJMEC, and the Parties to facilitate an inclusive South Sudanese political dialogue;
- assist the Parties to de-escalate tensions, restore trust among the Parties, and build consensus on the completion of the transition and the conduct of peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections;
- enhance technical and operational support to electoral institutions, particularly the NEC and PPC, including voter and civic education, electoral logistics, participation of women and youth, and measures to promote peaceful elections;
- continue supporting the permanent constitution-making process, including resource mobilization and technical assistance for the reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) once established; and
- strengthen support for transitional justice, reconciliation, and social cohesion initiatives, including the establishment and operationalization of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), and initiatives that promote national healing, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- continue supporting implementation of the R-ARCSS through sustained political engagement and coordinated diplomatic efforts;
- support the convening of the proposed AU C5 Plus inclusive South Sudanese political dialogue aimed at resolving the current impasse and building consensus on the peaceful and democratic conclusion of the transitional period;
- continue providing technical support for election preparations, particularly civic and voter education, electoral operations, inclusion of displaced populations, women and youth participation;
- enhance support for humanitarian operations, recovery programmes, food security interventions, and durable solutions for displaced populations;
- provide targeted support for implementation of the R-ARCSS through supporting institution-building, economic governance reforms, and public financial management initiatives that strengthen state capacity and accountability; and,
- enhance support for initiatives promoting civic space, human rights, gender equality, transitional justice and inclusive political participation in the lead-up to the December 2026 elections.

IV. CONCLUSION

99. Overall, the reporting period demonstrates that implementation of the R-ARCSS is at a critical juncture where technical and administrative efforts alone are insufficient to overcome the prevailing political and security challenges. While the institutions of the transition remain formally operational and some progress has been recorded in electoral preparations, political party registration, economic reforms, and the permanent constitution-making process, these gains were outweighed by continued insecurity, humanitarian deterioration, and the slow pace of implementation of key transitional benchmarks. Notwithstanding the challenges, some institutions tasked with implementing the Agreement remain capable of delivering results when provided with adequate political support and resources. Progress by the PPC, NEC, and NCRC illustrates that implementation remains possible where institutional commitment, political space, and resources are available.

100. What is fundamentally required is a renewed political consensus among the Parties regarding the implementation of the R-ARCSS and the conduct of the elections. In this regard, the AU C5 Plus Declaration and subsequent decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council provide an important framework for addressing the current impasse through an inclusive South Sudanese-led dialogue. Such a dialogue is essential to de-

escalate tensions, rebuild trust, clarify outstanding election-related issues, and forge consensus on the sequencing and modalities for concluding the transition.

101. In accordance with Chapter VII of the R-ARCSS, the RJMEC reaffirms its commitment to continue monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS. As circumstances require, it will continue to assist the parties to break any deadlock that may arise during the implementation of the Agreement. It will continue to regularly provide reports and briefings to the Executive of the RTGoNU, the reconstituted TNLA, the Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations.
102. Finally, RJMEC reiterates its continued commitment to supporting the Parties to the R-ARCSS and accompanying the peace process in accordance with its mandate, and appeals to all peace stakeholders to work collectively towards lasting peace, stability, and successful completion of the transition in South Sudan.

END